The missing link : fiscal sustainability analysis in South Africa by Ganyaupfu, Elvis Munyaradzi
 THE MISSING LINK: FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
ELVIS MUNYARADZI GANYAUPFU 
 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF COMMERCE 
 
in the subject 
 
ECONOMICS 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
Supervisor: PROFESSOR Z ROBINSON 
 
 
 
NOVEMBER, 2017 
 
 
 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined whether South African government reacted to its debt positions 
in a sustainable manner during the period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. Estimation 
of the fiscal reaction function was conducted by integrating the exogenous short-run 
impact of monetary policy stance on both primary balance and public debt positions. 
The VEC model approach was applied to estimate the fiscal reaction function. Results 
indicate that fiscal policy in South Africa was sustainable during the respective sample 
period while monetary policy stance had statistically significant impacts on both 
primary balance and public debt positions. The significant impacts of monetary policy 
stance on primary balance and public debt show that monetary policy contributes to 
ensuring fiscal sustainability in South Africa, hence government needs to harmonize 
monetary efforts in managing public debt. The estimated impact of the business cycle 
on primary balance positions indicate that fiscal policy was countercyclical in nature. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The major constraints encountered by fiscal policies in numerous economies include 
budget deficits financing, rising public debt levels, and fiscal risks emanating from 
numerous frontiers. The prime sources of fiscal risks include political instability, weak 
domestic and global output growth, unpredictable capital markets financing conditions, 
local labour market unrests, exchange rates volatility, and persistent fluctuations in 
commodity prices. Like many other countries in the world, the South African economy 
is likely to continue remaining vulnerable to fiscal pressures in the medium to long-run 
period due to several factors. The dominant factors putting pressure on the fiscus 
include constrained financial positions of the country’s state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and constantly rising demand for sustainable healthcare financing required to meet 
the goal of universal health coverage (UHC) and fighting against HIV epidemic.  
 
In order to maintain public debt on a sustainable path and simultaneously stimulate 
economic growth, the role played by monetary policy remains critical towards ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and creation of employment opportunities. In addition, the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy instruments cannot be realised exclusively autonomous 
from monetary policy. Hence, harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies remains 
critical towards ensuring fiscal policy sustainability. Given that output growth and 
macroeconomic stability are the common goals of fiscal and monetary policies, policy 
stances taken by monetary authorities affect the general price level in the economy 
and the country’s fiscal positions via public borrowing and debt servicing costs.   
 
1.2. Context and Background  
The manner in which government conducts fiscal policy in an economy plays a key 
role towards achievement of the broad macroeconomic policy objectives. Since the 
global economic and financial crisis during 2008/09, the South African economy has 
experienced prolonged unpredicted fiscal deterioration that has rendered the country 
into serious challenges that have further adversely affected the level and composition 
of public debt (Magubu, Maisonnave, Chitiga, and Decaluwé, 2015).  
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The country’s public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio sizably increased 
from 26.5% in 2008 to 47.1% in 2014 (SARB, 2017). While the total balance of public 
debt in the domestic bond market remains high, the interest payable on government 
debt remains one of the significant items of annual government expenditure in an 
environment characterised by remarkably low interest rates (Magubu, et al., 2015). 
Subsequent to the global economic crisis in 2008, South Africa’s real GDP growth 
plunged from 3.6% in 2008 to -1.7% in 2009 before recovery to 2.9% in 2010, and 
decline to 1.2% in 2015 (Intenational Monetary Fund (IMF), 2017). Sluggish growth in 
the country’s output was attributed to persistent labour market disruptions mainly in 
the mining, agriculture and manufacturing sectors, declining business and consumer 
confidence and weak growth in the nation’s major European and North American 
trading partners (Kumo, Rielander and Omilola, 2014).  
 
The domestic bond market remained as the primary source of new financing, providing 
about 70% of the annual requirement (Magubu, et al., 2015). Since the 2008/09 global 
financial crisis, monetary policy in South Africa has retained interest rates low to 
support fiscal policy towards improving weak domestic aggregate demand and 
negative output gap in the economy (FFC, 2014). Based on the primary balance-to-
GDP ratio, South Africa’s fiscal position after the global economic crisis remained 
depressed with an average of -1.8%. Therefore, the ratio of public debt to GDP has 
been consistently rising over the period 1998 quarter 2 to 2016 quarter 3.  
 
Figure 1: Public Debt-to-GDP ratio and Primary Balance-to-GDP ratio 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2017) 
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With particular focus on the post-apartheid epoch, Figure 1 shows that South Africa 
experienced gradual declines in public debt-to-GDP ratio from 46.7% in 1997 quarter 
4 to an all-time low record of about 22.2% in 2008 quarter 4. During the respective 
period, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio improved from 3% in 1997 quarter 4 to an 
all-time high record of 6% in 2001 quarter 4. Between 2002 quarter 4 and 2008 quarter 
4, the country’s fiscus recorded an average primary surplus-to-GDP ratio of 3.6%. 
Subsequently, the country’s primary balance positions during 2009 quarter 4 and 2010 
quarter 4 recorded primary deficits of -3.1% and -2.7% respectively. During the period 
2011 quarter 4 to 2016 quarter 3, the fiscal position remained very weak, recording an 
average primary balance-to-GDP ratio of -1.3%. Conversely, public debt-to-GDP ratio 
continuously increased from 22.2% during 2008 quarter 4 to 46 % in 2016 quarter 3.  
 
Figure 2: Central Bank Policy Rate and Real GDP Growth 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2017) 
 
With regards to the central bank policy-related interest rate and real output growth, 
Figure 2 shows that the interest rate generally declined from 19.3% in 1998 quarter 4 
to 9.5% in 2001 quarter 4. In addition, real output growth remained positive in the 
range 0.1% to 3.9% during the same period. Moreover, output growth was moderately 
volatile over the period 2002 quarter 4 to 2016 quarter 4, with a decline in real GDP of 
-1% being recorded in 2009 quarter 4 adjacent to recovery. Therefore, the central bank 
policy rate was moderately stable during the period 2010 quarter 4 to 2013 quarter 4 
in the range 5.0% to 5.5% and subsequently increased to 5.75% in 2014 quarter 4 and 
7% in 2016 quarter 4.   
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1.3. Problem Statement 
Despite the efforts from both fiscal and monetary authorities to stimulate the economy, 
fiscal space in the economy has largely remained narrowed. Although the South 
African economy’s total net debt-to-GDP ratio has remained below the 50% notch 
since 1998, the ratio has been rising from 22.2% in 2008 to 45.3% in 2016 on an 
annual basis. Congruently, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio has remained in the 
negative territory, recording -2.4% in 2009, -2.6% in 2012 and -1% in 2016 (SARB, 
2017). Such fiscal developments have caused unremitting setbacks on growth 
prospects of the economy. Although public borrowing is inevitable and interest rates 
remaining lower on public borrowing, the consistently rising public debt-to-GDP ratio 
causes substantial negative impacts on economic growth in the country.  
 
The gap noted in previous studies on fiscal sustainability analysis in South Africa is 
that fiscal policy was regarded as a fiscal issue purely exclusive from monetary policy, 
while monetary policy affects sustainability of fiscal policy through several channels 
which include public borrowing costs and seigniorage. Dahan (1998) highlights that a 
monetary policy stance has several channels through which it certainly affects budget 
deficit and government debt trajectories in the short-run. In respect of empirical studies 
conducted to assess fiscal sustainability in South Africa, none of the studies to date 
considered and examined the potential impact of the central bank’s monetary policy 
stance on primary balance and/or public debt developments in the country.    
 
1.4 Aim of the Study  
The primary aim of this research study was to explore and empirically validate the link 
between fiscal and monetary policies in examining fiscal sustainability in South Africa.     
 
1.5. Research Objectives 
 To examine whether fiscal policy in South Africa was historically sustainable 
during the sample period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. 
 To examine the exogenous short-run impact of monetary policy stance on 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 To determine the impact of a one standard innovation in primary balance-to-
GDP ratio on itself and on public debt-to-GDP ratio in the system.   
 To determine the impact of a one standard innovation in public debt-to-GDP 
ratio on itself and on primary balance-to-GDP ratio.    
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1.6. Research Questions 
 Was fiscal policy in the South African economy historically sustainable during 
the sample period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2? 
 What was the exogenous short-run impact of monetary policy stance on primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio and on public debt-to-GDP ratio? 
 What was impact of a one standard innovation in primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
on itself and public debt-to-GDP ratio? 
 What was the impact of a one standard innovation in public debt-to-GDP ratio 
on itself and on primary balance-to-GDP ratio?  
 
1.7. Research Hypotheses 
 Fiscal policy in South Africa was historically sustainable during the sample 
period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. 
 Monetary policy stance had short-run significant positive impact on primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio and significant negative impact public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 A one standard innovation in primary balance-to-GDP ratio had significant 
negative impacts on itself as well as on public debt-to-GDP ratio.   
 A one standard innovation in public debt-to-GDP ratio had significant positive 
impacts on itself and on primary balance-to-GDP ratio. 
 
1.8. Scope and Delimitation 
This study integrated the impact of monetary policy stance on examination of fiscal 
policy sustainability in South Africa. Given that the South African government started 
publishing primary balance data in the late 1990s in the Budget Review, the sample 
period was restricted to the period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. In light of such 
background, the empirical validity of econometric estimations derived from this study 
remains relevant to the historical fiscal behaviour of the South African government 
precisely for the sample period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. Therefore, empirical 
findings on the historical fiscal behaviour of the South African government reported in 
this research study cannot be generalised and applied further to other time horizons 
outside the sample period covered in this research study.     
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1.9. Format of the Study 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
This chapter provides the introduction and background to the study, research problem, 
aim of the study, research objectives, research questions, research hypotheses, 
significance of the study, scope and delimitation, and format of the research study.  
 
Chapter 2: The South African Fiscal Governance   
The governance of the South African fiscal system is discussed in this chapter. The 
principal elements of the fiscal governance discussed include the Inter-Governmental 
Fiscal Relations Framework, fiscal management mechanisms, medium term planning 
framework, budget process, fiscal oversight and fiscal risks.     
    
Chapter 3: The South African Fiscal Framework 
This chapter discusses the fiscal framework of the South African economy in terms of 
the medium-term to long-run trajectories in the broad budgetary aggregates of national 
government total tax and non-tax revenues, government expenditure, government 
debt, and fiscal balances. The fiscal risks framework is finally discussed with regards 
to their diverse sources of such fiscal risks, their relevant significances, disclosure and 
management in context of the South African economy.   
 
Chapter 4:  Theoretical Framework 
This chapter defines fiscal policy sustainability and discusses a theoretical framework 
comprising analytical methods applied in conducting fiscal sustainability analysis. The 
conceptual approaches discussed in the research study include the static budget 
constraint, government lifetime budget constraint, present value budget constraint, 
fiscal stance index, and regime-switching model-based sustainability test.  
 
Chapter 5: Empirical Literature Review  
This chapter discusses empirical findings on fiscal sustainability based on empirical 
literature survey conducted on countries in different continents. In particular, the 
continents and countries studied include Europe, America, Asia, Africa, mixed-group 
of countries and South Africa. Lastly, the chapter explores the research gap relating 
to the missing link between fiscal policy and monetary policy overlooked by previous 
empirical studies on fiscal sustainability conducted in South Africa.  
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Chapter 6: Methodology and Estimation Technique  
This chapter first discusses the data used in the study and sources from which the 
data were obtained. The chapter further discusses the methodological procedure as 
well as estimation technique applied in empirical estimation of the results. The 
methodological procedure and estimation process are discussed within the framework 
of econometric modelling of time-series data based on univariate and multivariate 
approaches.  
 
Chapter 7: Results and Analysis 
Empirical findings of the research study are presented in this chapter. The analysis 
and interpretation of the results was conducted in line with the aim of the study and 
research objectives specified in the first chapter. The results discussed cover the time 
series properties of the data in terms of stationarity and cointegration, and findings 
from the empirical analysis of fiscal policy sustainability in South Africa.    
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter provides a summary of the whole study in terms of the aim of the study, 
research objectives, methodological procedure, estimation technique, and the major 
findings. Some policy implications are discussed, followed by some major limitations 
of the study, and ultimately recommendations for further studies.  
 
1.10. Conclusion  
This chapter provided the introduction and background to the study. The background 
briefly discussed developments in the country’s fiscal positions around public debt and 
primary balance, together with developments in central bank policy interest rate and 
real output growth. The primary aim of the study was further provided together with 
research objectives, research questions, research hypotheses, scope and delimitation 
of the study, and format of the main research study.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FISCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the governance of the South African fiscal system. The major 
elements discussed are the Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations Framework, fiscal 
management mechanisms, the medium term planning framework, budget process, 
fiscal oversight, and fiscal rules. Prior to discussing fiscal elements identified herein, 
a simplified version of the fiscal governance ecosystem is depicted by Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Fiscal Governance Ecosystem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation  
             
2.2. Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations (IGFR) Framework 
South African government has a decentralised fiscal governance model that promotes 
effective cooperative decision-making among national, provincial and local spheres of 
government. The three government spheres are autonomous, distinctive, interrelated 
and interdependent in decision making, and coordinate budgets and policies on 
socioeconomic functions that apply to all the three spheres of government. The South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) officially represents local government 
sphere in the National Council of Provinces (NCP), as well as in provincial and national 
assemblies that deliberate on decisions around programmes and policies.  
 
The Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations Act, No. 97 of 1997 postulates “promotion of 
cooperation between the national, provincial and local spheres of government on 
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fiscal, budgetary and financial matters, and prescribes a process for the determination 
of equitable sharing and allocation of revenue raised nationally”. Section 2 subsections 
1 and 2 of the IGFR Act stipulate the establishment of a Budget Council that consists 
of the Minister of Finance, who serves as Chairperson of the Council, and Member of 
Executive Council (MEC) for finance of each province. Section 3(a) stipulates that the 
Budget Council is the “body in which national government and provincial governments 
consult on any fiscal, budgetary or financial matters affecting the provincial sphere of 
government”. Section 4(1) obliges the Minister of Finance to convene meetings of the 
Budget Council at least twice in each financial year. Section 4(2) (a) stipulates that the 
Chairperson of the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) may attend the meetings, 
or a delegation of the FFC nominated by the Chairperson of the FFC, and any other 
persons invited (subsection b).   
    
Section 5(1) provides for the establishment of a Local Government Budget Forum 
(LGBF), which consists of the “Minister of Finance, the MEC for finance of each 
province, five representatives selected by the national organisation recognised in 
terms of the Organised Local Government Act, 1997, and one representative 
nominated by each provincial organisation recognised in terms of that Act”. Section 6 
stipulates that the Budget Forum, chaired by Minister of Finance, has a constitutional 
mandate to serve as a “body through which national government, provincial 
governments and organised local government consult on any fiscal, budgetary or 
financial matter affecting the local government sphere (section 6(a)) and any matter 
concerning financial management, or monitoring of the finances of local government 
sphere (section 6(c)). Section 7(1) obliges Minister of Finance to convene meetings of 
the Budget Forum, for which the forum must meet at least once in each financial year. 
Subsection 2 paragraphs (a) and (b) make provision for attendance of meetings by 
Chairperson of the FFC, or a delegation of the FFC selected by the Chairperson of the 
FFC (paragraph “a”), and any other persons invited (paragraph “b”).   
 
Section 8 of the IGFR Act, 1997 establishes the process for the sharing of revenue 
raised nationally among national, provincial and local government spheres in line with 
section 214(1)(a) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996. The latter 
provides for equitable division of nationally raised revenue among three spheres of 
government. Section 9(1)(a) of the IGFR Act stipulates that the FFC must submit its 
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recommendations for the forthcoming financial year regarding equitable division of 
nationally raised revenue among three spheres of government to the Houses of 
Parliament and provincial legislatures and to the Minister of Finance. This should be 
done within a period of at least 10 months or a later date agreed upon between the 
Minister of Finance and the FFC before commencement of each financial year. 
 
When making its recommendations, the FFC is required by section 9(3) of the IGFR 
Act to take into consideration the matters listed in section 214(2) (a) to (j) of the 
Constitution. The matters listed include the following:  
 Interest of the nation.  
 National debt and other obligations.  
 Needs and interests the national government determined by objective criteria. 
 Fiscal capacity and efficiency of provinces and municipalities.  
 The need to ensure ability of provinces and municipalities to provide basic 
services and discharge functions allocated to them.  
 Economic disparities within a province and among provinces.  
 The need to ensure stable and predictable allocations of revenue sharing.  
 
In terms of section 10(1) of the IGRF Act, the Minister of Finance introduces a Division 
of Revenue Bill, concurrent with the Annual Budget for the relevant financial year to 
the National Assembly. The Division of Revenue Bill specifies the share for each 
government sphere of the nationally raised revenue for the relevant financial year 
(section 10 subsection 2(a)).  
 
2.3. Fiscal Management Mechanism 
The fiscal management mechanism in South Africa is anchored on the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA), Division of Revenue raised nationally, and inputs of the 
FFC on financial and fiscal matters of government spheres.    
 
2.3.1. Public Finance Management  
The PFMA, No. 1 of 1999 is the central legislation for fiscal management in South 
Africa. Public finance management refers to a set of statutes, systems and processes 
used by the government of a sovereign nation to mobilise revenues, allocate public 
funds among competing priorities, spend allocated funds, control expenditures, and 
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account for funds spent. The Act (as amended) was commenced in 2000 to regulate 
management of public finances in national government and provincial governments. 
Specifically, the Act stipulates procedures for effective and efficient management of 
revenues, expenditures and assets and liabilities of the national government and 
provincial governments, as well as government ministries, public entities, Parliament 
and provincial legislatures and constitutional institutions. 
 
From a fiscal management standpoint, a necessary condition for the government to 
put and maintain the economy on a fiscally sustainable path is enactment of a public 
finance management system that has an effective, efficient and transparent 
mechanism for allocation and spending of public finances.  The financial management 
system should facilitate the ability to endorse and maintain fiscal discipline to ensure 
that revenue and expenditure aggregates are consistent with fiscal deficit targets and 
prevent unsustainable levels of public debt. In South Africa, the PFMA prescribes fiscal 
transparency through effective monitoring of performance, expenditure control, regular 
financial reporting and audits, delivery of outputs, accountability and maintenance of 
sound control systems.         
 
Section 6(1) (a) to (d) of the PFMA stipulate that “promotion of national government’s 
fiscal policy framework, coordination of macroeconomic policy and inter-governmental 
financial and fiscal relations, control of budget preparation processes, and exercising 
of control over adoption of annual national budgets, including adjustments budgets” 
are constitutional responsibilities of National Treasury. In terms of section 6(1) (e) to 
(g), National Treasury “facilitates implementation of the annual Division of Revenue 
Act (DoRA) and monitors provincial budgets, and effectively enforces transparency in 
management of revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of government ministries, 
public entities, and constitutional institutions”.  
 
Section 27(3) (a) to (d) of the PFMA stipulates obligations that the national budget for 
a given fiscal year should contain and tabled by the Minister of Finance. Specifically, 
the national budget must contain “estimates of revenue expected to be raised during 
the financial year to which the national budget relates, estimates of current and capital 
expenditures expected to be incurred for that financial year, and estimates of interest 
and debt servicing costs, and loan repayments”. The PFMA section 28(1) (a) and (b) 
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provide for preparation of multi-year budget projections of estimated revenue expected 
to be raised and estimated expenditure (differentiated between current and capital 
spending) expected to be incurred during each fiscal year of the projected multi-year 
period. Section 28(2) requires that multi-year budget projects must be supplemented 
by multi-year macroeconomic projections.  
 
In terms of section 30(2), national adjustment budgets may only be provided for the 
following exceptions:  
 substantial and unanticipated economic and financial occasions affecting fiscal 
targets set by the annual national budget. 
 unpredictable and inevitable expenditure commended by national executive or 
any committee of Cabinet members to whom this task has been assigned. 
 appropriation of funds for expenditure previously announced by the Minister of 
Finance during the tabling of the national annual budget.  
 shifting of funds between and within votes. 
 use of savings under a key division of a vote for defrayment of excess spending 
under another major division of the same vote.  
 roll-over of funds not spent from the previous financial year. 
 
With regards to loans by national government, section 71 of the PFMA provides that 
the Minister of Finance may borrow funds only for the following purposes: 
 Financing of national budget deficits. 
 Refinancing of maturing debt or a loan paid before redemption date,  
 Acquisition of foreign currency. 
 Maintenance of credit balances on a bank account of National Revenue Fund. 
 Regulation of internal monetary conditions where necessity arises.  
 Any other purpose the National Assembly would approve by special resolution. 
     
2.3.2. Division of Revenue 
The Division of Revenue Bill for each forthcoming financial year specifies the following: 
 The share of revenue raised nationally allocated to each government sphere. 
 An equitable share of revenue allocated to each province from the provincial 
share of revenue raised nationally. 
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 Allocations to provinces and local governments from the national government’s 
share of revenue raised nationally, and conditions attached to such allocations.   
 
2.3.3. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)  
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (herein after referred to as the Commission) 
was established in terms of section 198 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa as a permanent expert Commission on financial and fiscal matters of the organs 
of state of three government spheres. Although the Commission regularly interacts 
with government in its consultation processes to obtain data and information for use 
in discharge of its functions, it is an organ of state that is separate, impartial, unbiased 
autonomous, objective and not part of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. 
In addition, section 220(2) of the Constitution stipulates that the Commission is subject 
merely to the Constitution of the country and relevant legislations.  
 
2.3.3.1. Role of the Commission  
The Commission’s prime constitutional role is to make recommendations and provide 
advice on fiscal and financial matters to organs of state across the three spheres of 
government of South Africa. In addition, the Commission provides impartial advice on 
equitable division of nationally raised revenue between three spheres of government 
(vertical division), as well as equitably between provinces and local government 
municipalities (horizontal division). In terms of section 4(2) (a) of the IGFR Act, the 
Commission represented by its Chairperson or a delegation of the Commission 
nominated by its Chairperson, and any other person invited (subsection b) must attend 
the meetings of the Budget Council (held at least twice in each financial year) 
convened by the Minister of Finance in terms of section 4(1) of the IGFR Act. With 
regards to the Local Government sphere, section 7(2) (a) and (b) of the IGFR Act 
requires the Chairperson of the Commission or a delegation of the Commission 
nominated by its Chairperson (paragraph “a”) and any other person invited (paragraph 
“b”) to attend meetings of the Budget Forum (held at least once in each financial year) 
convened by the Minister of Finance in terms of section 7(1) of the IGFR Act.  
 
When submitting its recommendations on division of nationally raised revenue among 
three government spheres, the Commission in terms of section 9(3) of the IGFR Act 
- 14 - 
 
takes into consideration the matters listed in section 214(2) (a) to (j) of the Constitution. 
Such matters include the following: 
 Interest of the nation.  
 National debt and other obligations.  
 The needs and interests of the national government determined by objective 
criteria, the fiscal capacity and efficiency of provinces and municipalities.  
 The need to ensure ability of provinces and municipalities to provide basic 
services and discharge functions allocated to them.  
 Economic disparities within a province and across provinces.  
 The need to ensure stable and predictable allocations of revenue sharing.  
 
The Minister of Finance does submissions of recommendations on equitable division 
of revenue by the Commission before tabling of the annual budget in the National 
Assembly or Parliament in February of each financial year in line with section 10(1) of 
the IGFR Act. In March, following tabling of the annual budget for the upcoming 
financial year in February, the Commission responds to the tabled budget in its 
submission of the Division of Revenue Bill to Parliament. Government’s responses, 
via the country’s Minister of Finance, to the Commission’s proposals are provided in 
an Annexure to the Division of Revenue Act of the relevant financial year, indicating 
the extent to which government took account the Commission’s recommendations.  
 
2.3.3.2. Contributions by the Commission 
Following Visser and Ayele (2014), contributions made by the Commission in fiscal 
budget processes are assessed based on output volume, consistency and response 
rates by National Treasury. These dimensions crudely measure the impact of outputs 
of the Commission. The IGFR Framework document issued in June 1995 was among 
some of the most influential outputs of the Commission. The first output submission of 
recommendations was made for the 1996/97 financial year budget. However, 
recommendations from that submission were not considered in the 1996/97 budget 
proposal owing to poor timing in release of the submission, which provided inadequate 
time for sufficient consultations and analysis into the expenditure planning process.  
 
Consistent with Wehner (2003) and Magubu (2009), Visser and Ayele (2014) 
emphasised that the FFC faced difficulties in the initial years to make submissions of 
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its recommendations in a timely manner. Prior to enactment of the IGFR Act, National 
Treasury was not required to respond to recommendations from the FFC. Such 
challenges faced by the FFC were resolved by enactment of the IGFR Act, which led 
to improvements in protocols the FFC has with the National Treasury and Parliament. 
Figure 4 Panel A shows numbers of the FFC’s submissions of recommendations and 
responses by government. Panel B shows proportions of the categories of responses 
relative to total responses by government over the period 2011-2014. 
 
Figure 4: Numbers and Categories of Submissions of Recommendations and Responses  
Panel A: Number of Submissions of Recommendations and Responses  
 
Panel B: Categories of Responses to Recommendations Submitted 
 
Source: DoR Bills 2010-2014 (de Visser and Ayele, 2014)  
 
As shown by Figure 4 Panel A, the largest proportions of the FFC’s recommendations 
which the government did not provide responses to stood at 64% (23 out of 36 
recommendations) in 2014/15 submissions, and 60% (26 out of 43 recommendations) 
in the 2013/14 submissions. In overall terms, the government did not respond to 50% 
(80 out of 160) of the recommendations submitted by the Commission during the 
sample period 2010/11 to 2014/15 submissions. The statistics reveal that government 
does not always essentially respond to every recommendation submitted by the 
Commission (Visser and Ayele, 2014). Conversely, the enormous proportions of 
responses from the government to the Commission’s recommendations submitted 
stood at 87% (20 out of 23 recommendations) in the 2012/13 submissions, and 58% 
(18 out of 31 recommendations) in 2011/12 submissions.  
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The proportions of positive responses from government relative to the total numbers 
of responses to recommendations submitted were substantially high during 2010/11 
to 2014/15 budget years. The largest proportion of positive responses stood at 83% 
(15 out of 18) in 2011/12 submissions, followed by 67% (8 out of 12 recommendations) 
in the 2010/11 submissions. In addition, almost two-thirds (65%) were experienced 
(13 out of 20 recommendations) in the 2012/13 submissions, 62% (8 out of 13 
recommendations) in the 2014/15 budget submissions, and 53% (9 out of 17 
recommendations) in the 2013/14 submissions. Therefore, the statistics show that 
government’s responses were generally in agreement with the FFC in most instances 
where National Treasury responded to comments submitted by the FFC. 
 
2.4. The Medium Term Planning Framework    
Like other countries in the world, South Africa adopted a “multi-year budgeting and 
medium-term (three-year) planning” system to improve transparency and predictability 
in the national budgeting process. The medium term planning framework around 
budgeting in South Africa consists of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) and Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). The prime rationale of 
the medium term planning framework is that economic forecasts, spending proposals 
and fiscal policy parameters that determine the framework indicate the direction of the 
country’s economic policy. The framework further provides the basis on which the 
economy deals with ad hoc policy changes. The framework upholds the effectiveness 
of the manner in which government departments and relevant spending entities 
determine their resource requirements over the long-term horizon (Verwey, 2015).    
 
2.4.1. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
Introduced during 1997/98 in South Africa, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) refers to a multi-year budget cycle or three-year rolling system of spending 
plans of the national and provincial governments tabled at the same time of tabling the 
national budget for the forthcoming financial year (Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa, 2011). Although the MTEF covers a period of the next three financial years, 
only the first year of the framework objectively links to the budget of the forthcoming 
financial year. Estimates of the other two financial years are subject to change were 
deemed appropriate through tabling of the MTBPS. Conversely, the framework that 
has matured as a permanent element of government practice in the fiscal system 
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aligns budget allocations with key national priorities set out in the MTSF. Therefore, 
the two major objectives of the MTEF include setting fiscal targets for a period of the 
next three financial years, and allocating resources to the government’s strategic 
priorities within the limits of the objectively set fiscal targets (Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, 2011).  
     
2.4.2. The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 
In October of each year, the National Treasury issues a MMTBPS to sustain certainty 
in the nation’s medium- to long-term planning. The policy statement provides the 
government’s fiscal framework, expenditure plans and policies, and proposed 
equitable division of nationally raised revenue among the three government spheres 
over the three-year financial period. Therefore, MTBPS is a policy document that 
conveys information about the MTEF (Verwey, 2015). Section 28 of the PFMA requires 
National Treasury to table multi-year budget forecasts for revenue, expenditure and 
macroeconomic indicators annually. The MTBPS provides the country’s fiscal policy 
stance, macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the fiscal policy, tax policy, 
summary of government’s primary goals and objectives and the MTEF. Estimates 
contained in the MTEF for the two outer financial years are used as baseline numbers 
for the budget of the next financial year. The MTBPS provides a summary of medium 
term economic outlook, fiscal policy proposals and sectoral budget allocations.   
 
2.5. The Budget Process and Fiscal Oversight  
The policy context of the South African national budget framework, which covers the 
next three financial years, highlights the economic policy, fiscal policy, tax policy, 
consolidation of government spending, division of revenue, government’s borrowing 
requirement and financial position of public sector bodies. The key role participants in 
the budget process are the Cabinet, Ministers’ Committee on Budgets (MinComBud), 
Budget Council, Budget Forum, Intergovernmental Technical Forums, departments, 
relevant entities, legislature, and Financial and Fiscal Commission (National Treasury, 
2011). The major documents of the budget process include Estimates of National 
Expenditure (ENE), Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), Budget 
Speech, Budget Review, Division of Revenue Bill/Act, and Appropriations Bill/Act.  
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The National Treasury (2016) specifies that the mechanism in which the budget 
process allocates resources is anchored on four dimensions described below: 
 Function (outcomes) budgeting, which classifies activities of institutions (health, 
education, social protection, safety and security, economic affairs, human 
settlements, rural development and agriculture, and general public services) 
around the country’s priority policy objectives and/or outcomes. 
 Economic (inputs) allocation, which creates a balance in the purchase of inputs 
and spending of resources on compensation of employees, interest payments, 
capital spending, goods and services, and transfers and subsidies. 
 Intergovernmental (spheres) fiscal planning, whereby national, provincial and 
local government collaborate in designing fiscal instruments and allocating 
resources towards key national priorities.  
 Consolidated budget, which combines departmental budgets of national and 
provincial governments with financing of public entities, agencies and relevant 
institutions that largely depend on funding from the fiscus.    
 
Based on the 2015 survey Open Budget Index (OBI) released by the International 
Budget Partnership, South Africa was ranked third out of 102 countries in terms of 
budgetary transparency (Sachs, 2015; Lings, 2016). The country was ranked third 
after New Zealand and Sweden, showing that South Africa’s budgeting process 
remains remarkably high by global standards (Lings, 2016). The respective index 
assigns nations covered by Open Budget Survey a transparency score on a 100-point 
scale calculated based on expert considerations regarding whether the government 
timely releases comprehensive budget information to the public in line with global 
standards of good practice. The survey measures the quality of transparency in 
budgeting, participation by public in the national budget process, and institutional 
oversight (Sachs, 2015). Improved access to information and prospects to contribute 
to budget processes by the public and relevant stakeholders strengthens transparency 
and accountability in allocation and spending of resources.  
 
According to the National Treasury (2016), the main goal of the budget process in 
South Africa is to attain efficiency in resource allocation to meet national priorities 
through improved effectiveness in spending of resources within sustainable fiscal 
limits. From a technical efficiency standpoint, National Treasury (2016) specifies that 
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the three key goals of the budget processes in South Africa are “fiscal sustainability, 
effective resource allocation and maximization of the value for money”. The fiscal 
sustainability objective aims to ensure a balance between revenue, expenditure, public 
debt, and relevant fiscal aggregates in a manner that stimulates economic stability and 
promotes a sustainable fiscal path. The budget process comprises of technical and 
political structures that make contributions and present recommendations towards 
determination of the budget. Table 1 below provides details of the budget process, 
which is a continual cycle that begins from April through to March every financial year.  
 
Table 1: The Annual National Budget Process in South Africa 
Period Budget process activities 
March – April The National Treasury issues government departments with procedures for 
application for rollovers of eligible unspent funds from the last financial year. 
Government departments’ submissions for requests for rollovers are made to the 
National Treasury for assessment.      
May – June Subsequent to approval by the Minister of Finance, the National Treasury issues 
letters for rollover allocations to government departments. The National Treasury 
issues the MTEF budget guidelines during this period.    
July Government departments make submissions of their relevant expenditure estimates 
to the National Treasury for the forthcoming budget. Changes to budget programme 
structures of departments are evaluated and approved, while policy priorities and 
considerations for enactment are conferred and approved by Cabinet Lekgota.     
August The preliminary fiscal framework, Division of Revenue and sectoral budget priorities 
are approved by Ministers’ Committee on Budgets (MinComBud).  
September Medium Term Expenditure Committee (MTEC), made up of senior officials from 
National Treasury, Department of Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation (DPME), 
Department of Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs, and Department of 
Public Service & Administration, presents recommendations on critical government 
priorities to the MinComBud. The MTEC advises the Cabinet on budget allocations 
for inclusion in the national budget, taking into account economic assumptions 
underpinning the budget, fiscal policy objectives and tax proposals. Cabinet receives 
final recommendations on allocations for approval. The Adjustments Appropriation 
process begins and recommendations for unexpected and inevitable spending are 
made, while adjusted allocations are appropriated in the subsequent month.      
October – 
November 
The Adjustment Appropriation Bill, Amended Division of Revenue Bill, MTBPS, and 
prime allocations for provincial and local governments are all tabled in Parliament. 
Final allocations to national government departments are presented to Cabinet for 
approval in November. Following approval by Cabinet, allocation letters are sent out 
to government departments.   
December – 
February 
Parliament sends recommendations reports on MTBPS, fiscal framework and 
Division of Revenue to the Minister of Finance. Following the response by the 
Minister of Finance to Parliament on recommendation reports, the National Budget, 
Appropriation Bill, Division of Revenue Bill, Estimates of National Expenditure and 
relevant budget information are finalised and tabled in Parliament by the Minister of 
Finance.       
 Source: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2011)             
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In terms of oversight of public expenditure by government departments, the PFMA 
specifies in-year reporting (IYR) requirements government departments must comply 
with. Within 15 days of the end of each month, accounting officers are required to send 
monthly reports to the relevant Treasury department. In particular, monthly reports 
should show details of actual revenue and expenditure allocations, spending of 
conditional grants, variances, expected revenue and expenditure for the remainder of 
the relevant financial year, and summary action plan to ensure that revenue and 
expenditure flows remain within the approved budget. Correspondingly, provincial 
treasuries are required to send a statement to the National Treasury before 22nd of 
each month showing details of the state of funds, transactions affecting finances, and 
corrective actions to be taken. To ensure value for money, the National Treasury holds 
government departments accountable on their expenditure patterns in relation to 
budget allocations and policy priorities. 
 
On a quarterly basis, accounting officers and provincial treasuries are required to send 
quarterly reports within 15 days to the end of each quarter showing details as in 
monthly reports, as well as information on grants received from Division of Revenue. 
The National Treasury publishes quarterly financial statements for each province and 
national sphere in the Government Gazette on its website, as well as progress reports 
of actual performances against national budget and predetermined objectives for 
scrutiny by government and civil society. Annual reports are then published showing 
details on non-performance, losses, misuse of funds, reports of public enterprises 
where relevant, actual performance against plans, and the budget agreed upon with 
the legislature at the start of the financial year. In line with section 32 of the PFMA, 
reports published in the Government Gazette contain information on budgeted versus 
actual figures of revenue and expenditure, deficit, net borrowing requirement, and 
deficit financing options; for instance, bonds, loans, and domestic or foreign market.  
 
With regards to auditing of the national budget, the two institutions involved in the audit 
process are the Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) and the Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts (SCOPA). The AGSA audits all government ministries’ financial 
and non-financial performance, and reports findings and matters arising from such 
audit outcomes to the Parliament’s SCOPA for suitable action. Similarly, the Standing 
Appropriations Committee (SAC) monitors in-year budgets by analysing monthly and 
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quarterly expenditure statements, compiles reports and submits to Parliament. The 
reports are required to show information on actual revenues and progress on budget 
implementation and service delivery. The Parliament’s Standing Committees, in 
collaboration with Ministry of Finance (National Treasury) and Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) analyse national government departments’ reports 
on performance progress towards delivery of measurable outcomes upon which 
budget allocations were made. To ensure good and sound progress on delivery of 
outputs, government departments are held accountable by the DPME in terms of the 
Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement (NSDA) signed between the President and 
each Minister of a national department.    
 
2.6. Fiscal Rules 
The IMF (2009) defines fiscal rules as simple and permanent constraints through 
numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. Since sustainability of fiscal policy largely 
depends on the general fiscal behaviour of government, four major fiscal rules are 
used to ensure fiscal sustainability, namely, budget balance rules, debt rules, 
expenditure rules and revenue rules (IMF, 2009). Budget balance rules can be based 
on the overall balance, cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) or structural balance while 
debt rules commonly target a specific level of debt-to-GDP ratio to ensure debt 
convergence. Furthermore, expenditure rules are permanent limits to total, primary or 
current government spending relative to GDP, while revenue rules aim to enhance 
revenue and/or prevent or at least minimise the burden of tax.  
 
2.6.1. Rationale for Fiscal Rules 
Fiscal rules have emerged as a common instrument for circumventing procyclicality 
and augmenting credibility of fiscal policy. Depending on country-specific institutional 
arrangements and fiscal policy objectives, a fiscal path characterised by persistent 
volatility of fiscal aggregates and economic activity validates the merits of fiscal rules. 
Following Caceres, Cevik, Fenochietto, and Gracia (2015), the basic rationale for 
optimal designing and implementation of rule-based fiscal frameworks is to manage 
government spending and maintain public borrowing on sustainable paths to ensure 
fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity. Fiscal rules provide a sound medium-
term framework for stimulating economic growth and ensuring macroeconomic 
stability through promotion of countercyclical fiscal policy. According to Magubu and 
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Marinkov (2011), fiscal rules create a depoliticised policy framework, prevent growth 
in size of government, promote intergenerational equity, and ensure fiscal discipline. 
In line with Kennedy and Robbins (2001), Magubu and Marinkov (2011) emphasise 
that the rationale for fiscal rules include enhancement of macroeconomic stability 
through a countercyclical fiscal policy, reinforcement of fiscal policy credibility, 
elimination of budget deficits, and promotion of fiscal sustainability.  
 
In order to ensure effectiveness of fiscal rules, a number of preconditions need to be 
effectively put in place and fulfilled. Such preconditions include a sound public finance 
management system, availability of adequate budgetary aggregates data, technical 
capacity in forecasting, extensive reporting of budget outcomes, public release of fiscal 
data, and political commitment to improve fiscal policy credibility. Overall, fiscal rules 
should not be ambiguous, but should rather be flexible in order to respond to domestic 
and global shocks. Numerical targets should have a clear link with ultimate goals, while 
a sound institutional mechanism should be in place to constantly monitor and 
appropriately address deviations of outcomes from numerical targets.   
         
Nonetheless, one major drawback of fiscal rules is that they sometimes limit the space 
for fiscal policy to be discretionary during periods where discretionary stances may be 
required. During times where the scope for fiscal policy to be discretionary is limited, 
fiscal policy may be forced to be procyclical while countercyclicality may be required 
(IMF, 2009). For instance, poor timing in implementation of expenditure rules may lead 
to reductions in capital spending for infrastructure development, which could reduce 
prospects for economic growth and job creation in the medium-term to long run.                 
 
2.6.2. Fiscal Rules for South Africa   
Following the global financial crisis during 2008/09, the South African fiscal balance 
faced considerable pressure like many other developing and emerging economies in 
the world. Moreover, the restricted capacity of monetary policy to stimulate and sustain 
economic growth translated into an increase in fiscal deficits and public debt. Despite 
such fiscal and economic developments, South Africa’s fiscal authorities have 
maintained a good record of fiscal management, transparent budget system and fiscal 
policy credibility in the absence of fiscal rules (Calitz, Siebrits & Stuart, 2013). In the 
absence of fiscal rules, government has pursued a credible fiscal policy through 
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ensuring reductions in primary deficit and increasing national budget surplus in 
response to rising public debt. Government fiscal management efforts aimed at 
monitoring fiscal deficits and public debt are anchored on existence and use of the 
country’s sound national budget process and fiscal management mechanisms.  
 
The country’s fiscal policy path remains markedly strengthened by a set of legislative 
instruments and processes coordinated by numerous structures involved in national 
budgeting and fiscal planning. The fiscal legislative instruments and processes include 
the PFMA, IGFRA, Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 
MTEF, MTBPS, Budget Review, and Division of Revenue Bill. Concomitantly, the 
major structures involved in the national budget process and fiscal planning include 
National Treasury, Minister’s Committee on Budget (MinComBud), Budget Council, 
Budget Committee, Cabinet and relevant Parliament’s Standing Committees.  
 
Given the robust fiscal stance, South Africa has maintained over the past years, and 
the notion that fiscal rules are not essential for a country with a strong standing of fiscal 
prudence (Magubu and Marinkov, 2011). Nevertheless, South Africa to date does not 
have basic fiscal rules. The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters 
Act (MBAPRMA) of 2009 provides for strengthening of oversight of the budget-related 
matters through the Parliamentary Budget Office (Calitz, et al., 2013). Therefore, 
instead of substantive fiscal rules, the MBAPRMA requires the framework for the 
budget process to be anchored on Budget Review and Recommendations (BRR) 
reports, MTBPS, fiscal framework, and revenue laws, Division of Revenue Bill/Act 
(DoRA), and Appropriation Bill with distinct departmental budgets (FFC, 2016). In 
terms of section 15(1) of the MBAPRMA, the main role of the Parliamentary Budget 
Office (PBO) is to provide autonomous, unprejudiced, and expert advice and analysis 
to Parliament on budget and money bills related matters.  
 
In assessing the progress in Parliamentary fiscal oversight since establishment of 
Parliamentary Budget Office, the Financial and Fiscal Commission (2016) revealed 
that the numbers of budget-related recommendations made by Finance Committees 
and Appropriations Committees improved since 2012, as presented by Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Progress of Parliamentary Fiscal Oversight by Parliamentary Budget Office 
Panel A: Number of Recommendations by Finance Committees  
 
 
Panel B: Number of Recommendations by Appropriations Committees  
 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission (2016)      
 
As demonstrated by Figure 5 Panel A, the total number of the Finance Committees’ 
recommendations on the revised fiscal framework accepted by the Ministry of Finance 
generally increased over the period 2012 to 2015. The number of recommendations 
doubled from four recommendations in 2012 to eight recommendations in 2013, and 
slightly increased to nine recommendations in 2014 and 12 recommendations in 2015. 
Similarly, Panel B shows that the total number of recommendations made by the 
Appropriations Committees drastically increased by 380% from five recommendations 
in 2013 to 24 recommendations in 2014, but slightly dropped to 20 recommendations 
in 2015 and improved by 40% to 28 recommendations in 2016.    
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Categorically, the number of MTBPS recommendations by Appropriations Committees 
constantly increased from four recommendations on the 2012 MTBPS for the 
FY2012/13 to six recommendations on the 2013 MTBPS for the FY2013/14, 10 
recommendations on 2014 MTBPS for the FY2014/15 and 14 recommendations on 
2015 MTBPS for FY2015/16. Additional recommendations made by Appropriations 
Committees and accepted by National Treasury include Adjustments Appropriation 
Bill, Division of Revenue (DoR) Amendment, proposed DoR and conditional grant 
allocations to provincial and local spheres and the new Development Bank Special 
Appropriations Bill. The increase in the number of recommendations by relevant 
Committees reveals the significance of the influence of these Committees on the 
country’s fiscal matters.                       
 
The MBAPRMA additionally provides an institutional framework for the budget 
process, which is characterised by the following features: 
 Structures of the Finance and Appropriations Committee and PBO. 
 Budget processes and timelines with clear procedures and realistic timeframes. 
 Symmetrical information flows through numerous financial instruments such as the 
Budget Review and Recommendations (BRR), MTBPS, Estimates of National 
Expenditure (ENE), Budget Speech, Budget Review, MTEF and relevant reports 
released by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA).  
 Committee roles – numerous committees actively involved in budget processes.      
 
Concerning the legislative oversight of the budget and fiscal framework, the PBO 
supports the implementation of the Money Bills Act through research and analysis for 
the committees on Finance and Appropriations in the National Assembly and National 
Council of Provinces (NCoP). Accordingly, the relevant Office provides policy advice 
and analysis on proposed amendments to the fiscal framework, Division of Revenue 
Bill and Money Bills, revenue and expenditure trends, and analysing budgetary 
implications of reports tabled in the Cabinet. A response was made to the Parliament’s 
request to the National Treasury during 2010 to examine channels through which 
government expenditure could be maintained on a sustainable path over the long run. 
Agaist this background, Sachs (2015) asserts that the National Treasury proposed 
fiscal policy guidelines in the 2015 MTBPS that should be based on the following three 
principles: 
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 Countercyclicality – the budget balance needs to be consistently set in a manner 
that enhances its capacity to absorb and counteract variations in business cycles. 
 Long-term public debt sustainability – government expenditure must be maintained 
at levels that do not lead to indefinite increases in public debt.  
 Inter-generational equity – considerable care must be given to long-term costs of 
spending programmes.   
 
The fiscal policy guidelines proposed by the National Treasury 2015 MTBPS include: 
 Implementation of annual structural budget balance targets linked to long-term 
growth, preferred level of public debt, and inter-generational equity. 
 Making explicit the costs of long-term new and existing programmes.   
 Setting out a timeframe to bring the budget back on target level after fiscal shocks. 
 
Given that the computation of structural budget balance remains difficult largely owing 
to reliance on unobservable assumptions, academic researchers, policy makers, and 
financial markets investors constantly give considerable attention to observable fiscal 
measures, specifically primary balance and public debt (Sachs, 2015). In that regard, 
the National Treasury introduced the MTEF estimate of the main budget non-interest 
spending as a ceiling in 2012. The key rationale behind introduction of the expenditure 
ceiling is anchored on its simplicity to calculate and communicate to the public to 
ensure certainty about fiscal policy path (Sachs, 2015). In practice, the “rule of thumb” 
for the expenditure ceiling restricts the government to nominal limits on expenditure 
growth over relevant medium term periods to ensure that government expenditure as 
a share of GDP remains stable over the long term. Therefore, critical scenarios under 
which amendments to the ceiling can be made are permanent structural improvements 
to revenues and large inflation shocks (Sachs, 2015).  
 
Burger and Marinkov (2012) recommend approaches that can be worthwhile taking 
into consideration when setting fiscal rules for ensuring fiscal sustainability. Instead of 
setting point targets for the overall deficit and structural budget balance, a realistic 
approach would be to set target bands for the deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio (Burger & 
Marinkov, 2012). The budget deficit target band can determine the magnitudes of 
adjustments in revenue and expenditure that would be required to maintain fiscal 
sustainability. Similarly, the debt rule determines the size of adjustment in the deficit 
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that could be desired to maintain the actual debt-to-GDP ratio on the required margin 
when the ratio moves outside the restricted range. Since fiscal rules are sensitive to 
fluctuations in economic activity, automatic stabilisers need to be designed properly to 
enhance implementation of flexible fiscal rules in a simple manner that promotes fiscal 
sustainability. Burger and Marinkov (2012) suggest that a debt-to-GDP ratio target 
band should be used as the starting point in implementation of fiscal rules, anchored 
on a good historical record of accurate fiscal forecasts and policy credibility. 
 
2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the governance of the South African fiscal system. The major 
aspects of governance of the country’s fiscal systems discussed include the IGFR 
framework, fiscal management mechanisms, the medium term planning framework, 
budget process and fiscal oversight and fiscal rules.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FISCAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses the South African fiscal framework comprised of budgetary 
aggregates of national government total tax- and non-tax revenue, expenditure, public 
debt, budget balances, tax system, and fiscal risks framework. The interaction of such 
budgetary aggregates and their relevant impacts on the macroeconomy form the fiscal 
policy of the economy (Verwey, 2015). In situations where an amendment to the fiscal 
framework is deemed necessary, only Parliament holds unrestricted power to amend 
the fiscal framework, tax policy and Division of Revenue allocations in terms of the 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters (MBAPRM) Act of 2009.  
 
The execution of the amendment is required to follow a formalised procedure and 
make engagements with relevant strategic role players of the budget to ensure that 
amendments to allocations are in line with the national fiscal framework. Additional 
key reasons relating to the requirement for making consultations with relevant key role 
players of the budget on matters relating to any fiscal adjustments are to ensure that 
such adjustments do not lead to an unsustainable fiscal path, and do not put the overall 
sustainability of the national budget at risk (Verwey, 2015). In the 2017 Budget Review, 
National Treasury (2017) postulates that South Africa’s fiscal framework remains 
devoted towards ensuring fiscal consolidation through a countercyclical approach to 
sustainably control expenditure, contain the budget deficit and stabilise public debt. 
 
3.2. Revenue Trends  
The major categories of total national government revenue are tax revenues and non-
tax revenues. Like in many other countries, the South African economy substantially 
depends more domestic taxation as the primary source through which national 
government raises revenue required to finance public expenditure requirements. In 
order to ensure fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability, trajectories in public 
spending should consistently be adjusted in line with developments in tax revenues 
generated by the fiscus. Therefore, tax revenues are an essential fiscal indicator of a 
country’s economic performance, given the implications they have for budget deficits 
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and/or public sector borrowing requirements. Figures 6 to 9 depict total national 
government tax revenue and non-tax revenue (nominal terms and percentage of total 
revenue), tax revenue versus nominal GDP, and total tax revenue-to-GDP proportion.  
 
Figure 6: Total National Government Revenues (1990-2016) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2017) 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that total national government tax revenues remain as the key 
contributor to the fiscus’ total national government revenue between 1990 and 2016. 
Tax revenue collections in the country dropped by 4.5% between 2009 and 2010. 
While non-tax revenues contribute very insignificantly to the total revenue of the fiscus, 
nominal total national government revenue has been rising exponentially.  
 
Figure 7: Total National Government Revenues Proportions (1990-2016) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2017) and Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 7 shows that the proportion of total national government tax revenue-to-total 
revenue ranged between 97% and 99% from 1990 to 2015, and dropped to 95% in 
2016 from 98% in 2015. Concurrently, the contribution of total national government 
ranged between 1% and 3% between 1990 and 2015, and increased to 5% in 2016. 
Thus, tax revenues are the key contributor to national government total revenue.    
     
Figure 8: Tax Revenue and Nominal GDP (FY1995/96 – FY2015/16) 
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (SARS) 2015 Tax Statistics 
 
The trends in South Africa’s tax revenue and nominal output (GDP) remained close 
during 1995/96 to 1999/00 (Figure 8). Despite evidence of growths in the respective 
macroeconomic indicators, nominal GDP increased at a continuously faster pace than 
the rise in tax revenue between the financial periods 2000/01 and 2015/16.  
  
Figure 9: Total Tax Revenue-to-GDP Ratio (FY1994/95 – FY2015/16) 
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (SARS) 2015 Tax Statistics    
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The level of taxation in an economy can be gauged by the prevailing tax to GDP ratio. 
Figure 9 shows that during 1994/95 to 2015/16, South Africa’s total tax-to-GDP ratio 
remained in the range of 22.2% during 1994/95 to 26.4% during 2007/08. The 
proportion of tax revenue to output thus remained high over the period under review. 
         
3.3. Expenditure Trends 
Stable government expenditure trends anchored on changes in GDP growth prospects 
and revenue collections remain as a crucial condition for sustainable public finances. 
Figure 10 depicts the trend in national government expenditure during 1994 to 2016.  
 
Figure 10: National Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio (1994 – 2016) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2017) 
 
National government spending, as a proportion of GDP, remained stable during the 
period 1994-2016. Government expenditure-to-GDP ratio levels over the period 1994 
to 2016 considerably fluctuated between 23.3% during 2003 and 30.2% during 2016.   
 
3.4. Public Debt Trends 
The sources and trends of government debt are essential indicators of the degree to 
which financial markets accommodate government as a borrowing agent, given the 
observed and perceived manner in which government manages its sovereign debt. 
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Subdued economic growth prospects coupled with policy risks place considerable 
pressure on sustainability of public finances; hence the need for fiscal consolidation 
that constricts fiscal deficits and stabilise public debt-to-GDP ratio. The National 
Treasury 2017 Budget Review points out that one of the central objectives of fiscal 
policy should be stabilisation of public debt through reduction of budget deficit. Figure 
11 depicts composition of South Africa’s public gross debt during 1994/95 to 2016/17.            
 
Figure 11: Composition of Public Gross Debt (FY1994/95 – FY2016/17) 
 
Source: National Treasury 2017 Budget Review Statistical Tables 
 
Figure 11 shows that the domestic market remains as the country’s major source of 
government borrowing. From the total public gross debt during the period 1994/95 to 
2016/17, the highest proportion of domestic debt stood at 96.3% during 1994/95 while 
the lowest proportion stood at 81.1% during 2001/02. A substantial increase in the 
proportion of foreign debt by 10.9 percentage points from 8% during 2000/01 to 18.9% 
during 2001/02 was realised to compensate for the drop in the proportion of domestic 
debt by 10.9 percentage points from 92% during 2000/01 to 81.1% during 2001/02. 
Based on the National Treasury 2017 Budget Review, government debt remains within 
optimal benchmarks while liquid domestic capital markets remain as the government’s 
main source of borrowing despite volatile market conditions (National Treasury, 2017).           
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Figure 12: Total Gross Loan Debt of Government (FY1994/95-FY2016/17) 
 
Source: National Treasury 2017 Budget Review Statistical Tables 
 
Figure 12 shows that, gross loan debt-to-GDP ratio consistently declined from 49.5% 
during 1995/96 to 27.3% during 2008/09, and progressively increased to a projected 
record of 50.7% during 2016/17. While total foreign loan debt as a proportion of GDP 
constantly remains below 8% throughout the period 1994/95 to 2016/17, the highest 
gross domestic debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 47.6% during 1995/96. The ratio steadily 
rose from lowest mark of 23.1% during 2008/09 to 45.7% during 2016/17.          
 
Figure 13: Total Net Loan Debt of Government (FY1994/95-FY2016/17) 
 
Source: National Treasury 2017 Budget Review Statistical Tables 
 
Figure 13 shows that net loan debt-to-GDP ratio steadily reduced from 48.1% during 
1996/97 to 22.9% during 2008/09, and progressively increased to a projected record 
of 45.5% during 2016/17. Similarly, net domestic debt-to-GDP ratio declined from 
46.3% during 1996/97 to 18.6% during 2007/08, and rose to 43.2% during 2016/17.  
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3.5. Fiscal Balances Trends 
 
Figure 14: Main budget balance (as percentage of GDP) 
Source: National Treasury 2016 Budget Review Statistical Tables 
 
Figure 14 shows that the main budget balance-to-GDP ratio remained in surplus over 
the period 1994/95 to 1999/00. With the exception of financial years 2006/07 and 
2007/08, the main budget balance remained in deficit over the period 2000/01 to 
2014/15. The largest budget deficit of -6.3% occurred during 2008/09, remained below 
-4% during 2009/10 to 2014/15 and improved into a surplus of 4.2% during 2015/16.        
 
Figure 15: Primary balance (as percentage of GDP): 2000-2016 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2017) 
 
Primary balance-to-GDP ratio remains a crucial determinant of public debt dynamics. 
Stabilisation of public debt-to-GDP ratio requires adequate primary surpluses to be 
generated over time. Figure 15 shows that the country maintained primary surplus 
positions ranging from 1.2% in 2004 to 3.4% in 2007 and 2008 over the period 1998 
to 2009. Conversely, the country experienced primary deficits positions over the period 
2010 to 2017, steadily narrowing from -2.8% in 2010 to -0.6% in 2017.            
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Figure 16: Cyclically adjusted balance and cyclically adjusted primary balance: 2000-2016 
 
Source: IMF (2017) Fiscal Monitor 
 
 
The cyclically adjusted balance (CAB), also called “full employment budget balance” 
refers to the budget or fiscal balance that would be realised under present policies if 
the country’s output were equal to its full potential. Technically, the cyclically adjusted 
balance indicates the economy’s latent fiscal position when cyclical and/or automatic 
movements are detached. The cyclically adjusted balance depicted in Figure 16 shows 
that South Africa’s decomposed fiscal position was largely depressed during the 
period 2000-2016. While cyclically adjusted surpluses of 1.7% and 1.2% were only 
realised during 2006 and 2007 respectively, the periods 2000-2005 and 2008-2016 
recorded average cyclically adjusted balances of -0.9% and -3.1% respectively.   
 
Congruently, the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is the cyclically adjusted 
balance less net interest payments. The interest payments are excluded since their 
automatic movements are often not correlated with changes in cyclical output. South 
Africa’s cyclically adjusted primary balance was in a surplus territory during the period 
2000 to 2008. The surplus varied between 4.5% during 2006 and 1.9% during 2008, 
recording an average surplus of 3.1% between 2000 and 2008. During the period 2009 
to 2014, the cyclically adjusted primary balance varied between -1% and -0.3% and 
recorded an average of -0.8% during 2009 to 2014. 
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3.6. The South African Tax System  
Tax revenue collections in South Africa are largely dependent on economic growth, 
effectiveness and efficiency of tax administration. The Davis Tax Committee (DTC, 
2016) underscores that the country’s tax policy framework plays a key role towards 
supporting fiscal sustainability, among other broad macroeconomic objectives such as 
investment absorption, economic growth, job creation, and price stability. Following 
recommendations of the Katz Commission, the South African tax system is regarded 
as relatively robust and competitive vis-à-vis other countries. The tax system greatly 
improved from numerous frontiers, which include formation of an autonomous tax and 
customs administration institution called SARS, intensification of the tax base and 
lowering of marginal tax rates (DTC, 2016). Although the payment of taxes remains a 
legal obligation in any given sovereign nation, the effectiveness of the tax system 
largely depends on the magnitude of willingness and compliance by the nation’s 
natural and corporate citizens (National Treasury, 2017). 
  
In light of the backdrop of the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality, 
the country has been facing since attainment of democracy, consistent review of the 
tax policy framework has been regarded as a necessary requirement to ensure fiscal 
sustainability, socio-economic growth and development in the country (DTC, 2016). 
Essentially, rigorous and appropriate reviews of the tax policy framework have helped 
the country maintain a progressive and transparent tax structure that ensures equity 
and efficiency of in collection of tax revenue in a way that does not depress economic 
growth, international trade, investment and creation of jobs.  
 
Although the success in achieving fiscal sustainability depends on maintaining public 
debt-to-GDP ratio on a sustainable path, maximisation of growth subject to revenue 
adequacy and government’s intertemporal budget constraint are equally important 
conditions for tax reform and fiscal prudence (DTC, 2016). Concomitantly, success in 
tax system reform depends on consistency in fiscal consolidation and the ability of 
countercyclical fiscal policy to mitigate domestic and global shocks to the economy. 
Figure 17 below shows the trends of main tax revenue sources as percentage of GDP 
over the period 1994/95 to 2015/16.                   
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Figure 17: Main Sources of Tax Revenue (FY1994/95 – FY2015/16) 
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (SARS) 2015 Tax Statistics 
 
As shown by Figure 17, the primary sources of national tax revenue in South Africa 
are personal income tax (PIT), value added tax (VAT) and corporate income tax (CIT). 
Personal income taxes remain the largest source of tax revenue in the economy. 
During the period 1994/95 to 2015/16, the lowest proportion of personal income tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP stood at 7% during 2007/08, while the highest 
proportion stood at 10.3% during 1998/99 and 1999/00. Since continued decline in the 
PIT revenue as a percentage of GDP from 10.3% during 1999/00 to 7.0% during 
2007/08, a remarkably stable recovery has been witnessed from 7.7% during 2008/09 
to 9.5% during financial year 2015/16.  
Given that a tax is basically defined by its rate (percent), and its base (amount actually 
taxed), South Africa’s PIT has a progressive structure where higher incomes are taxed 
at higher rates. In efforts to mitigate declines in growth of tax revenue collections to 
maintain current spending programmes, fiscal authorities proposed to raise tax rates 
mainly at the upper income group during tabling of the 2017/18 Budget Review. The 
proposal reflects the progressive nature of the country’s PIT system to ensure that 
equity remains observed in the economy’s tax system (National Treasury, 2017).    
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VAT was introduced in South Africa in 1991 to replace General Sales Tax (GST). It is 
an indirect, mildly progressive, certain and buoyant tax. This tax instrument remains 
the second main source of tax revenue over the period 1994/95 to 2015/16. Since 
1993, VAT in South Africa is levied at a standard rate of 14% on goods and services 
consumed domestically and imported into the country. According to the DTC (2015), 
any upward adjustment of the VAT rate would need to be accompanied by enactment 
of rigorously assessed mechanisms to compensate low-income households and 
consumers. However, there is a limited range of goods and services that qualify for 
either a zero rate of VAT and/or VAT exemption in order to bring relief to consumers. 
Since 1993, a few basic commodities were zero-rated, such as eggs, fresh vegetables, 
milk and maize meal (DTC, 2016).     
Given that VAT is charged at every stage of production and distribution, it is therefore 
proportional to distinct prices charged for goods and services. Based on Figure 15, 
VAT remains the main contributor of tax revenue to the fiscus since attainment of 
democracy in 1994. The VAT-to-GDP ratio progressively remained between 5.7% and 
5.8% during 1995/96 to 2002/03, before steadily improving to a peak of 7.3% during 
2006/07. However, the proportion plummeted from 7.3% during 2006/07 to 5.8% 
during 2009/10, before steady recovery to 6.9% during 2015/16. In relation to tax 
buoyancy, VAT yields are frequently driven by trends in consumption levels in the 
economy. In South Africa, household consumption is less sensitive to business cycles 
than firms, reflecting that VAT is minimally affected by business cycles compared to 
CIT in the country (DTC, 2016). Based on empirical evidence from the analysis 
conducted by Keen (2013), there are largely two factors which influence changes in 
VAT revenues, namely, C-efficiency and change in consumption. Figure 16 below 
shows the trends of changes in VAT yields comparative to changes in consumption 
and the C-efficiency calculated based on equation (3.7.1) below: 
 


effC                          (3.7.1)  
where effC denotes C-efficiency,  represents VAT revenues,   signifies the standard 
rate of VAT, and   represents final consumption expenditure less VAT revenues. 
Computationally, C-efficiency is therefore a ratio of VAT revenue to the product of the 
standard VAT rate and final consumption expenditure less VAT revenue (Keen, 2013).   
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Figure 18: Value Added Tax C–efficiency (1995 – 2016) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from SARB (2017) 
 
Consistent with empirical findings from the analysis conducted by Keen (2013), annual 
percentage changes in VAT yields as a percentage of GDP in South Africa are greatly 
influenced by changes in the C-efficiency factor relative to changes in consumption 
expenditure. The DTC (2016) defines C-efficiency as an indicator that measures the 
magnitude of departure of VAT from an impeccably enforced tax levied at a constant 
rate on all consumption. From a technical stance, the C-efficiency factor indicates gaps 
in compliance and existing tax policy. Gaps in the existing tax policy primarily include 
tax refunds and zero-rated or exempted commodities (DTC, 2016). As presented in 
Figure 18, changes in C-efficiency drastically worsened from -1% in 2007 to -7% in 
2008 and -9% in 2009 before convalescing to 5% in 2010. Congruently, variations in 
VAT yield as a percentage of GDP in South Africa plunged from -2% in 2007 to -7% 
in 2008 and -8% in 2009 before recuperating to 5% in 2010. The upsurges in the C-
efficiency factor after the year 2009 reflect improvements in base broadening and 
compliance to the tax law in the country.   
 
Concerning CIT, the actual tax rate paid by companies in South Africa varies by sector 
owing to differentials in tax incentives that are designed to enable and stimulate 
corporate investment, profitability and demand for labour. Although tax incentives 
promote investment in a country, a conducive investment environment characterised 
by policy certainty, institutional capacity and political stability among other measures 
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of good governance have much larger influence on corporate investment decisions 
(National Treasury, 2017). Verwey (2015) and National Treasury (2017) concur that 
CIT in South Africa largely remains elastic with respect to growth. In that regard, 
improvements in economic growth translates into higher corporate profits that can be 
taxed by the country. However, the National Treasury (2017) points out that the CIT 
rate of 28% currently being taxed on corporate entities remains higher compared to 
the average of 25% for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which potentially exposes the fiscus to base erosion and/or profit shifting 
vulnerabilities. In order to maintain and increase corporate tax revenues, the most 
viable option fiscal authorities can be tax base broadening by reducing tax incentives 
and adopt measures that curb tax avoidance. 
 
The general fuel levy, a component of the three major fuel taxes together with the 
Road Accident Fund (RAF) levy and customs and excise levy, remains the fourth main 
source of tax revenue in South Africa. The contribution of fuel levy to total tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP sustainably fluctuated between 1% and 2% over the period 
1994/95 to 2015/16. Based on the National Treasury 2017 Budget Review, the general 
fuel levy for 93 octane petrol increased from R2.55/litre during 2015/16 to R2.85/litre 
during 2016/17 and R3.15/litre during 2017/18. Similarly, the fuel levy for diesel 
increased from R2.40/litre during 2015/16 to R2.70/litre during 2016/17 and R3.00/litre 
during 2017/18. In terms of the customs duties, also called import tariffs, the rates 
have progressively been reduced to enhance trade liberalisation and ensure that 
industries become more competitive. Since South Africa is a member of the South 
African Customs Union (SACU), all customs duties collected within SACU are shared 
among member states of the block according to the designed revenue sharing formula. 
However, revenues from customs duties do not greatly contribute to the total revenue 
pool of the South African fiscus relative to other member states.         
 
3.6.1. Tax Revenue Buoyancy  
Based on the “certainty, simplicity, administrative efficiency, and equality” four major 
canons of a good tax system (Musgrave, 1966), tax-revenue buoyancy remains an 
important indicator and simple criterion extensively used to objectively measure the 
efficiency of tax system in an economy with regards to revenue mobilisation. 
Therefore, tax buoyancy objectively assesses the magnitude to which output growth 
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in an economy can contain and reduce fiscal deficits from the budget revenue side 
during a given specific period of time (Belinga, Benedek, de Mooij, and Norregaard, 
2014). In classic terms, tax buoyancy refers to the total response of tax-revenue to 
changes in an economy’s national income and discretionary adjustments in tax policy 
over time. From a public finances sustainability standpoint, changes in levels of public 
spending need to be matched with changes in revenue mobilisation through taxation 
in order to reduce or avoid large budget deficits. 
 
Following Twerefou, Fumey, Osei-Assibey, and Asmah (2010), the global buoyancy 
of a country’s tax system is measured by the relative change in total tax revenue with 
respect to the proportional change in national output, defined by the function: 
 




 x                (2.7.2) 
 
where  represents the buoyancy coefficient, T denotes total tax-revenue, and Y 
signifies nominal GDP or national income.  
 
Decomposing equation (2.7.2) into individual tax buoyancy elements yields: 
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B
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T
...B
T
T
B
T
T
              (2.7.3) 
....: taxesofnumberthedenotesnandTTTTwhere nbat   
 
The global buoyancy of a tax system is hence given by the weighted sum of distinct 
tax buoyancy, and used to estimate the elasticities (ηs) of tax revenue with respect to 
tax-to-base and base-to-income (Twerefou et al., 2010), defined by the functions: 
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Based on equations (2.7.4) and (2.7.5), the global buoyancy is therefore defined as: 
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Figure 19 demonstrates the tax revenue buoyancy of the South African economy 
during the period 1994/95 to 2014/15.  
  
Figure 19: Tax Revenue Buoyancy (FY1994/95 – FY2015/16) 
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (SARS) - 2015 Tax Statistics and National Treasury (2017) 
 
Figure 19 depicts that South Africa’s total tax revenue buoyancy statistics (buoyancy 
coefficients greater than 1) reveal that the country’s overall tax system was buoyant 
for most of periods between 1994/95 and 2014/15. Highest significant buoyancies of 
the overall tax system were observed for the financial years 2004/05, 2005/06, 
2014/15 and 2015/16; with total tax revenue buoyancy coefficients of 1.55, 1.54, 1.48 
and 1.47 respectively. Moderate total tax revenue buoyancies were observed for the 
financial years 1994/95 (buoyancy coefficient = 1.34), 1996/97 to 1998/99 (buoyancy 
coefficients in the range 1.22 to 1.42), 2006/07 and 2007/08 (buoyancy coefficients of 
1.38 and 1.15; respectively), and 2010/11 to 2013/14 (buoyancy coefficients ranged 
between 1.13 during 2011/12 and 1.25 during 2013/14). 
 
Given that high tax buoyancy reflects built-in flexibility in the country’s tax structure, 
the buoyancy coefficients greater than 1 indicate evidence of South Africa’s more than 
proportionate responses of tax revenues to upsurges in GDP. Therefore, South 
Africa’s total tax system demonstrates high magnitudes of responsiveness over the 
period 1994/95 to 2016/17. However, South Africa’s worst total tax revenue buoyancy 
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was -0.71 during 2009/10 when the global economy experienced a financial crisis. The 
country’s tax buoyancy in 2016/17 was low at 0.88, down from 1.47 during 2015/16.  
 
3.6.2. Fiscal Forecasts and Fiscal Policy Credibility    
In order to optimise the contribution of fiscal rules towards enhancing and maintaining 
fiscal sustainability, fiscal authorities need to ensure that the fiscal policy demonstrates 
a good record of credibility and accurate forecasts of fiscal aggregates. Consistent 
with findings from some studies in other countries (Franke, 2011; Frankel and 
Schreger, 2012), Calitz, et al. (2016) maintain that the credibility of fiscal policy in 
South Africa is determined by the magnitude of accuracy of forecasts of fiscal and 
macroeconomic aggregates used in annual national budget processes. Furthermore, 
Calitz, et al. (2016) assessed the accuracy of the National Treasury’s fiscal forecasts 
compared to those of other nations, and evaluated whether relevant fiscal forecasts 
improved over time. The study assessed the accuracy of forecasts of macroeconomic 
aggregates included in the national budget relative to macroeconomic forecasts of 
non-government economists. 
 
In terms of fiscal forecasts, Calitz, et al. (2016) assessed the accuracy of National 
Treasury’s official forecasts of national budget revenue (R), national budget 
expenditure (G) and national budget balance (B). In this regard, these researchers 
used budget estimates (data in the Budget Review during presentation of the National 
Budget by the Minister of Finance to Parliament in February each year), revised 
estimates (forecasts for a given budget year revised during the course of the same 
budget year, but appear in the Budget Review for the following budget year) and final 
figures. The forecasting errors are classified into three types, namely, implementation 
error, forecast error and revision error. The implementation error, calculated by 
subtracting the budget estimate from the revised estimate, measures the magnitude 
to which the budget design needed to be adjusted based on recent economic data and 
other relevant information. Forecast error is calculated by subtracting the budget 
estimate from the final figure. The revision error, calculated by subtracting the revised 
estimate from the final figure, measures the gap or error that could have remained 
after adjustments have been made to the budget figures based on recent economic 
data and relevant updated information.  
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Using fiscal and GDP data for the period 2000/01 to 2010/11, Calitz, et al. (2016) 
assessed the accuracy of South Africa’s fiscal forecasts based on the orthodox Mean 
Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) statistical measures of 
accuracy. The country’s budget balance over seven successive years from 2000/01 
to 2006/07 have been found to be substantially favourable owing to actual outturns of 
revenue that largely exceeded the budgeted revenue versus actual expenditure that 
marginally exceeded the budgeted outlays. On average, the largest proportion of 
forecast error in the deficit or budget balance as a ratio of GDP was accounted for by 
72.1% in revenue forecast errors, followed by 22.1% average forecast errors in 
expenditure and 5.8% forecast errors in nominal GDP. 
  
In several years over the sample period, the errors partially neutralised each other 
concerning their impact on the ultimate budget balance-to-GDP ratio. After eliminating 
the 2009/10 recession year from the sample, the observed upward trend of the budget 
balance forecast error as a ratio of GDP suggest lack of evidence of improved ability 
in forecasting (Calitz, et al., 2016). Despite variations in magnitudes of errors in 
revenue, expenditure and GDP forecasts, the budget balance forecasts by the 
National Treasury are regarded as relatively accurate by global standards. 
Furthermore, Calitz, et al. (2016) buttress that findings from the study by Frankel 
(2011) indicate that the magnitude of official deficit forecast errors for South Africa are 
comparable to the global average. In the same vein, Frankel (2011) found evidence of 
the tendency of underestimation of the deficit across 33 countries while South Africa 
on contrary tends to overestimate its deficit. Over the period 2000/01 to 2010/11, 
South Africa’s national budget average Mean Absolute Error (MAE) was 26% smaller 
than the mean of 1.83 for 14 countries in the European Union (EU).  
 
3.7. Fiscal Risks Framework 
According to the IMF (2009), fiscal risks refer to possible deviations of actual fiscal 
outturns from outcomes that were expected at the time of tabling the national budget. 
In practice, fiscal outcomes usually differ largely from budget and fiscal forecasts 
owing to diverse factors like shocks to key macroeconomic variables, forecasting 
capacity, political climate, and global economic trends. Given that the sources of fiscal 
risks vary from one country to another, the manner in which country-specific risks are 
disclosed has serious implications for fiscal sustainability. Coupled with strong public 
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financial management system and macroeconomic policy framework, effective 
identification, evaluation, disclosure and management of fiscal risks are key requisites 
for safeguarding fiscal policy sustainability in any economy (IMF, 2009).  
 
3.7.1. Sources and Significance of Fiscal Risk 
Fiscal risks emanate from different shocks to fiscal and macroeconomic aggregates 
such as government revenue, expenditure and debt levels, economic growth, interest 
rates, exchange rates, labour market disruptions, inflation, commodity prices and 
contingent liabilities (IMF, 2009). The approaches used for disclosure, management 
and mitigation of fiscal risks should take into account whether fiscal risk are temporary 
or permanent, the magnitude of deviations of outcomes from official forecasts, and 
quantification of the risk. Automatic stabilisers may easily correct fiscal risks arising 
from temporary shocks, while fiscal risks emanating from permanent shocks that affect 
fiscal sustainability may require a blend of sound policy actions to correct the deficit. 
The accuracy of forecasts for fiscal and macroeconomic aggregates plays a major role 
in mitigating fiscal risk since significant forecast errors due to weak forecasting ability 
reduce the likelihood of reducing fiscal risk.  
 
Disclosure of a fiscal risk in a quantitative or qualitative manner is largely conditional 
upon the probability of accurately estimating the fiscal cost of the anticipated episode 
and the likelihood of its occurrence. The IMF (2009) regards circumstances where an 
episode’s anticipated cost cannot be quantified as “uncertainty”, and circumstances 
where the probabilities and costs of events can be quantified as “risk”. Since fiscal 
sustainability is a long-term issue, unexpected changes in fiscal and macroeconomic 
aggregates such as GDP growth, debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios, calculated 
as differences between budget estimates and final figures, have implications for fiscal 
sustainability. Based on findings of the IMF (2009), forward-looking estimates of fiscal 
risks derived based on standardised bound tests in 19 developed and emerging 
market economies reveal that a one-half standard deviation shock to GDP growth 
could lead to an average increase in debt-to-GDP ratio by 6.8 percentage points five 
years later. Similarly, a one-half standard deviation shock to the primary deficit would 
lead to 5.2 percentage points rise in debt-to-GDP ratio after five years.     
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Most unexpected upsurges in public debt-to-GDP ratio in nations that operate floating 
exchange rate systems are largely attributed to exchange rate depreciations and calls 
on contingent liabilities (IMF, 2009). In addition, calls on guarantees, public private 
partnerships (PPPs) on large investment or infrastructure projects and government 
bailouts on public enterprises and sub-national government spheres are another major 
source of fiscal risks. In order to effectively manage such fiscal risks, fiscal authorities 
should publicly disclose information on such risks in a transparent manner to enable 
government make informed decisions on whether or not to take such risks (IMF, 2009). 
Reliable public disclosure of fiscal risks enhances fiscal transparency, sovereign bond 
ratings and access to domestic and foreign capital markets for government borrowing. 
Cross-country regressions conducted by the IMF (2009) on a sample of 54 nations 
surveyed at different time periods during 1999 to 2007 report evidence of significant 
and positive association between overall fiscal transparency (disclosure of fiscal risk) 
and sovereign bond ratings and access to capital markets, ceteris paribus.  
 
3.7.2. Fiscal Risks Disclosure and Management  
Sound macroeconomic policies, fiscal risk regulatory and administrative frameworks, 
appropriate public debt management strategies, and systematic integration of fiscal 
risk analysis into medium term fiscal planning and budget processes are prerequisites 
for cost-effective mitigation of fiscal risks (IMF, 2009). As such, improved transparency 
in disclosure of information on fiscal risks creates room for additional rigorous analysis, 
which further improves accountability by government. Essentially, standard practices 
of fiscal risk disclosure require budget documentation to show an analysis of fiscal 
sustainability, overall risk mitigation strategy, alternate macroeconomic scenarios and 
sensitivities of fiscal aggregates to alterations in assumptions, descriptions of the 
nature and fiscal significance of quasi-fiscal activities and associated risks, public debt 
management strategy and information on contingent liabilities (IMF, 2009). The 
identified fiscal risks should systematically be integrated into fiscal analysis and budget 
process, and macroeconomic policy framework to ensure that such fiscal risks can be 
rigorously scrutinised and integrated into fiscal sustainability analysis.  
 
Based on guidelines provided by the IMF (2009) with regards to public disclosure of 
fiscal risks, a single “Statement of Fiscal Risks” should be used by countries to present 
their relevant fiscal risks for each budget year. The probable structure of the respective 
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statement can be adapted by countries based on their applicable characteristics, such 
as relevance of shocks and institutional arrangements. The statement could begin with 
a concise description of how the government’s overall fiscal strategy could have 
reduced fiscal risks to ensure fiscal policy sustainability. The sources of fiscal risks 
covered in the statement include macroeconomic risks and budget sensitivity, public 
debt composition, contingent central government expenditures, PPPs, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and subnational governments. 
 
Depending on country-specific conditions, sound strategies for fiscal deficit or debt 
reduction are the major approaches used to mitigate fiscal risks. Numerous countries 
such as Japan, Armenia, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, and Indonesia implemented formal 
debt management strategies, while some countries such as South Africa adopted 
explicit targets for public debt durations, maturity profiles of public debt service and 
proportions of public debt denominated in foreign currency (IMF, 2009). In mitigating 
fiscal risks linked to PPPs, government can allocate or transfer certain project risks 
such as design and implementation risks to agents that have the technical capacity to 
manage those risks, while government manages political and regulatory risks.  
 
3.7.3. Fiscal Risks Disclosure in South Africa 
The IMF (2009) guidelines for disclosure of fiscal risks stipulate that “fiscal risks to 
which the government is exposed should be identified and disclosed, so as to facilitate 
an effective conduct of fiscal policy”. Stuart and Dlamini (2015) define fiscal risk as 
“possible adverse events that could substantially affect the probability of government 
to attain its budgetary commitments and long-term fiscal sustainability”. Since the 
overall management of the fiscus in a country remains the mandate of the Ministry of 
Finance, the authority of identification, disclosure, monitoring and management fiscal 
risks should be assigned to a central unit with sufficient technical capabilities in the 
respective ministry (IMF, 2009). In South Africa, the National Treasury formed a Fiscal 
Risks Committee in 2014 to develop a fiscal risks framework that aims to enhance 
achievement of the nation’s fiscal targets (Stuart and Dlamini, 2015). The respective 
risks are classified into short-term, medium-term and long-term risks. Short-term risks 
are those that can possibly arise during the current financial year. Conversely, 
medium-term risks are those that can probably occur during the three-year budgeting 
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phase. On the contrary, long-term risks are those that are expected to occur during 
the post-MTEF period (Stuart and Dlamini, 2015).        
 
The combination of overestimated growth projections, sluggish fiscal consolidation 
and rising public debt resulted in recognition of the need to ensure extensive reporting 
of fiscal risks as part of efforts to ensure fiscal sustainability through counter-cyclical 
stimulus, and compelled fiscal authorities to adopt institutional reforms. In the 
beginning of 2012/13 fiscal year, an expenditure ceiling (explicit limit on main budget 
non-interest spending) was introduced whereby medium-term expenditure estimates 
are converted into numerical targets instead of baselines (Stuart and Dhlamini, 2015). 
Moreover, the modelling of the nation’s long-term fiscal outlook was also conducted to 
assess sustainability of the country’s large social programmes. On the contrary, a 
fiscal risk statement was introduced as an ongoing integral component of the medium-
term fiscal planning and budget process. 
 
The 2016 MTBPS Fisk Risk Statement postulates that South Africa is characterised 
by a number of institutional strengths that promote fiscal sustainability. The National 
Treasury (2016) points out that the respective strengths include the following: 
 The Constitution of the country and the PFMA that embed a centralised framework 
for fiscal management. National government revenues are all paid into the National 
Revenue Fund (NRF) and the national budget is tabled in a consolidated manner. 
 Reduced debt-refinancing risks in the deep and liquid domestic bond market and 
long maturity government debt largely denominated in local currency. Subnational 
governments’ loans and guarantees are limited and subject to national legislation. 
 Transparent, predictable and open budget process reinforced by the MTEF, and a 
fiscal framework anchored on credible fiscal and macroeconomic projections. The 
country’s tax system steadily improved, coupled with well-maintained government 
expenditure ceiling despite emerging spending pressures.  
 The nation’s record of fiscal sustainability reflected by the government’s continued 
commitment to reduce budget deficit in reaction to rising debt.  Complimentarily, 
SARB supports government’s efforts to maintaining fiscal sustainability by 
operating an inflation targeting system that manages inflation expectations and 
flexible exchange rate regime, which further ensures absorption of external shocks.    
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 Adequate capitalisation of financial institutions and sound regulation of the financial 
sector. The IMF 2014 Financial System Stability Assessment Report indicates that 
South Africa’s financial sector remains in a resilient position to withstand austere 
shocks owing to sound capitalisation (National Treasury, 2016).  
 
Despite the above-mentioned institutional strengths that support fiscal sustainability in 
South Africa, the National Treasury 2016 MTBPS also released a Fiscal Risk 
Statement containing descriptions of fiscal risks that affect the government’s efforts to 
stabilise public debt-to-GDP ratio and ensure fiscal sustainability. The Statement 
postulates that the major fiscal risks faced by the country over the next years beyond 
2016 are “lower than projected economic growth, higher than predicted upsurges in 
compensation budgets, and perilous finances of some SOEs and public entities” 
(National Treasury, 2016). In that regard, South African government’s fiscal risks 
framework is mainly organised into the following four main categories outlined below: 
 
a) Macroeconomic risks 
These risks emanate from the effect of slower than projected nominal GDP and 
revenue growth, public debt sustainability under alternate economic scenarios, and 
impact of macroeconomic outlook on rising debt servicing costs. Since 2011, there 
have been several downward revisions of South Africa’s growth projections following 
downward revisions of global economic growth projections by the IMF and lower than 
projected commodity prices, domestic electricity shortages, drought and labour 
disruptions (National Treasury, 2016). To evaluate the magnitude of fiscal risk arising 
from macroeconomic channels, the National Treasury developed three probability 
macroeconomic scenarios. The first scenario points out the likelihood of “long-term 
deterioration in potential growth”. Projected output growth over the medium term is 
likely to remain lower, and expected to remain below 2% in the long-term.  
 
The second scenario points out the likelihood of “intensified global instability”. Global 
productivity growth forecasts may be subject to regular downward revisions owing to 
the observed impact of Britain’s departure from European Union and China’s 
transition. Unfortunately, sluggish economic growth in developing countries, shrinking 
capital flows and unfavourable commodity prices are likely to cause upsurges in local 
risk premiums, which could imply increases in government borrowing costs. The third 
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scenario points out the likelihood of “improved export competitiveness owing to 
depreciation of the rand”. South Africa’s exports have not improved in line with the 
significant depreciation of the rand in recent years (National Treasury, 2016).  
   
b) Policy and budget execution risks 
Policy risks result from unforeseen and emergency expenditure requests leading to 
pressure on expenditure ceiling, while budget risks emanate from implementation risks 
linked to proposed in-year spending estimates and failures by departments and 
entities to achieve expenditure targets. For instance, budget execution risks attributed 
to the 2016 MTBPS proposal include public sector wage bill pressures, underspending 
on infrastructure, and pressures on the exchange rate. Sustained pressure on the 
wages frontier may lead to crowding out of resources from capital budgets for 
infrastructure development to compensation.    
 
c) Contingent and accrued liabilities risks 
Government guarantees in South Africa are the central government’s main explicit 
contingent liabilities. Deteriorations in financial positions of public entities or SOEs 
increase the risk of government’s guarantee exposure. Based on National Treasury 
2016 MTBPS, the primary contingent liability risks to the South African fiscus are 
government guarantees to the following SOEs: 
 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) for acquisition of new rolling 
stock and signaling equipment.  
 South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) to enhance the 
expansion of toll roads portfolio.  
 South African Airways (SAA) to sustain operations of the enterprise as a going 
concern.  
 South African Post Office (SAPO) for governance reform.  
 Land Bank for expansion.  
 Road Accident Fund (RAF) to mitigate insolvency of the enterprise.  
 
To maintain fiscal sustainability, the National Treasury consistently reviews its long-
term fiscal model to evaluate the sustainability of the country’s large social spending 
programmes. Currently, the country’s large social spending programmes are deemed 
sustainable over the long-term based on the present assumptions of demographic 
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changes and growth forecasts (National Treasury, 2016). Changes to the population 
structure would largely have serious implications on sustainability of social spending 
programmes, which would put pressures on municipal finances earmarked for service 
delivery in face of the currently constrained revenue capacity. 
          
3.8. Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the fiscal framework of the South African economy in terms of 
the medium-term to long-run trajectories in the broad budgetary aggregates of national 
government total tax and non-tax revenues, government expenditure, government 
debt and fiscal balances. The fiscal risks framework was finally discussed with regards 
to its diverse sources of such fiscal risks, their relevant significances, disclosure and 
management in context of the South African economy.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter consists of three major sections. Section 4.2 provides a brief theoretical 
economic definition of fiscal policy sustainability. Section 4.3 presents and discusses 
the analytical framework comprising of diverse approaches used by previous studies 
in assessing fiscal sustainability. Section 4.4 provides the conclusion to the chapter.  
 
4.2. Defining Fiscal Sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability can be defined as either static budget constraint or inter-temporal 
budget constraint. A static budget constraint is satisfied if a government demonstrates 
the ability to finance its current spending with revenues and new borrowing in a manner 
that allows the rolling-over of maturity liabilities. Burnside (2004) asserts that since the 
concept of fiscal sustainability is linked to the solvency condition, a fiscal policy can be 
deemed sustainable only if government can service its debt obligations without explicit 
default. Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2006) and Burger, et al. (2011) argue that a fiscal policy 
is regarded sustainable if the long-term terminal debt-to-GDP ratio does not exceed 
its initial ratio. Fiscal becomes sustainable only if government can infinitely pay back 
its debt without explicit default, and if the present value of future revenue flows 
exceeds outstanding debt plus the discounted value of future spending.  
 
4.3. Analytical Framework  
Following Abdulla, Mustafa and Dahalan (2012), analysis of fiscal sustainability can 
be conducted based on the static budget constraint and/or inter-temporal budget 
constraint (IBC). A static budget constraint is satisfied if government exhibits the ability 
to finance its current spending with its revenue and new borrowing, and rolling over its 
maturing liabilities. In addition, the IBC hinges on the solvency criterion and requires 
the present discounted value of upcoming primary balances to be at least equal to the 
unpaid debt stock value. Prior studies assessed fiscal sustainability (Chalk and 
Hemming, 2000; Burnside 2004; Polito and Wickens 2005; Kirchgaessner and Prohl 
2006; Tshiswaka-Kashalala 2006; Burger, et al. 2011; Calitz, et al. 2013; Ganyaupfu 
2014; Aldama and Creel 2016). 
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4.3.1. The Static Budget Constraint 
Conceptualising from the static budget constraint, Chalk and Hemming (2000) propose 
that the level of future public debt stock should be determined by the discounted initial 
debt stock and current primary balance, defined by the function: 
 
tttt BDRD 1                      (4.3.1.1) 
 
where tD  represents government’s initial debt stock or outstanding bonds, rR t 1
denotes the discount factor between periods t and t + 1, and tB is the primary balance.     
 
Through forward iteration, equation (4.3.1.1) yields the budget constraint specified as: 
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represents the discount factor between periods t and t + h. 
From equation (4.3.1.2), the present value of future primary surpluses must exceed 
the present value of future primary deficits by an amount sufficient to settle the 
difference between the initial debt stock and present value of the terminal debt stock.  
 
Consistent with equation (4.3.1.2), the transversality (no-Ponzi) condition specified in 
equation (4.3.1.3) must hold in order to ensure sustainability of fiscal policy. 
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Therefore, current debt must be matched in present value terms, with an excess of 
future primary surpluses over primary deficits in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
 
4.3.2. Government Lifetime Budget Constraint 
Burnside (2004) argues that government lifetime budget constraint must be observed 
as the crucial starting point for analysing fiscal sustainability, based on the identity: 
 
seignoragebalanceprimarypaymentsinterestissuancedebtNet   (4.3.2.1) 
 
Expressing the above identity (4.3.2.1) as a mathematical notation yields the function: 
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)MM(BIDD tttttt 11              (4.3.2.2) 
 
t:where denotes time in years, tD  symbolises the amount of government debt at the 
end of period t, tI represents interest payments, tB denotes primary balance (revenue 
less non-interest spending), and tM represents local currency denominated monetary 
base at the end of time period t. 
 
Since sustainability of fiscal policy remains a long-term policy issue, Burnside (2004) 
considers use of a government’s lifetime budget constraint as a suitable approach to 
assess sustainability of public finances. To derive the government’s lifetime budget 
constraint, Burnside (2004) makes the assumptions that time is discrete, all public debt 
matures in time period t, debt is measured in real terms and interest rate is constant.  
 
The government’s lifetime budget constraint (equation 4.3.2.2) can be rewritten as: 
 
  tttt bdrd  11                   (4.3.2.3) 
 
ttt /YDd:where   is the end-of-period public debt stock as a ratio of GDP, ttt /YBb   
is primary balance-to-GDP ratio, and   tttt P/MM 1  is real value of seigniorage. 
 
Rearranging equation (4.3.2.3) reduces to: 
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Updating equation (4.3.2.4) to period t yields: 
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Substituting td (equation 4.3.2.5) into the RHS of equation (4.3.2.4) yields: 
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Substituting 1td  on the RHS of equation (4.3.2.6), and for 2td ,…., recursively (after 
several iterations) yields: 
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The mathematical expression in equation (4.3.2.7) describes the correlation between 
the amounts of debt a government holds at two different time periods t-1 and t + j. In 
real practice, the amount of debt a government holds at period t+j is therefore a 
function of the amount of initial debt stock held at period t-1, as well as the amount of 
primary surplus realised and seigniorage raised between periods t+j and t-1.  
 
The condition     01 1  
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drlim  has to be imposed in order to derive the government 
lifetime budget constraint specified by the function: 
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The budget constraint specified in equation (4.3.2.8) shows that government finances 
its initial debt by raising seigniorage revenue and generating primary surpluses in 
future, whose present value equals initial public debt obligations (Burnside, 2004).            
 
From the fiscal and monetary policy coordination viewpoint, when a set of fiscal and 
monetary policies maintained indefinitely puts the country on a solvency path, that 
policy composite can be deemed sustainable (Burnside, 2004). Therefore, analysis of 
fiscal sustainability should not focus merely on default alone, but also on possible 
effects of changes to the policy mix required to prevent possible default. Against this 
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backdrop, Burnside (2004) developed a fiscal sustainability analysis framework that 
captures the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy. The effects of 
changes to fiscal policy and monetary policy stances are captured by the real version 
of the government lifetime budget constraint defined as: 
 
    tttttt P/MMbdrd 111                (4.3.2.9) 
 
ttt P/Ddwhere  denotes the end of period t real debt stock, r  is the real interest rate, 
ttt P/Bb   is the real primary balance and   ttt P/MM 1  is real seigniorage revenue.  
 
Rearranging equation (4.3.2.9) to a reduced form yields: 
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The RHS of equation (4.3.2.10) represents the government’s financing requirement, 
given by the nominal value of the sum of real interest payments and primary deficit. 
Concomitantly, the LHS of equation (4.3.2.10) denotes government’s financing, which 
comprises of the net issuance of debt and net issuance of base money. In scenarios 
where fiscal authorities determine tb , then trd could be predetermined. In addition, the 
role of monetary authorities as per equation (4.3.2.10) could fundamentally be defined 
to be management of government debt. 
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From a price stabilisation standpoint, fiscal authorities can choose tb  while monetary 
authorities (central bank) choose 
tM  and td  consistent with equation (4.3.2.10). In 
situations or regimes where government issues debt to finance deficits while money 
is never printed to finance deficits or monetise government debt  tMM t  , the 
government lifetime budget constraint becomes: 
   



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0
1
1 1
t
t
t
brd                    (4.3.2.11) 
Equation (3.3.2.11) implies that the present value of the primary balance remains 
equal to the initial government debt stock. The scenario that tMM t   implies that 
running a primary deficit at time 00 0  b;t  forces fiscal authorities to ensure future 
primary surpluses in present value terms as specified by the function:  
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1
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t
t
t
br                       (4.3.2.12) 
The condition specified by equation (4.3.2.12) characterises a rigid monetary policy 
stance, which could require future fiscal policy to tighten if the current fiscal stance 
tends to be become loose as time progresses.  
 
In circumstances where government and central bank coordinate fiscal and monetary 
policies and pursue an inflation target   , the central bank can determine a growth 
rate of money stock consistent with the inflation target. Conversely, in situations where 
fiscal and monetary policies are not coordinated, the central bank would essentially 
need to set the transactionary motive for money demand constant MdMdT   to 
ensure that the real balance remains constant )v/qP/M( tt  , where “q” denotes real 
GDP and “v” signifies a constant real value for money velocity. If the growth of money 
remains constant at some rate , the inflation rate can be set at  , and the real 
value of seigniorage becomes constant at t such that:  
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To maintain stability in the general price level from the current period 0 to some future 
period T, the central bank sets the growth rate of money to some realistically lowest 
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possible arbitrary value  . However, if central bank inevitably prints money to ensure 
government’s solvency, the money growth rate could have to be set at constant  , 
consistent with government’s lifetime budget constraint. To ensure policy coordination, 
fiscal authorities can set tbb t   and 1 rdb . As such, some seigniorage revenue 
can be required to satisfy the government’s lifetime budget constraint at some time 
period T+1 defined by the function: 
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Since   tbbandT,tforθ1m/θρ tt  , equation (4.3.2.14) can be rewritten as: 
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r
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          (4.3.2.15) 
 
Solving for  in equation (4.3.2.15) yields: 
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From equation (4.3.2.16), higher levels of government debt at time period T could 
imply higher   since 
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The government budget constraint rolled from time period 0 to time period T becomes: 
 
         


 
T
t
tt
t
T
T
brdrd
0
11
1 11        (4.3.2.18) 
 
Rearranging equation (4.3.2.18) yields: 
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Such that: 
 
- 59 - 
 
  
  

















1
1
11 1
1
mb
r
drrln
T
d TT       (4.3.2.20) 
 
The government can accumulate more public debt when   is lower. Following 
Burnside (2004), the mathematical manipulations above exhibit that a tougher 
monetary stance (lower ) over a significantly long period (higher T) potentially leads 
to increased public debt stock  Td . Burnside (2004) demonstrates that in order to 
ensure sustainability of fiscal policy, fiscal authorities and the central bank should set 
paths of primary balance  tb  and base money supply  tM  consistent with the 
government’s lifetime budget constraint      

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i
itit
i
t brd . Since the central 
bank cannot stabilise prices indefinitely without support of fiscal authorities, the dual 
goals of a stable general price level and a sustainable fiscal policy can only be attained 
through effective coordination of fiscal and monetary policies (Burnside, 2004). 
 
4.3.3. Present Value Budget Constraint 
The present value budget constraint (PVBC) is an alternative approach used to assess 
sustainability of fiscal policy. Furthermore, Yamauchi (2004) elaborates that fiscal 
policy is deemed sustainable if the present value of the budget constraint remains 
satisfied without making substantial abrupt adjustments to both revenue and 
expenditure balances to prevent solvency and liquidity constraints. In order to ensure 
solvency, the current and future primary expenditure in present value terms should not 
exceed the analogous current and future revenue (net of interest payments) as given 
by the function: 
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tPEwhere is primary expenditure (net of interest payments), GDP is national income, 
tD  is public debt stock at the start of period t-1, and tr  is the nominal interest rate.  
 
Equation (4.3.3.1) shows that regardless of satisfying the solvency condition, liquidity 
can be deemed to exist when government holds liquid assets and financing sufficient 
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to meet or rollover maturing obligations. Based on this condition, fiscal sustainability 
occurs when the present value budget constraint is satisfied, defined by the function: 
 
     
  





















0 0 0
000
111i i i
i
h
ht
t
i
h
ht
ht
i
h
ht
it
t
r
PE
r
Z
r
B
D              (4.3.3.2) 
 
tDwhere represents government debt stock at the start of period t, tB denotes primary 
balance, 
tZ signifies government total revenue, tPE  represents primary expenditure 
(total spending less interest payments), and tr  represents the nominal interest rate. 
 
The condition specified by equation (4.3.3.2) indicates that current government debt 
must not exceed, or at most equal, the excess sum of future primary surpluses over 
primary deficits in present value terms. Therefore, government can experience 
temporary primary deficits as long as such primary deficits can eventually be offset by 
the total of future primary surpluses. Expressing the variables in equation (4.3.3.2) as 
ratios of GDP yields the PVBC in the functional form given as: 
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where the lower cases of variables represent the respective variables as ratios of 
GDP, and  represents the nominal growth of GDP.  
 
Since government debt comprises domestic debt denominated in local currency and 
external debt denominated in foreign currency, equation (4.3.3.3) can be modified to 
express domestic debt and external debt components expressed as ratios of GDP: 
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tddwhere is the initial government domestic debt stock dominated in local currency at 
period t, ted denotes the initial government external debt stock dominated in foreign 
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currency, t is the nominal exchange rate, t signifies the rate of nominal exchange 
rate appreciation, and 
fr represents the nominal interest rate on external debt. 
 
The function expressed by equation (4.3.3.4) indicates that the main determinants of 
public finance sustainability are government revenue, primary expenditure, domestic, 
and foreign debt stocks with corresponding nominal interest rates, nominal exchange 
rate and real GDP growth (Yamauchi, 2004). The exchange rate implicitly influences 
fiscal sustainability via the effect it directly transmits on the external debt component 
of the total government debt stock. The fluctuations in GDP remain critical to ensuring 
fiscal sustainability given the effect output trends have on developments of the primary 
constituent indicators of fiscal policy sustainability.  
 
4.3.4. Intertemporal Budget Constraint  
Kirchgaessner and Prohl (2006) posit that sustainability of government’s budget deficit 
is anchored on the statistic and intertemporal budget constraints of government. 
Derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint follows the statistic budget constraint: 
 
  ttttt DRDrG  11                     (4.3.4.1) 
 
tGwhere is government expenditure (excluding interest payments), tD  represents 
government debt stock, tR  is government revenues, and tr  denotes interest rate on 
government debt. Through forward substitution, the government intertemporal budget 
constraint is given by the mathematical function:  
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Assuming a constant real interest rate, the government budget constraint becomes: 
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Sustainability of fiscal policy depends on progression of the second term of equation 
(3.3.4.3) represented by . In cases where the transversality condition holds  0 , 
the government’s present value budget constraint reduces to: 
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The transversality condition 0 , also called the “no-Ponzi game” rule for government 
debt requires that the growth of government debt must not be greater than real interest 
rate. Escolano (2010) defines transversality condition as a scenario where government 
does not service its principal debt and interest by issuing new debt on a regular basis. 
The condition is deemed necessary and sufficient for fiscal sustainability only if the 
real interest rate is greater than the real growth rate.  
 
If current and discounted future surpluses sufficiently pay-off the current public debt, 
fiscal policy can be regarded to be consistent with the present value budget constraint. 
To determine whether fiscal policy remains consistent with the transversality condition, 
Kirchgaessner and Prohl (2006) follow the proposition by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
that stationarity properties of the primary deficit (excluding interest payments on public 
debt) can be tested. In addition, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) regard stationarity of the 
primary deficit as a sufficient condition for the validity of the present value budget 
constraint, such that 0 implies stationary public debt.  
 
Kirchgaessner and Prohl (2006) also elaborate that an alternative to the stationarity 
test approach proposed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) in measuring the intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC) is cointegration test between government debt and budget 
deficit series, particularly when such series has the same order of integration. Hakkio 
and Rush (1991) introduced a cointegration approach between government revenues 
and expenditures (instead of public debt and primary balance) given by the function: 
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tZwhere  denotes aggregate government expenditure. 
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In order for the R and Z  to be stationary, R and G series must be integrated of 
order one, yielding the fiscal condition: 
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As the term 
ntD   approaches zero at the limit, equation (4.3.4.6) becomes: 
 
ttt ZR                (4.3.4.7) 
 
The cointegration between Z and R is considered as a necessary condition for the 
present value budget constraint to hold, conditional upon both Z and R being I(1). In 
that regard, the condition 10   must hold in order for the term ntD   to approach zero. 
Based on the cointegration approach, Quintos (1995) argues that a distinction should 
be made between “strong” and “weak” sustainability. Using the regression function 
specified in equation (4.3.4.7), strong sustainability requires cointegration between 
government expenditures and revenues to have a cointegrating vector [1 -1], whereas 
weak sustainability occurs when 10  . To validate the “strong” and “weak” conditions 
for fiscal policy sustainability, Quintos (1995) reformulates the transversality condition 
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If the interest rate r  remains constant and D is a stationary process, the trend of the 
limit of the term in equation (4.3.4.8) can be derived conditional upon stochastic 
characteristics of D . The presence of stationarity in D leads to evolution of the term 
at the limit given by the function specified below: 
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where remains constant  0  
 
Similarly, a unit root D  gives a path of the limit term in equation (3.3.4.8) defined by: 
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The stationarity of tD  is regarded as a sufficient condition for the term in equation 
(4.3.4.8) to approach zero. Since the term in equation (4.3.4.9) approaches zero faster 
than the term in equation (4.3.4.10), equation (4.3.4.9) is deemed a “strong” condition, 
while equation (4.3.4.10) is regarded as a “weak” condition for fiscal sustainability.  
 
An alternative fiscal sustainability analysis approach used by Doi, Hoshi and Okimoto 
(2011) involves computation of a minimum tax rate the government has to impose to 
stabilise debt-to-GDP ratio given future government expenditures. The computation of 
the minimum amount of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio that can ensure sustainability of 
fiscal policy follows the method used by Broda and Weinstein (2005) and Doi (2009). 
The approach specifies that a fiscal policy can be regarded sustainable if it stabilises 
the debt-to-GDP ratio at the level in the base year in line with the government IBC:   
 
11   ttttt iDTGDD               (4.3.4.11) 
 
tDwhere denotes public debt outstanding at the end of time period t, tG  is government 
expenditures during time period t, tG is government expenditures during time period t, 
tT is government tax revenues for time period t, and i denotes constant interest rate.  
Expressing the fiscal variables in equation (4.3.4.11) as proportions of output yields: 
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ttt and,g,dwhere   are the public debt, government revenues and tax revenues (as 
ratios of GDP) respectively, and  represents the constant GDP growth rate such that 
the i in the long-run ensures fiscal policy sustainability. 
 
Deriving the debt-to-GDP ratio as a function of future debt-to-GDP ratio and future 
primary balance (surplus) by rearranging equation (4.3.4.13) yields: 
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Solving equation (4.3.4.14) further yields: 
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0dwhere denotes debt-to-GDP ratio at the initial period zero, and T is the future date.     
 
Equation (4.3.4.15) indicates that the current debt-to-GDP ratio must be equal to the 
present value of the future debt-to-GDP ratio and the future primary surpluses. Since 
fiscal sustainability requires the debt-to-GDP ratio at some future point in time to revert 
to the level at the initial period, the constant tax rate that makes Tdd 0  computation: 
 




















































iifg
T
iifg
ii
d
i
T
t
t
T
t
t
tT
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
           (4.3.4.16) 
 
From equation (3.3.4.16), the tax rate required to ensure fiscal sustainability becomes 
high under four scenarios, namely (i) high initial debt-to-GDP ratio, (ii) high levels of 
future government expenditure, (iii) high interest rate, and (iv) low output growth rate.   
 
For purposes of comparative analysis, Doi, et al. (2011) emphasise use of the method 
established by Bohn (1998) for examining fiscal policy sustainability. The estimation 
approach defines primary balance-to-GDP ratio as a linear function of public debt-to-
GDP ratio at the end of the previous period, defined as: 
 
ttttt Zbdb   11         (4.3.4.17) 
 
tbwhere represents primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, 1td denotes debt-to-GDP ratio in 
previous period, tZ  is a vector of stationary fundamental variables that influence the 
primary balance, t  is the Gaussian white noise with variance 
2 . The first variable 
contained in vector Z is the transitory deviation of government expenditure from its 
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trend level, as a proportion of GDP   Y/GGG ttdevt  , where tG  signifies the trend 
level of government spending computed using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) approach. 
Output gap computed using Hodrick-Prescott is incorporated into vector Z to capture 
variations of primary balance emanating from the budget automatic stabiliser function.  
 
Assuming constant interest rate and growth rate, the relation between primary balance 
and public debt (as ratios of GDP) gets defined as:  
 
  ttt bdid  11           (4.3.4.18) 
 
Substituting equation (3.3.4.17) into equation (3.3.4.18) yields: 
 
  ttttt Zbdid   111       (4.3.4.19) 
 
Realizing that   121 1   ttt ddib , the function for td becomes: 
  
    ttttt Zdidid   21 11        (4.3.4.20) 
 
Expressing td in the ADF regression yields: 
 
      ttttt Zdidid   11 11      (4.3.4.21) 
 
Therefore, td becomes stationary if    1i . The public debt-to-GDP ratio tends 
to stabilise in the long run if the primary surplus positively responds significantly to a 
rise in the debt-to-output ratio, assuming i . In scenarios where the primary balance 
follows the process defined by equation (4.3.4.17), the long-run primary balance-to-
GDP ratio can be given by   td/  1 . Therefore, government debt can be considered 
sustainable if   1/  exceeds the interest rate less the growth rate   )i/(  1 .  
                
4.3.5. Fiscal Stance Index 
In recognition of the interdependence between fiscal policy and monetary policy, Polito 
and Wickens (2005) proposed the construction of a fiscal stance index for analysis of 
fiscal policy sustainability. The index is therefore regarded as suitable for conducting 
an empirical analysis of possible implications for fiscal sustainability of monetary policy 
formulated based on the Taylor’s rule. Although a fiscal stance is deemed sustainable 
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if it satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint condition, it fails to solve the problem 
if the policy stance is analysed from a progressive angle over an infinite time horizon. 
Polito and Wickens (2005) recommended an intertemporal budget constraint based 
sustainability index of the current fiscal policy stance.  
 
The index is computed from comparing the existing debt level with a forecast of the 
present value of the current and future deficits and surpluses derived from the 
economy’s VAR forecasting model. An index exceeding unity indicates a sustainable 
fiscal stance while an index less than unity indicates absence of fiscal sustainability, 
and hence implies the need to adjust the fiscal stance. Nonetheless, based on the 
Lucas critique, any policy switch would have to be evaluated to determine whether it 
would achieve fiscal sustainability without altering the model of the economy. The main 
strength of the fiscal stance index is that the index is both informative and realistic.  
 
Instead of merely exploring the stationarity and/or cointegration properties of budget 
deficits and public debts, the fiscal stance index nullifies the assumption that interest 
rate and GDP growth rate are constant, either in the past or over a given forecast 
period. Both the interest rate and GDP growth rate are modelled in the simple VAR 
together with public debt, government expenditures and tax revenues (Polito and 
Wickens, 2005). As such, the conceptual framework of government budget constraint 
proposed and used by Polito and Wickens (2005) follows the function: 
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        (4.3.5.1) 
 
tgwhere is real government expenditure, ty is real GDP, tR is average interest rate on 
debt at the end of period t-1, td is government debt, t is inflation rate )P/P( tt 1 , 
denotes GDP growth rate, tt y/T is the average tax rate, and tm  real money stock. 
Therefore, government’s deficit in nominal terms is defined as: 
 
ttttttt
def
tt MTPDRgPGP  1          (4.3.5.2) 
def
tGwhere represents government budget deficit. 
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Expressing equation (4.3.5.2) as a proportion of GDP yields: 
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Concomitantly, the nominal primary deficit  tt bP  is defined as: 
 
1 tt
def
tttt DRGPbP                     (4.3.5.4) 
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Therefore, the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio becomes: 
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Defining 
   tttttttt
t
t rRwhere,
R
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11
1
1  (the real interest rate 
adjusted for economic growth), equation (4.3.5.6) can be expressed as: 
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From equation (4.3.5.7), the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio becomes: 
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The reaction specified in equation (4.3.5.7) remains key to determining sustainability 
of fiscal policy. Since fiscal sustainability examines the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratio
 tt y/d  and whether such government debt remains finite or explodes, fiscal policy can 
be deemed sustainable only if the debt-to-GDP ratio remains finite while financial 
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markets demonstrate willingness to hold the amount of debt that emerges. In respect 
of this background, Polito and Wickens (2005) underscore that when conducting fiscal 
sustainability analysis, it is important to differentiate between two scenarios. The first 
scenario assumes that the discount rate t  (and thus ttt ,,R  ) are constant, and the 
second scenario observes the discount rate as time varying in nature.  
 
Scenario 1: Constant discount rate  
In a scenario where t is observed to be constant, the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratio 
 tt y/d  from equation (4.3.5.7) follows the difference equation: 
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ηπRor,
η1π1
R1
1where 


  .  
 
Since the solution for the debt-to-GDP ratio )y/d( tt depends on whether equation 
(4.3.5.9) is either stable or unstable, both conditions should essentially be considered 
as elaborated by the following conditions. 
 
 Condition 1.1: 0  (stable condition) 
In this condition, 
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 and equation (4.3.5.9) is a stable difference function 
solved backwards through successive substitution. The expected value of the debt-to-
GDP ratio )y/d( tt at time period n conditional upon information at time t is defined as: 
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Taking the limit as n  yields the transversality condition: 
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In circumstances where equation (4.3.5.11) holds, the expected value of government 
debt (as a ratio of GDP) over a certain horizon is defined as: 
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Therefore, based on equation (4.3.5.12), the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratio depends 
on evolution of primary balance-to-GDP ratio. If tt y/b  exhibits stochastic tendencies 
and expected to grow at the rate , the expected value of tt y/b  gets defined as: 
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Proceeding further from equation (4.3.5.13), it therefore follows that: 
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The formulation above (equation 4.3.5.15) implies that the 0
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and explode if 0 . Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio remains finite and positive if the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio  tt yd  does not explode. Likewise, a 0  implies a 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio characterised as an I(0) process, and an expected value 
of debt-to-GDP ratio equal to zero. Where 0 , primary balance-to-GDP and debt-
to-GDP ratios become non-stationary I(1) processes. Therefore, the primary balance 
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and debt (as ratios of GDP) can be cointegrated with a cointegrating vector 






1
1, , 
implying a sustainable fiscal policy, as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio does not explode. 
 
 Condition 1.2: 0  (unstable condition) 
In this condition, 
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, and equation (4.3.5.16) is considered to be an 
unstable difference function solved by forward iterations defined by the function: 
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Applying the limits as n yields the transversality condition 
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The R.H.S. of equation (4.3.5.18) is the expected present value of current and future 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio. The equation reflects that the current and future primary 
surpluses can be adequate to offset current government debt. If the primary balance-
to-GDP ratio is expected to evolve according to the function  
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(equation 4.3.5.13), the debt-to-GDP ratio becomes: 
 
- 72 - 
 
   
01
1
11
1





 








 




;if,
y
b
y
b
y
d
t
t
s t
ts
t
t
         (4.3.5.19) 
   
Therefore, fiscal policy can be regarded sustainable as along as the current level of 
public debt-to-GDP ratio (L.H.S) does not exceed the R.H.S of equation (4.3.5.19), 
and the debt-to-GDP ratio can grow at the rate , the same rate as tt y/b . Hence, a 
stationary 01  tt y/b  and tt y/d  that is stationary. If tt y/b,  0  becomes 
an I(1) non-stationary process, resulting into a condition in equation (4.3.5.15): 
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Based on equation (4.3.5.20), tt y/d becomes I(1) and cointegrated with tt y/b .  
 
Scenario 2: Time-varying discount rate  
 
In standard practice,  is time-varying rather than constant. Reverting to the original 
budget constraint, the function  
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given by equation (4.3.5.7) can be 
solved through forward iterations, yielding: 
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Based on equation (4.3.5.21), fiscal solvency depends on the transversality condition: 
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Similar to equation (4.3.5.18), equation (4.3.5.23) indicates that the present value of 
the current and future primary surpluses must be sufficient to pay-off current debt. For 
purposes of determining the sustainability of fiscal policy, variables tx and tz  are 
introduced into the system and defined as: 
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In order to attain fiscal sustainability, the transversality condition specified in equation 
(4.3.5.25) is required to be present: 
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From the condition specified in equation (4.3.5.25), tx is defined as: 
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Following Wilcox (1989), fiscal sustainability is achieved if tx  becomes a zero-mean 
stationary process. However, Uctum and Wickens (2000) contend that tx  does not 
necessarily need to be stationary, and argue that fiscal sustainability can be attained 
if tz becomes a zero-mean stationary process while tx is an I(1) process.  
 
4.3.6. Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability Test 
Given that fiscal sustainability is a long-run policy issue, Aldama and Creel (2016) 
propose that analytical approaches to fiscal sustainability should address stochastic 
switches between fiscal regimes to separate sustainable regimes from unsustainable 
regimes. Building on Bohn’s (1998) Model-Based Sustainability framework and some 
literature on Markov-switching fiscal rules, Aldama and Creel (2016) introduce a 
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Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability test for examining fiscal sustainability. 
The construction of the test begins from the government budget constraint defined as: 
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tdwhere signifies the stock of public debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t, tg is 
the government non-interest expenditure-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t, t
signifies tax revenues-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t.  
 
The government budget constraint defined by equation (4.3.6.1) reflects that 
government non-interest expenditure  tg  is financed by national tax revenues  t  or 
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 t,t rr  and iteration of equation (4.3.6.1) yields: 
 


























 
11
1
11 T,t
Tt
t
T
i i,t
s
jt
t
s
tt
r
d
Elim
r
b
Ebd          (4.3.6.2) 
 
s
tbwhere  represents the primary surplus-to-GDP such that tt
s
t gb  .  
 
In order to consider fiscal policy as sustainable, the standard solvency condition must 
be satisfied according to which the initial public debt stock must be sufficiently backed 
by future expected primary surpluses in present value terms defined by the PVBC:  
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From equation (4.3.6.2), the PVBC can be equivalent to the transversality condition 
on the expected present value government debt stock defined as: 
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Equation (4.3.6.4) reflects the No-Ponzi Game (NPG) condition. The PVBC (equation 
4.3.6.3) equals to the NPG condition (equation 4.3.6.4) at equilibrium, thus preventing 
lenders and government from playing a Ponzi-scheme (Aldama and Creel, 2016).  
 
To address gaps associated with fiscal sustainability frameworks that do not capture 
the NPG condition and debt-stabilising condition, Aldama and Creel (2016) introduce 
a necessary and sufficient condition on the regime-switching fiscal policy rule for which 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilised by fiscal policy in the long-run. From a real practice 
standpoint, the economy is considered to be stochastic and comprises consumers and 
government such that the monetary authority holds complete control over the inflation 
dynamics in the economy. Therefore, government intertemporal budget constraint is 
required to hold for any given general price level, such that total national output (Y) at 
time period t characterised by a unit root with drift is given by the function: 
 

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0where denotes the long run growth rate of output, and 
 t  represents the random 
shock to the long-run output growth rate.  
 
To prevent the government from running a Ponzi scheme against lenders, and account 
for uncertainty and risk-aversion by lenders, a stochastic discount factor is integrated 
into the public debt function, yielding the present value budget constraint: 
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The PVBC specified by equation (3.3.6.6) is equivalent to the transversality condition: 
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The equivalence of the PVBC and transversality condition reflects that the government 
cannot run a Ponzi scheme following the Markov switching fiscal policy rule given by: 
 
   tttt
s
t zdzb  1              (4.3.6.8) 
 
 tzwhere  is the regime-switching parameter that represents the feedback effect of 
the initial public debt-to-GDP ratio 1td on primary surplus-to-GDP ratio conditional on 
fiscal regime tz . Therefore, fiscal regime is defined as: 
 
 






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
)(zif
)(zif
z
t
t
t
regimele ab unsustain
regimele sustainab
00
10
                 (4.3.6.9) 
 
 andwhere signify sustainable regime and unsustainable regime, respectively. 
 
Upsurges in debt lead to improvements in the primary balance during sustainable 
regimes  0 . Conversely, primary balance neither improves nor worsens during 
unsustainable regimes )( 0 . Finally,  tt z  is defined by the function: 
 
          sttttgttttt zgzzzz 

                          (4.3.6.10) 
 
where
tη

denotes output gap, 
t
g

represents temporary government spending,  tz  
signifies a regime-switching constant,  tz  represents the regime-switching standard 
error associated to an IID shock  10,~st  .  
 
The regime switching is considered to be stochastic and exogenous rather than being 
deterministic and endogenous. Therefore,    is defined as a row vector 
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containing regime-specific parameters while  Tttt zzZ  1 is defined as a column 
vector related to the Markov process tz . The scalar  tz  is then defined by: 
  
      







t
t
tt
z
z
Zz
1
                (4.3.6.11) 
 
The Markov process tz is associated to a transition matrix   with elements 
     10
1
,j,ijzizh
ttij


 such that: 
 
 ttttttt ZEZwith,ZZ 11           (4.3.6.12) 
 
The assumption that tz is an ergodic Markov process implies that t
j
jtt ZZE   
converges to unique ergodic distribution  such that: 
 
 
j
t
j Z              (4.3.6.13) 
 
 Tφwhere    is the column vector of ergodic probabilities related to each 
fiscal policy regime.   
 
Following Hamilton (1994), Aldama and Creel (2016) highlight that the Markov process 
remains ergodic as long as 1iih  and    100 ,j,ihh jjii  . Computationally, the 
ergodic probabilities are defined by the function: 
 
   jjii
jj
i
hh
h


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11
1
              (4.3.6.14) 
 
Based on equations (4.3.6.11) and (4.3.6.13), the conditional expectation of the 
feedback parameter  tz  at time period t converges to its unconditional expectation 
that is ergodic (long-run) value: 
 
   


j
t
j
jtt ZzE                  (4.3.6.15) 
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Following Aldama and Creel (2016), a necessary and sufficient condition is derived on 
the sequence    0iitz  such that equations (4.3.6.6) and (4.3.6.7) hold. In an 
economy where dynamic efficiency exists with bounded innovations t , a necessary 
and sufficient condition accompanied with the transversality condition is defined as: 
 
0                (4.3.6.16) 
where  represents an unconditional expectation  tz . 
 
The conditional defined by equation (4.3.6.16) specifies that a regime-switching fiscal 
policy must satisfy the No-Ponzi-Game condition, implying that the frequencies and 
deviations of sustainable regimes must be sufficient to compensate for unsustainable 
regimes in the long-run (Aldama and Creel, 2016). Based on the definition of ergodic 
probabilities (equation 4.3.6.14), and denoting the expected duration of fiscal regimes 
by
iih
q


1
1
, the condition given by equation (4.3.6.16) is defined as: 
 



q
q
           (4.3.6.17) 
 
Longer unsustainable regimes characterised by larger primary deficits require larger 
reactions of primary surpluses to public debt trajectories during sustainable regimes. 
Nonetheless, provided the condition defined by equation (4.3.6.17) holds, fiscal policy 
can periodically be unsustainable while at the same time satisfying the PVBC. Since 
the stronger constraint on fiscal policy requires a stationary public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
an upper bound on primary surplus-to-GDP ratio such that 
max,ss
t bb   implies presence 
of the maximum level (fiscal limit) of public debt (as a ratio of GDP ratio) such that: 
 
 



0i
i,tt
max,smax bd          (4.3.6.18) 
 
Therefore, fiscal policy would essentially be considered to be running a Ponzi scheme 
against lenders whenever 
max
t dd  . Since a condition defined by equation (4.3.6.17) 
does not rule-out the likelihood of an explosive path for debt-to-GDP ratio, a necessary 
and sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability could be a debt-stabilising rule around 
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a steady-state level below a given fiscal limit. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio must 
follow a Markov-switching autoregressive process defined by the function: 
 
   tttt zudzd  1              (4.3.6.19) 
 
            ttttttt
t
t zσr1zuandzκη11
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
  
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for strict stationarity of the process defined by 
equation (4.3.6.19) requires that: 
 
 r               (4.3.6.20) 
 
In order to stabilise government debt in the long-run, a regime switching fiscal policy 
must ensure that the condition specified by equation (4.3.6.21) holds: 
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        (4.3.6.21) 
 
Provided the conditions defined by equations (4.3.6.20) and (4.3.6.21) hold, the debt 
to GDP ratio converges to its unconditional mean defined as: 
 
       
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dE tt                   (4.3.6.22) 
 
   0 tzEwhere  represents the ergodic value of  tz . 
 
So long as the growth-adjusted real interest rate remains positive, the debt-stabilising 
condition remains tighter than the NPG condition. Therefore, Aldama and Creel (2016) 
elucidate that the response of primary surplus to initial public debt during sustainable 
regimes must be sufficient to compensate for primary deficits that could have been 
experienced during unsustainable regimes. Conversely, when  r , the condition 
defined by equation (4.3.6.21) could ultimately imply violation of the NPG condition by 
government, which is a minimum requisite for fiscal sustainability. Since a stationary 
debt-to-GDP ratio does not always invalidate the Ponzi scheme, the NPG condition 
and debt-stabilising condition thus provide as complements rather than substitutes.  
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4.4. Conclusion            
Theoretical literature covered the definition of fiscal policy sustainability and the 
theoretical framework consisting of analytical approaches which can be applied in 
conducting fiscal sustainability assessment. The conceptual approaches discussed in 
this research study include the static budget constraint, government lifetime budget 
constraint, present value budget constraint, fiscal stance index, and regime-switching 
model-based sustainability test.  
  
- 81 - 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses empirical findings on fiscal sustainability based on empirical 
literature survey conducted on countries in different continents. The chapter comprises 
six sections that distinctly discuss empirical findings on countries in Europe, America, 
Asia, Africa, mixed-group of countries and South Africa. The major issues discussed 
in this chapter include the data used, methodological procedures applied; estimation 
techniques used and major empirical findings from the studies. Discussed further are 
the research gap relating to the missing link between fiscal policy and monetary policy 
overlooked by previous empirical studies on fiscal sustainability conducted in South 
Africa. The last section provides the conclusion to the chapter.  
 
5.2. Frequencies of Empirical Studies Reviewed  
Table 2 below provides a summary of total numbers of empirical fiscal sustainability 
studies reviewed in this research study. 
 
Table 2: Numbers of Studies Reviewed  
Continent/Region/Country Number of studies (n) Relative proportion (%) 
Europe 11 26% 
America 9 21% 
Asia 5 12% 
Africa 8 19% 
Mixed-group of countries 4 10% 
South Africa 5 12% 
Total 42 100% 
Source: Compilations from various empirical publications  
 
From the total 42 empirical studies on fiscal sustainability reviewed in this study, the 
largest proportions of 26% (n=11) and 21% (n=9) related to countries in the European 
and American continents, respectively. Related studies explored in South Africa and 
Asian countries accounted for equal proportions of 12% (n=5), while the least quota of 
10% (n=4) of the studies comprised the group of countries from different regions.   
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5.3. Empirical Findings from European Countries 
This sub-section discusses empirical findings on fiscal policy sustainability obtained 
from empirical literature survey conducted on European countries. 
 
Table 3: Empirical Findings from European Countries  
Author(s), year and 
country/region 
Nature of data and 
time span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main 
findings 
Kirchgaessner, G. 
and Prohl, S. 
(2006). Switzerland 
Time-series (annual) 
1900–2002 
Revenue-to-
GNP ratio 
Expenditure-to-GNP 
ratio 
Cointegration 
(Engle-
Granger) 
Sustainable 
  
1900–1939 Unsustainable 
  
1946–2002 Sustainable 
  
1900–2002 
Cointegration 
(Johansen) 
Sustainable  
  
1900–1939 Sustainable 
  
1946–2002 Unsustainable 
     
1930–2002  
Primary 
deficit-to-GNP 
ratio 
Public debt-to-GNP 
ratio, Output gap, 
Expenditure, Inflation 
and Money growth rate 
OLS Unsustainable 
      
Antonevich, K. 
(2010); Sweden 
Time-series 
(quarterly); 
1994q1–2009q4 
GDP growth 
Revenue, Expenditure 
and Debt of the general 
government 
VAR 
Fiscal policy 
effectiveness- 
mixed results 
      
Potrafke, N. and 
Reischmann, M. 
(2012); 
German states  
Panel data (annual); 
1974–2010 for West 
German states and 
1992–2010 for East 
German states 
Primary 
balance (as a  
ratio of GDP) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio, and 
Institutional setting 
(fiscal equalisation 
schemes), Output gap 
and Public spending 
FGLS Mixed results 
      
Tantos, S. (2012). 
Greece 
Time-series (annual); 
1980–2009 
Public debt-
to-GDP ratio 
Primary deficit-to-GDP 
ratio, Growth rate, and 
Real interest rate 
2SLS Sustainability 
      
Stoian, A. M. 
(2016). 5 European 
countries  
Time-series (annual); 
1995–2013 
Primary 
balance (as a 
ratio of GDP) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Inflation, Interest rate, 
and Firms production  
OLS Mixed results 
      
Bi, H. and Leeper, 
E. M. (2013). 
Greece and 
Sweden 
Time-series (annual 
data for Sweden); 
1980–2007 
Expenditure,  
Transfers and 
Debt (% GDP) 
Productivity  
Transition 
probabilities 
calibrations 
Sustainable 
      
Rajlakshmi, D. 
(2013). 14 OECD 
countries  
Panel data (annual); 
1974–2010  
 
Revenue-to-GDP ratio, and Expenditure-
to-GDP ratio 
Cointegration Mixed results 
      
Burret, H. T., Feld, 
L. P. and Kohler, E. 
A. (2014). 16 
German states 
Panel data (annual); 
1950–2011  
Government 
revenue 
Government 
expenditure  
Cointegration Mixed results 
      
Piergallini, A. and 
Postigliola, M. 
(2016). Italy 
Time-series (annual);  
1862–2012 
Primary 
balance-to-
GDP ratio 
Debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Government spending 
gap and Output gap 
STR Sustainable 
      
Aldama, P. and 
Creel, J. (2016). 
France 
Time-series (annual); 
1963–2012    Primary 
balance-to-
GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, Temporary public 
government spending 
and Output gap 
OLS Unsustainable 
   
Time-series (annual); 
1963–2013    
RS-MBS Mixed results   
      
Afflatet, N. (2016). 
EU countries 
Panel data (annual);  
1995–2013 
Primary 
surplus 
Interest rates, Growth 
rate, RER, and UR  
FE  Sustainable 
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Kirchgaessner and Prohl (2006) performed unit root and cointegration tests to analyse 
whether fiscal policy in Switzerland was sustainable during the period 1900-2002. In 
order to take into account World War II-related structural shifts in budgetary processes, 
sub-samples tests were conducted for the pre- and post-World War II sub-periods. 
Unit root tests in levels and first differences were performed using the ADF and PP 
methods to examine stationarity properties of the federal primary budget deficit-to-
GNP ratio, total budget deficit, government debt, revenues, and expenditures. Based 
on the necessary condition that sustainability of the budget balance requires primary 
budget deficit to be stationary, unit root tests results provided evidence of stationarity 
of the primary deficit to-GNP ratio for the entire sample period 1900-2002.  
 
For the sub-sample periods, the null hypothesis of presence of unit root in the primary 
balance-to-GNP ratio was not rejected for the 1900-1939 pre-World War II sub-period. 
This indicates that fiscal policy was unsustainable during that period. Conversely, the 
null hypothesis on unit root in the primary balance-to-GNP ratio was rejected in respect 
of the 1946-2002 post-World War II sub-period, but indicated evidence of weak fiscal 
sustainability. Given that fiscal sustainability tests based on unit root tests of primary 
deficit are equivalent to tests for cointegration between revenues and expenditures 
conditional upon such variables having the same order of integration, cointegration 
tests were conducted between revenues and expenditures. Stationarity properties of 
revenue- and expenditure-to-GNP ratios were first examined. The null hypothesis of 
unit root in the series was rejected and variables demonstrated the same order of 
integration. Engle-Granger cointegration tests between revenue- and expenditure-to-
GNP ratios were then conducted for the entire period 1900-2002, as well as for sub-
periods 1900-1939 pre-World War II period and 1946-2002 post-World War II period.  
 
Findings of the Engle-Granger cointegration tests reveal that the Swiss fiscal policy 
was sustainable during the entire sample period 1900-2002 based on evidence of the 
presence of a cointegrating relationship found between revenue-to-GNP ratio and 
expenditure-to-GNP ratio. However, findings for the sub-samples periods reveal no 
evidence of presence of fiscal sustainability during 1900-1939 pre-World War II sub-
period. On the contrary, there was evidence of weak fiscal policy sustainability during 
1946-2002 post-World War II sub-period. Analogous findings from Johansen 
multivariate cointegration tests based on the Maximum Eigenvalue statistic and Trace 
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statistic confirm evidence of a cointegrating relationship between revenue- and 
expenditure-to-GNP ratios during the entire sample period 1900-2002. Results for the 
1900-1939 pre-World War sub-period show no evidence of cointegration between 
revenue and expenditure-to-GNP ratios, while evidence of a cointegrating relationship 
between the respective series was found during 1946-2002 post-World War II sub-
period. The study concluded that the federal budget deficit was consistent with the IBC 
condition during the complete sample period 1900-2002. However, the IBC condition 
was violated during 1900-1939 pre-World War II sub-period while evidence of weak 
sustainability of fiscal policy was found during the post-World War II sub-period.  
 
Antonevich (2010) analysed the effectiveness of Sweden’s fiscal policy using time-
series data during the period 1994q1–2009q4. The effects of general government 
revenue, expenditure and central government debt on GDP growth were examined 
using the Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model. The estimated results indicate that 
GDP growth demonstrated positive responses to increases in government expenditure 
and shocks in central government debt. However, the study points out that the positive 
response of output to an increase in revenue was in contradiction to economic theory, 
although similar findings were obtained by previous empirical studies.   
 
Potrafke and Reischmann (2012) introduced and examined the effect of institutional 
setting in fiscal policy formulation on sustainability of public finances in German states. 
With fiscal equalisation schemes considered as one of the institutional settings in fiscal 
policy making in the federal states, the study examined whether governments of the 
German states pursued sustainable fiscal policies, taking into consideration fiscal 
equalisation transfers. Panel annual data for the sample period 1974-2010 for West 
German states, and 1992-2010 for East German States were collected on the series 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio, public debt-to-GDP ratio, fiscal equalisation transfers, 
government spending and output gap. Using the Feasible Generalised Least Squares 
(FGLS) technique with fixed state and fixed period effects, fiscal sustainability was 
assessed by examining the effect of public debt on primary surplus, all as GDP ratios. 
Results from the estimated model for all the German states reveal the presence of a 
statistically significant positive association between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and 
government debt-to-GDP ratio. Similar results were found for West German states and 
the study concluded that governments as a whole panel and governments of West 
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German states pursued sustainable fiscal policies. The study found strong evidence 
that fiscal equalisation transfers enhanced sustainability of the states’ fiscal policies. 
Nonetheless, fiscal equalisation was found to have had a potential effect of providing 
governments with an incentive to increase their public expenditure levels, which would 
eventually render the entire equalisation scheme fiscally unsustainable.                     
 
Tantos (2012) examined whether Greek public debt-t-GDP ratio would be sustainable 
up to fiscal year 2020 by estimating a system of four equations for the sample period 
1980-2009. The equations formulated for estimation include the growth rate, public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, primary deficit-to-GDP ratio, and real interest rate. Regressors of 
the growth rate equation included public debt-to-GDP ratio, external balance-to-GDP 
ratio, real interest payments-to-GDP ratio, and real interest rate. On the contrary, 
explanatory variables of the public debt-to-GDP ratio included the growth rate and real 
interest rate. Regressors of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio included the growth rate, 
primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio, tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, and money supply. 
 
Explanatory variables in the real interest equation included the growth rate, primary 
deficit-to-GDP ratio, government debt-to-GDP ratio, and money supply-to-GDP ratio. 
ARDL model estimations were conducted to test for presence of long-run relationships 
in each equation. Subsequent to determination of suitable ARDL estimates, a system 
of equations was solved using the 2SLS approach. Simulated results indicate that 
increases in the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio led to reductions in primary deficit-to-GDP 
ratio at 1 percent significance level while public debt-to-GDP ratio plunged when 
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio decreased and/or when the growth rate increased.   
 
Stoian (2016) conducted country-specific analysis of five different European countries 
that were regarded to be most affected by sovereign debt and economic meltdown. 
The countries included Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Based on annual 
time-series data for the sample period 1995-2013, the OLS technique was applied to 
estimate the fiscal reaction function, which measured the response of primary balance-
to-GDP ratio to fluctuations in debt-to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, results reveal that 
governments of Italy and Portugal fulfilled the conditions of fiscal sustainability. The 
reaction of primary balance in response to shocks to shocks in public debt was 
statistically significant and positive, and immediate in the two respective nations. 
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Conversely, increases in public debt-to-GDP ratio led to reductions in primary surplus-
to-GDP ratio in Ireland. Therefore, fiscal policy in Ireland was deemed unsustainable 
during the period 1995-2013. Though positive, the impact of public debt-to-GDP ratio 
on primary surplus-to-GDP ratio Greece and Spain was statistically insignificant. 
Hence, no conclusion could be reached as to whether fiscal policies were sustainable 
or not in Greece and Spain.  
 
Bi and Leeper (2013) analysed the implications of fiscal policy behaviour on sovereign 
risk in Greek and Sweden during the period 1980-2007. Annual time-series data on 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio, transfers-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio and 
productivity series were analysed using transition probabilities calibrations within a 
framework of fiscal limit. Parameter calibrations of the model to annual data for the 
Greek and Sweden economies showed that Greek and Swedish fiscal policies were 
countercyclical. Therefore, fiscal policies in Greece and Sweden were regarded 
sustainable during the sample period 1980-2007.  
 
Rajlakshmi (2013) examined whether fiscal trends were sustainable or unsustainable 
in 15 selected OECD countries during the sample period 1974-2010. Annual panel 
data series on revenue-to-GDP ratio and expenditure-to-GDP ratio was analysed 
using unit root tests, cointegration and multicointegration frameworks, and employing 
sustainability criteria to assess fiscal practices in the respective countries. Results 
provide evidence of fiscal sustainability in eight countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Portugal during the sample period 
1974-2010. However, fiscal policies in France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, USA, and Spain were deemed unsustainable during the period 1974-2010.       
 
In German, Burret, Feld and Kohler (2014) examined sustainability of public finances 
in 16 selected German states using annual data on government revenue and spending 
for the sample period 1950-2011. Second generation error correction-based panel 
cointegration tests were applied in empirical estimation. The tests explored both the 
cross-sectional dimension and cross-sectional variation among states in the East 
German Laender and West German Laender. For the West German Laender panel, 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected in both the unrestricted case and 
restricted short-term dynamics. Although revenues and expenditures of some Laender 
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states were cointegrated, panel tests reveal that the entire panel was not cointegrated. 
Expenditures and revenues of West German Laender were deemed not cointegrated. 
Hence, fiscal policy was considered unsustainable. Panel cointegration tests on the 
West German first sub-panel rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration while the 
respective null hypothesis was not rejected for the second sub-sample. In addition, the 
nature and magnitude of cointegration coefficients in each panel were examined using 
Cross Correlated Effects (CCE) to determine sustainability conditions. The estimated 
cross-section beta coefficient less than provided evidence for rejection of the null of 
strict sustainability, though a significant and stable long-run relationship was detected.                                            
 
Piergallini and Postigliola (2016) investigated whether Italy’s primary surpluses were 
compatible with public debt to sustainability. Using annual time-series data for the 
period 1862-2012, the association between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and public 
debt-to-GDP ratio was tested using the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model. 
Government expenditure and output gap were integrated into the model as additional 
regressors. The STR approach was used to allow for the switching mechanism that 
captures the transition from one economic phase to another. Given that economic 
variables do not respond promptly to current prevailing economic conditions; a logistic 
function was employed to connect relevant economic variables. Controlling for output 
gap, government spending and World War periods, both linear and non-linear STR 
tests were conducted to examine the relationship between primary surplus and debt.  
 
Empirical findings from the study show that the null hypothesis of nonlinearity in the 
relationship between primary surplus-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio 
substantially outperformed the null hypothesis of linearity in the relationship between 
the respective fiscal indicators. The statistically significant negative effect of temporary 
government spending gap on the country’s primary surplus-to-GDP ratio supports the 
tax-smoothing theory. The positive but statistically insignificant effect of output gap 
reflects countercyclicality in the behaviour of fiscal policy. The significant positive 
reaction of primary surplus-to-GDP ratio to public debt-to-GDP ratio provides evidence 
of fiscal sustainability in Italy during the sample period 1862-2012. 
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Aldama and Creel (2016) examined whether fiscal policy was sustainable in France 
during the period 1963-2013. In order to consider the effect of fiscal regimes on fiscal 
sustainability in application to France, Aldama and Creel (2016) introduced a Regime-
Switching Model Based Sustainability approach to allow for periodic violations of the 
fiscal sustainability condition. In searching for a strictly positive and statistically 
significant feedback effect between one-period lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio and 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio, seven distinct models were estimated using the OLS 
technique. Findings obtained from five models that were employed in estimation of 
constant-parameters fiscal policy rules revealed no evidence of fiscal sustainability. 
Results showed statistically insignificant negative feedback effects between one-
period lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and primary surplus-to-GDP ratio. After controlling for 
deterministic time trends confirmed by unit root tests, two models revealed evidence 
of significant and positive reaction of primary surplus response to initial public debt. 
 
To assess the effect of switches in fiscal regimes, the Markov-switching fiscal rule was 
examined based on the Regime-switching Model-Based Sustainability test using data 
for the sample period 1965-2013. Accordingly, findings reveal that initial debt had a 
significant and positive effect on primary surplus in the first regime, indicating strong 
evidence of fiscal sustainability. Nonetheless, the second regime showed a statistically 
significant and negative correlation between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and initial 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, indicating that fiscal policy was unsustainable in France 
during that regime. The estimated long-run coefficients computed using ergodic 
transition probabilities reveal that both regimes were persistent, with primary surplus-
to-GDP ratio being positively correlated with initial public debt-to-GDP ratio.     
 
Based on the hypothesis of market discipline, Afflatet (2016) analysed the interaction 
between public debt and financial markets by estimating the reaction of governments’ 
primary surpluses to changes in borrowing costs. Using panel data of European Union 
countries for the period 1995-2013, the Fixed Effects model was applied to estimate 
the reaction of primary surplus to changes in two distinct forms of borrowing costs. 
The borrowing costs are (i) effective (perceived) interest rates general governments 
have to pay on unpaid debt, and (ii) effective interest rates central governments have 
to pay on outstanding debt. Empirical results reveal strong evidence that governments 
indeed raise primary surpluses in reaction to higher interest rates.  
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5.3. Empirical Findings from American Countries 
This sub-section discusses findings on fiscal policy sustainability obtained from related 
empirical literature survey conducted on countries in the American continent.   
 
Table 4: Empirical findings from American countries 
Author(s), year and 
country/region 
Nature of data and 
time span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main 
findings 
Hamilton, J. D. and 
Flavin, M. A. (1986). 
USA 
Time-series (annual);  
1960–1982 
Primary deficit and public debt ADF test Sustainable 
      
Wilcox, D. W. (1989). 
USA 
Time-series (annual); 
1960 – 1982 
Primary deficit and public debt ADF test Unsustainable 
      
Bohn, H. (1998); 
USA 
Time-series (annual); 
1916– 1995 
Primary surplus 
-to-GDP ratio  
Public debt-to-GDP 
ratio,  Government 
spending, and 
Output variation 
OLS (linear, 
quadratic 
and cubic) 
Sustainable 
      
MacDonald, R. 
(1992). USA 
Time-series 
(quarterly);  
1951q1–1984q4  
 
Primary deficit and public debt 
Cointegration 
tests (Engle-
Granger and 
Johansen) 
Unsustainable 
     
Bohn, H. (2005). 
USA 
Time-series (annual); 
1792–2003  
Primary surplus 
-to-GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, Temporary 
output and outlays 
OLS  Sustainable 
      
Daude, C., Melguizo, 
A. and Neut, A. 
(2011). Latin 
America 
Panel data (annual);  
2000-2009 
Adjusted budget balances (as ratios of 
GDP) – adjusted for deviations of 
output and commodity prices  
OECD 
methodology 
Fiscal policy 
cyclicality – 
Mixed results 
      
Luporini, V. (2015). 
Brazil 
Time-series 
(monthly);  
1991–2011 
Primary 
surplus-to-GDP 
ratio 
Net debt-to-GDP 
ratio; Output gap; 
and Indexed 
Federal securities 
VECM Sustainable 
      
Carvalho, L., Diniz, 
A., Pedrosa, I., and 
Rossi, P. (2016). 
Brazil  
Time-series 
(monthly); Dec 2006–
Jan 2014 
Net debt-to-
GDP ratio 
Monetary policy 
interest rate  
VAR  Unsustainable 
      
Alberola, E., 
Katarynuk, I., 
Melguizo, A. and 
Orozco, R. (2016). 
Latin America 
Panel data (annual);  
1990-2014 
Fiscal policy 
stance 
(structural 
primary 
balance) 
Financing 
conditions (spreads, 
threshold balances, 
debt dynamics and 
output gap); and 
Fiscal rules 
Panel 
estimation – 
FE, IV, OLS, 
and 2SLS 
with FE  
Mixed results 
 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) assessed fiscal sustainability in USA during the sample 
period 1960-1982 using annual time-series data series on primary deficit and public 
debt. Following the proposition made by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) that stationarity 
of primary deficit is a sufficient condition for the validity of the present value budget 
constraint (PVBC), the study tested for unit root on government budget deficit using 
the ADF test. The study finds evidence of stationarity on public debt and primary deficit 
levels and concludes that the US federal budget deficit was balanced in present value 
terms. Hence, fiscal policy was deemed sustainable during the period 1960-1982. 
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However, Wilcox (1989) criticised use of the unit root approach in assessing fiscal 
sustainability based on stationarity of public debt and primary balance in present value 
terms. Using the same data on public debt and primary deficit, Wilcox (1989) criticised 
the assumption of a constant real interest rate and proved that the PVBC can be 
satisfied even if the primary deficit is non-stationary. In light of such findings, Wilcox 
(1989) established that fiscal policy should be deemed sustainable only if the 
discounted value of public debt converges to zero. Using public data for the period 
1960-1982, Wilcox (1989) allowed for time-varying real interest rate, discounted the 
public debt series back to the initial time period and applied the ADF test to the 
discounted series. Findings from the analysis provide evidence of unsustainability of 
the US fiscal policy during the respective sample period.  
 
Bohn (1998) assessed whether fiscal policy was sustainable in USA during the period 
1916-1995. Using annual time-series data, the reaction of primary surplus-to-GDP 
ratio to changes in public debt-to-GDP ratio, government spending, and output cyclical 
variation was estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator linear, 
quadratic and cubic models. Results show that US fiscal policy was sustainable during 
the respective sample period. Moreover, Bohn (2005) conducted another long-series 
study to assess whether fiscal policy in USA was sustainable during the period 1792-
2003. The OLS method was used to estimate the response of primary surplus-to-GDP 
ratio to changes in debt-to-GDP ratio, temporary output, and temporary outlays. 
Findings show that US fiscal policy was sustainable during the relevant sample period. 
 
Macdonald (1992) introduced the cointegration test as an alternative to the unit root 
test approach used by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). Using US quarterly fiscal data on 
public debt and primary deficit for the sample period 1951 quarter 1 to 1984 quarter 4, 
Macdonald (1992) applied Engle-Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) cointegration 
methods. Empirical results from the analysis found evidence of cointegration between 
public debt and budget deficit, and concludes that the US fiscal policy or budget deficit 
was not consistent with the intertemporal budget deficit (IBC).  
 
Daude, Melguizo and Neut (2011) analysed whether fiscal policy in several selected 
Latin American countries was countercyclical and sustainable during the period 2000-
2009. Using annual panel data, original estimates of cyclically adjusted revenues for 
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eight countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and 
Peru) were presented using the standardised OECD methodology. The methodology 
was extended to assimilate the direct and statistically significant effect of commodity 
cycles on fiscal balances of numerous economies in Latin America. Results provide 
evidence that primary budget balances (as ratios of GDP), adjusted for deviations in 
output and commodity prices, were in equilibrium or surplus in all the eight countries. 
The graphical exposition produced to perform a comparative analysis of variations in 
adjusted primary balance and output gap levels to assess the cyclicality of fiscal policy 
indicate that the discretionary fiscal policy in Latin America was procyclical during the 
period 2000-2009. The estimated negative coefficient for correlation between adjusted 
primary balance and output gap confirm evidence of pro-cyclicality of the discretionary 
fiscal policy in Latin America. 
 
Luporini (2015) estimated a fiscal reaction function for the Brazilian economy to assess 
the manner in which the government’s fiscal reaction evolved over time using time-
series monthly data for sample period 1991-2011. The government’s average fiscal 
response measured by the reaction of primary surplus-to-GDP ratio to fluctuations in 
net debt-to-GDP ratio was estimated using the VECM approach. Two control variables 
were added to the fiscal reaction function, namely output gap and the percentage of 
government securities. The output gap captured the effect of the economic cycle, while 
the percentage of government securities was indexed to the baseline interest rate.  
 
Empirical results of the long-run section of the cointegrating vector showed a positive 
and statistically significant response of the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio to fluctuations 
in the net debt-to-GDP ratio, indicating that the Brazilian fiscal policy was sustainable. 
Similarly, results on the short-run dynamics primary surplus equation indicate that net 
public debt had a negative and statistically significant impact on primary surplus. Such 
results suggest that transitory deviations of the long-run primary surplus and net public 
debt relationship were compensated by fluctuations in the primary surplus.                
   
Carvalho, Diniz, Pedrosa, and Rossi (2016) conducted a study to assess the fiscal 
cost of an upsurge in monetary policy interest rate in the Brazilian economy. The 
indirect effects were estimated on the yield of public bonds that are indexed to the 
inflation and the exchange rate, and net public debt stock adjusted for international 
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reserves measured in the Brazilian currency. A Vector Auto-Regressive Model (VAR) 
model was used to estimate relationships between the interest rate, inflation and 
exchange rate to incorporate the indirect effects of the respective variables on the 
reaction of net public debt to shocks in the implicit interest rate. Findings reveal that 
monetary policy tightening based on diverse scenarios of GDP growth and primary 
surplus-to-GDP ratio led to an increase in net public debt-to-GDP ratio. The presence 
of a substantial foreign reserves stock intensified the fiscal costs of a tight monetary 
policy stance via the nominal exchange rate channel, thus leading to unsustainability 
of fiscal policy. Results indicated the need for consistent macroeconomic coordination 
between fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies to ensure fiscal sustainability.  
 
Alberola, Katarynuk, Melguizo, and Orozco (2016) analysed the effect of changes in 
financing conditions and fiscal rules on structural primary balance in eight Latin 
American countries using annual data for the sample period 1990-2014. The variables 
used as indicators of changes in the financing conditions include changes in spreads 
(Δspreads), threshold balance (Δtb) and market-based threshold balance (Δtb-mb). A 
positive effect of a specific financing condition indicator on structral primary balance 
implied that fiscal policies were restrained in response to deteriorations in financing 
conditions. Since fiscal policy reacts to dynamics in public debt and output gap, the 
respective variables were incorporated into the model as regressors. Accordingly, the 
Fixed Effects (FE) model was employed for estimation and took account of omitted 
variables bias emanating from presence of unobserved country heterogeneity. In order 
to address potential endogeneity between financial conditions variables and fiscal 
impulse, an instrumental variable (IV) estimator was applied for estimation.  
 
Results from the FE model show that changes in the implied threshold balance had 
statistically significant positive effect on changes in the structural primary balance 
while government did not react to changes in spreads. Correspondingly, results 
obtained from the IV (2SLS with FE) estimator provide strong evidence that changes 
in the implied threshold balance had a signifcant positive effect on changes in the 
structural primary balance. Results from both FE and IV estimators provide evidence 
that financing conditions indeed a significant determinant of fiscal stance during the 
sample period studied. Public debt had a significant negative effect on structural 
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primary balance, which showed enhancement of the fiscal position. The FE and IV 
methods also integrated fiscal rules and assesed their effect on fiscal stance, and 
showed that structural primary balance positively and significantly reacted to changes 
in financing conditions. Therefore, fiscal rules had a significant effect, but with an 
indication that fiscal rules potentially induced some endogenity in the bahaviour of 
financial variables. Overall, results show that the bahaviour of fiscal policy was 
countrcyclical during the crisis period but later became procyclical. Financing 
conditions were deemed a significant determinant of fiscal stance, while fiscal rules 
had a stabilising effect on fiscal policy.             
 
5.4. Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in Asian Countries 
This sub-section discusses findings on fiscal sustainability based on relevant empirical 
literature survey conducted on countries in the Asian continent.   
 
Table 5: Empirical findings from Asian countries  
Author(s), year 
and 
country/region 
Nature of data and 
time span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main 
findings 
Adams, C., 
Ferrarini, B. and 
Park, D. (2010). 
Developing Asia 
Panel data (annual);  
1990–2008  
Primary balance-
to-GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, GDP gap, 
Government 
expenditure gap  
FGLS, OLS 
FE and 
SGMM 
Sustainable 
      
Doi, T., Hoshi, T. 
and Okimoto, T. 
(2011). Japan 
Time-series (quarterly); 
1980q1–2010q1 
Primary balance-
to-GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, Government 
expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio, and GDP gap 
MLE and 
MSC 
Unsustainable 
      
Kuncoro, H. and 
Sebayang, K. D. 
A. (2013). 
Indonesia 
Time-series (quarterly); 
1999q1–2009q4 
Primary surplus-
to-GDP ratio 
Debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Interest rate ratio, 
Inflation rate, Output 
gap, Exchange rate 
depreciation, Relative 
change in real money 
supply, and Oil price   
OLS Sustainable 
      
Munawar-Shah, 
S., Abdul-Majid, 
M. and Hussain-
Shah, S. (2014). 
10 Asian 
countries 
Panel data (annual);  
1990–2010 
Primary balance-to-GDP ratio and Public 
debt-to-GDP ratio Panel Unit 
Root, and  
Cointegration 
tests 
Mixed results 
 
Revenue-to-GDP ratio and Expenditure-to-
GDP ratio 
      
Dalgıc, B., 
İyidogan, P. V. 
and Balıkcıoglu, 
E. (2014). Turkey   
Time-series (quarterly); 
2006q1–2013q3 
Tax revenues 
Government 
expenditures 
ARDL 
Weak 
sustainability 
 
Adams, Ferrarini and Park (2010) empirically examined whether public finances in the 
developing Asia were sustainable during the sample period 1990-2008. The study 
used annual panel data on the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
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GDP gap, and government expenditure gap. Fiscal reaction functions measuring the 
adjustment of primary fiscal balance to fluctuations in debt-to-GDP ratio positions were 
estimated using numerous panel estimation approaches. The latter include the 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects 
(OLS FE), and System General Methods of Moments (SGMM). Empirical results 
obtained from fiscal reaction functions estimated using the abovementioned panel 
estimators show evidence of fiscal sustainability in the whole region. The average 
response of primary balance to current and lagged public debt positions show that 
fiscal behaviour in the region was consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint.  
 
Doi, et al. (2011) used a three-step procedure in analysing sustainability of fiscal policy 
in Japan over the period 1980q1-2010q1. The first step calculated the minimum tax 
rate the government had to impose to stabilise the public debt-to-GDP ratio based on 
the approach used by Broda and Weinstein (2005) and Doi (2009). Estimated results 
from the first approach show that government revenue-to-GDP ratio had to increase 
permanently by the range 40%-47% to stabilise public debt-to-GDP ratio. The second 
step involved estimation of the response of primary balance-to-GDP ratio to an 
increase in public debt-to-GDP ratio between two regimes using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) and Markov switching criterion (MSC) methods. However, findings 
from second step estimation reveal that primary surplus-to-GDP ratio did not respond 
positively to debt fluctuations, signifying that the process was explosive. The final step 
estimated fiscal and monetary policies functions using the Markov switching model. 
 
Estimation of the monetary policy function was performed in respect of the rationale 
that in a country with a sound macroeconomic framework. The behaviour of fiscal 
policy also depends on how the central bank conducts monetary policy taking into 
account the inflation rate, output gap and real exchange rate variations. Based on the 
Markov switching model, estimation of the fiscal policy function focused on analysing 
the manner in which tax revenues responded to fluctuations in public debt-to-GDP 
ratio. The tax revenue-to-GDP ratio was estimated as a function of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio, government expenditure and output gap. Findings reveal that tax revenues 
did not rise in response to increases in debt-to-GDP ratio, while tax revenues slightly 
increased in response to upsurges in government expenditures. Fiscal dynamics in 
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Japan during 1980q1-2010q1 suggest that tax revenues did not adjust accordingly to 
enhance a sustainable fiscal path, hence fiscal policy was unsustainable.   
 
In empirically analysing the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal policies 
in Indonesia, Kuncoro and Sebayang (2013) estimated a monetary reaction function 
and a fiscal reaction function using quarterly time-series data for the period 1999q1–
2009q4. Therefore, the monetary policy interest rate and primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
were identified as the main determinants of the interaction between monetary and 
fiscal policies. Public debt-to-GDP ratio was included as a regressor in both monetary 
and fiscal policies reaction functions to determine whether the respective policies react 
to public debt positions. In respect of the fiscal reaction function, additional variables 
that accompanied debt-to-GDP ratio as regressors of the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio 
include monetary policy interest rate relative to the US interest rate, inflation rate, 
output gap, exchange rate depreciation, relative change in real money supply and oil 
price. With the interest rate specified as the regressand in the monetary policy reaction 
function, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies was explained by the 
coefficients of primary surplus and lagged government debt, as ratios of GDP.  
 
Results for the monetary reaction function estimated using the OLS approach show 
that the coefficients for primary surplus and lagged debt were positive and statistically 
significant. Increases in primary surplus and public debt led to positive adjustments in 
monetary policy interest rate. The respective findings provide evidence that monetary 
policy in Indonesia was certainly responsive to the fiscal policy, thereby enabling the 
government to maintain a sustainable fiscal path. With regards to estimates of the 
fiscal reaction function, the statistically significant and positive coefficient of lagged 
public debt-to-GDP ratio reveals that the government increased the primary balance 
surplus in response to an increase in public debt stock. Therefore, results suggest that 
fiscal policy in Indonesia was sustainable during period 1999q1-2009q4. However, the 
positive and statistically insignificant estimated coefficient of monetary policy interest 
rate of the fiscal reaction function shows provide evidence that fiscal policy was not 
responsive to monetary policy. Findings suggest violation of the necessary condition 
that in order to maximise utility, fiscal authorities should also consider monetary policy.  
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Munawar-Shah, Abdul-Majid and Hussain-Shah (2014) assessed fiscal sustainability 
for 10 Asian countries. The analysis was also conducted for two sub-panels of 
countries, grouped as SAARC* and IMT-GT* nations. The IMT-GT* group consisted 
of four high income countries, while the SAARC* group consisted of six low income 
countries. Using annual panel data for the sample period 1990-2010, panel unit root 
and cointegration tests were applied to examine cointegration properties between 
primary-balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio. Similar empirical tests 
were also performed between revenue-to-GDP ratio and expenditure-to-GDP ratio. 
Fischer ADF, Fischer PP, and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) unit root tests were used to 
examine stationarity properties of data, while the Pedroni (1999; 2004) Engle-Granger 
cointegration approach was applied to data series with the same order of integration. 
 
The Pedroni Engle-Granger panel cointegration results on primary surplus-to-GDP 
ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the 
group of all 10 countries, and SAARC* group of low income countries while the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected for countries in the IMT-GT* group of high income 
countries. Based on panel cointegration tests of primary surplus and public debt, 
results show that fiscal policy was sustainable in the region as a whole, and in the 
SAARC* group of four low income countries. Conversely, fiscal policy was deemed 
unsustainable in the IMT-GT* group of six high income countries. Similarly, results of 
panel cointegration test for revenue and expenditure show that the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration was rejected for the SAARC* group while the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected for the IMT-GT* group. Findings further confirm that fiscal policy was 
sustainable in SAARC* group of four low income countries, but unsustainable in the 
IMT-GT* group of six high income countries during the sample period of the study. 
 
Dalgıc, İyidogan, and Balıkcıoglu (2014) examined sustainability of fiscal policy in 
Turkey using quarterly time-series data for the sample period 2006q1-2013q3. 
Accordingly, the long-run relationship between fiscal tax revenues and government 
expenditures was analysed using the cointegration test and Auto-Regressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. Cointegration test was performed within the framework 
of the bounds testing methodology of Pesaran, et al. (2001). The respective 
methodology tests determined whether series were I(0), 1(1) or mutually cointegrated. 
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To validate the estimates from the cointegration test and determine the degree of fiscal 
sustainability, the ARDL model of revenues and expenditures was estimated. Though 
statistically significant, the estimated coefficients smaller than one indicate evidence 
of weak sustainability of fiscal policy in the country during period 2006q1-2013q3.         
 
5.6. Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in African Countries 
This sub-section discusses findings on fiscal sustainability based on relevant empirical 
literature survey conducted on countries in the African continent.   
 
Table 6: Empirical findings from African countries 
Author(s), year 
and country/region 
Nature of data 
and time span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main 
findings 
Mohamed, A. H. 
(2014). 6 member 
states of the 
WAMZ  
Panel data 
(annual); 
1985–2013 
Primary balance 
(as a ratio of GDP) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio Cointegration Mixed results 
      
Asiama, J., 
Akosah, N. and 
Owusu-Afriyie, E. 
(2014). Ghana 
Time-series 
(quarterly);  
2000q1–2014q1  
Primary balance 
(as a ratio of GDP) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Output gap, Exchange 
rate depreciation, CPI, 
and Commodity prices 
Bounds 
Testing ARDL 
Sustainable 
      
Oyeleke, O. J. and 
Adebisi, D. G. 
(2014). Ghana 
Time-series 
(annual); 
1980–2010 
Revenue-to-GDP 
ratio 
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
2-Step Engle-  
Granger ECM  
Sustainable 
(weak) 
      
Mafusire, A. (2015). 
Swaziland 
Time-series 
(annual); 
1986–2009  
Primary balance-
to-GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
and Output gap 
OLS Sustainable 
      
Caceres, C., Cevik, 
S. Fenochietto, R. 
and Gracia, B. 
(2015). Lybia 
Time-series 
(annual); 
2003–2010, 
Projections 
(annual); 
2011–2024 
Overall balance-to-
GDP ratio, Primary 
expenditure-to-
GDP ratio, Net 
asset accumulation  
Numerical fiscal rules 
(structural balance rule, 
augmented growth based 
rule, expenditure rule and 
an enhanced structural 
fiscal balance rule)  
Unrestricted 
VAR and 
Monte Carlo 
Simulations of 
fiscal rules 
Unsustainable 
      
Nzaramba, L. 
(2015). 10 African 
countries 
Panel data 
(annual);  
1970–2012  
Primary balance-
to-GDP ratio 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Government spending 
gap, Output gap, FDI-to-
GDP ratio, and 
Remittances-to-GDP ratio 
OLS Mixed results 
      
Mutuku, C. (2015). 
Kenya 
Time-series 
(annual);  
1970-2013 
Primary balance 
(as a ratio of GDP) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Output gap, REER, CPI, 
and Political dummy 
VAR and 
VECM 
Unsustainable 
      
Jibrilla, A. A. 
(2016). Nigeria 
Time-series 
(annual);  
1961–2014 
Real government revenue, Real government 
expenditure, and Budget deficit 
Cointegration, 
ARDL and 
DOLS 
Sustainable 
(weak) 
 
Mohamed (2014) analysed the fiscal policy framework in six member countries of the 
West African Monetary Zone over the sample period 1985-2013. The countries include 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The PVBC of fiscal policy 
in the region was tested using annual panel data for the variables primary balance-to-
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GDP ratio and total public debt-to-GDP ratio analysed using unit root and cointegration 
tests. Findings on the unit root tests rejected the null hypothesis of presence of unit 
root in the series primary balance-to-GDP ratio and total debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, 
results from cointegration tests show that fiscal policy was sustainable in Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. On the contrary, fiscal policy in Liberia was 
regarded to be unsustainable during the sample period under review.  
 
Asiama, Akosah, and Owusu-Afriyie (2014) assessed sustainability of fiscal policy in 
Ghana using quarterly time-series data over the period 2000q1–2014q1. The fiscal 
behaviour of government in terms of its reaction to rising public debt was assessed 
through estimation of a fiscal reaction function. The primary balance-to-GDP ratio was 
specified as the regressand in the fiscal reaction function, government debt-to-GDP 
ratio at the end of the preceding period was the independent variable. In order to 
account for the influence of economic factors on fiscal sustainability, output gap, 
exchange rate depreciation, CPI inflation, and oil commodity prices were integrated 
into the model as additional regressors of the primary balance position.  
 
Output gap captured the effect of business cycles while exchange rate depreciation 
accounted for the effect of persistent currency depreciation on the economy’s fiscal 
position pertaining external debt service costs. Similarly, CPI inflation accounted for 
the effect of inflation on the fiscal balance while oil commodity prices accounted for 
the effect of price fluctuations on the fiscal position. Accordingly, the fiscal reaction 
function was estimated using unit root tests and the Bounds Testing ARDL model. 
Estimates from estimation of the ARDL model show existence of significant linear and 
non-linear relationships between primary balance and public debt in the previous 
period. Results demonstrate strong evidence that government systematically reacted 
to rising public debt in both short-run and long-run periods by generating future primary 
surpluses. Findings indicate that the fiscal behaviour of the government was consistent 
with the IBC, hence fiscal policy was sustainable during the period 2001q1-2014q1.  
 
Oyeleke and Adebisi (2014) assessed the sustainability of Ghana’s fiscal policy during 
the period 1980-2010. Specifically, time-series annual data on government revenue-
to-GDP ratio specified as the regressand, and government expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
specified as the regressor were analysed using the OLS Engle-Granger 2-step ECM. 
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Stationarity test results show that both series demonstrated presence unit roots in 
levels and became stationary at first difference; hence, the variables were integrated 
of order one. The first-step results of the Engle-Granger 2-step cointegration test 
procedure indicate that the crucial condition of presence of a long-run (cointegrating) 
relationship between government revenue and government spending was satisfied. 
the Engle-Granger step-2 procedure for cointegration test was conducted to determine 
whether the sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability was satisfied.  
 
Following Quintos (1995), a fiscal deficit is deemed strongly sustainable if and only if 
government revenue and expenditure are I(1) and β =1. Concurrently, a fiscal deficit 
is regarded as weakly sustainable if fiscal revenue and expenditure are cointegrated 
but 0<β<1, while fiscal policy is deemed unstainable if β=0. In addition, the second 
step of the Engle-Granger 2-step procedure was performed to test for presence of 
long-run cointegrating relationship between fiscal revenue and expenditure using the 
OLS estimation method. The ADF and PP tests of unit roots on the residuals show 
that residuals were stationary in levels, confirming presence of a long run relationship 
between fiscal revenue and spending. Results of the Wald coefficient restriction test 
show a statistically significant positive β coefficient but significantly less than one, 
indicating that the fiscal deficit in Ghana was weakly sustainable.  
 
Mafusire (2015) assessed the sustainability of Swaziland’s fiscal policy, and analysed 
the impacts of fiscal adjustments on economic growth, inflation and sectoral resource 
allocation during the period 1986-2009. Eventually, the study evaluated whether fiscal 
sustainability was potentially endangered, and if so, intended to explore relevant policy 
options for adoption. Based on annual time-series data, the reaction of primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio to fluctuations in public debt-to-GDP ratio was analysed using the OLS 
technique. Output gap, interest and economic growth series were also included in the 
primary surplus function as relevant explanatory variables influencing primary surplus. 
Results from the estimated model indicate that lagged public debt and primary deficit 
rationally explained variations in the present primary deficit, indicating sustainability of 
fiscal policy in Swaziland during the given sample period. However, the computed 
finite horizon tax gap and primary gap indicators suggest that fiscal sustainability was 
endangered, hence government revenues and expenditures needed to be readjusted 
while resources allocation had to focus on stimulating growth.  
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Given the background of the bulk of Libya’s government revenues greatly dependent 
on volatile hydrocarbon resources, Caceres, Cevik, Fenochietto, and Gracia (2015) 
assessed the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance, and further examined sustainability of 
fiscal policy in Libya within the framework of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). 
Several fiscal policy rules were simulated with the main objective of designing a rule-
based fiscal strategy that promotes and maintains fiscal sustainability, macroeconomic 
stability and intergenerational equity. Fiscal rules simulated are the expenditure rule, 
structural balance rule, enhanced structural balance rule, and augmented growth-
based balance rule. The rationale behind the design of a rule-based fiscal strategy 
originated from the practical realisation that a fiscal framework anchored on fiscal rules 
and strong institutional arrangements enhance the credibility of fiscal policy and its 
ability to maintain fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability.  
 
To account for the effects of uncertainties in fiscal projections, stochastic simulation 
methods were used to assess the effectiveness of alternate fiscal rules in response to 
calibrated macroeconomic shocks. In addition, joint distributions of shocks were 
calibrated to fit statistical properties of historical time-series data for the period 2003-
2010 using the unrestricted VAR model to describe co-movements in endogenous 
variables, namely, the real interest rate, real effective exchange rate and output gap. 
Furthermore, annual projections for the forecasting period 2011-2024 were generated 
for growth, domestic real interest rate, output gap, and real exchange rate via Monte 
Carlo simulations. Projections for fiscal aggregates under each fiscal rule were 
computed for each year of the predicting period. Since budgetary aggregates of 
commodity-export nations are determined by global price fluctuations, oil price shocks 
were included in the model as an exogenous variable to capture the impact of global 
demand and supply conditions. 
 
Results from simulation analysis conducted show that fiscal rules (expenditure rule, 
structural balance rule, and augmented growth-based balance rule) anchored on the 
cyclically adjusted balance are effective in dealing with output shocks and commodity 
price shocks. The structural balance rule produces the narrowest spectrum for primary 
expenditure in response to output and commodity price shocks, with low variability in 
automatic deviations from targets to accommodate exogenous shocks. Moreover, 
simulations of fiscal rules under numerous shocks show that net asset accumulation 
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consistently follow a downward path in the long-term. The augmented growth-based 
balance yields the narrowest continuums for the overall fiscal balance and net asset 
accumulation. The enhanced structural balance and expenditure rules produce wider 
and declining trends for net asset accumulation during the 2011-2024 forecast horizon. 
In terms of the present value of future accumulated net assets, the primary budget 
deficit drifting above equilibrium level raises concerns about long-term sustainability 
of the nation’s public finances. However, constraints related to institutional capacity 
may render implementation of the fiscal rule ineffective in the short-to medium term. 
                       
Nzaramba (2015) examined fiscal sustainability in each of the 10 countries in Africa 
during the period 1970-2012. The countries covered in the study are Algeria, Ivory 
Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia. 
Fiscal response functions were estimated for each of the countries where the response 
of primary surplus-to-GDP ratio to fluctuations in public debt-to-GDP ratio was 
estimated using the OLS technique. Temporary government spending, output gap, 
FDI-to-GDP ratio, and remittances-to-GDP ratio were integrated into the fiscal reaction 
functions as exogenous variables to primary surplus. Therefore, results from estimated 
fiscal reaction functions provide evidence that fiscal policies were sustainable in 
Algeria, Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Rwanda, while public debt was 
unsustainable in the remaining countries during the sample period under review.  
 
The study conducted by Mutuku (2015) examined whether fiscal policy was consistent 
with the inter-temporal budget constraint and sustainable during the period 1970-2013. 
Based on annual time-series data, a fiscal reaction function was estimated to assess 
the response of primary surplus to fluctuations in public debt using the VAR and VECM 
techniques. Accordingly, the VAR model was applied in light of the rationale that 
macroeconomic variables are often potentially endogenous and allow for dynamic 
interaction among variables without explicitly enforcing theoretical structures on 
estimates (Sims, 1980). In addition to public debt-to-GDP ratio, other variables 
included in the models include output gap, consumer price index (CPI), real effective 
exchange rate (REER), and the dummy for political elections. Following Bohn (1998), 
output gap captured the effect of business cycles on primary surplus while the CPI 
operated as a proxy of commodity prices to capture the influence of commodity price 
fluctuations on the fiscal position. 
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The real exchange rate was included in the model to capture the influence of persistent 
depreciation of the country’s currency on its fiscal positions via the external debt-
servicing channel. The ADF and PP tests for stationarity, and cointegration tests for 
long-run relationship among variables (Johansen and Julius, 1990) indicate that all 
variables were integrated of order one and cointegrated at 5% significance level. 
Results of the long-run segment of the VEC model show that public debt-to-GDP ratio 
had a negative and statistically insignificant effect on primary balance-to-GDP ratio. In 
addition, results show that the reaction of government to accumulating public debt was 
non-systematic. Hence, fiscal policy was unsustainable during the period 1970-2013. 
                    
Jibrilla (2016) investigated the sustainability of Nigerian fiscal policy by estimating the 
influence of government revenues and expenditures on budget deficit over the period 
1961-2014. Time-series annual data on real government revenue, real government 
expenditure and budget deficit were analysed using the Bounds Test ARDL approach 
and DOLS estimator by allowing for structural breaks. Cointegration test results show 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship between government’s real revenue and real 
spending, indicating budget deficit sustainability. The bounds test ARDL cointegrating 
method was used to test robustness of estimates from a Johansen cointegration test.  
 
Results from the ARDL bounds test indicate presence of a cointegrating relationship 
between government revenues and expenditure, suggesting evidence of fiscal policy 
sustainability. In order to assess the degree of sustainability of the budget deficit, long-
run coefficients of the government revenues and spending series estimated using the 
DOLS method to check the robustness of estimates. Results showing the coefficient 
of government spending significantly less than one suggests that public debt stock 
grew faster than growth in output, signifying that fiscal policy was weakly sustainable. 
      
5.7. Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in Mixed-Groups Countries 
This sub-section discusses findings on fiscal sustainability based on relevant empirical 
literature survey conducted on countries in the mixed-groups of countries.   
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Table 7: Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in Mixed-Groups of Countries 
Author(s), Year and 
Country/Region 
Nature of Data 
and Time Span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main findings 
Polito, V. and Wickens, 
M. (2005). US, UK and 
Germany 
Time-series 
(quarterly); 
1960q1–2005q4 
Fiscal 
Sustainability 
Index (FSI) 
Monetary rule (interest 
rate), debt, revenue, 
GDP growth and 
disbursements  
VAR  Mixed results 
      
Papadamou, S., 
Sidiropoulos, M. and 
Spyromitros, E. (2017). 
22 countries 
Panel data 
(annual);  
1992–2000 
Public debt-
to-GDP ratio 
Primary deficit-to-GDP 
ratio, Government bond 
yield, GDP growth rate 
(adjusted for Central 
Bank independence) 
System 
GMM 
Unsustainable 
      
Greenlaw, D., 
Hamilton, J. D., 
Hooper, P. and 
Mishkin, F. S. (2013). 
20 advanced nations 
Panel data 
(annual);  
2000–2011  
Sovereign 
interest rate 
or borrowing 
cost 
Gross debt and Net 
debt (as % of GDP); 
and BOP Current 
Account  deficit  
FE model 
Increased debt 
and BOP CA 
deficit cause 
Unsustainability 
      
Camarero, M., Carrion-
i-Silvestre, J. and 
Tamarit, C. (2013). 17 
OECD countries 
Panel data 
(annual);  
1970–2012 
Real 
government 
revenue 
Real government 
expenditure and real 
public debt 
DOLS and 
cointegration 
tests 
Weak 
sustainability 
 
In assessing fiscal sustainability of the US, UK and Germany, Polito and Wickens 
(2005) developed an index of fiscal stance and conducted a counter-factual analysis 
of possible implications for fiscal sustainability of using a Taylor rule to set monetary 
policy over a period of 25 years. Though a fiscal stance is considered sustainable if it 
satisfies the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC), Polito and Wickens 
(2005) underscore that the condition does not solve the problem if the policy stance is 
examined from a forward-looking standpoint over an infinite horizon. Therefore, Polito 
and Wickens (2005) proposed an IBC-based sustainability index of the current fiscal 
stance derived from comparison of the existing public debt level with a forecast of the 
present value of the current and future deficits and surpluses computed from the 
economy’s VAR forecasting model. An index exceeding unity indicates a sustainable 
fiscal stance, and vice-versa. In UK and US, the fiscal sustainability index fluctuated 
substantially, with periods of unsustainability followed by episodes of sustainability. 
 
Papadamou, Sidiropoulos and Spyromitros (2012) empirically analysed the effect of 
the level of central bank independence on the impacts budget deficits, government 
bond yields and GDP growth discretely have on net domestic government bond issues 
and net public debt (as a ratio of GDP). The study was conducted on a group of 22 
developed countries using data for the period 1992-2000. Two different models were 
estimated, where net domestic government bond issues were the regressand in one 
model while public debt-to-GDP ratio was a dependent variable in the other model.  
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The same set of regressors comprised primary deficit-to-GDP ratio, government bond 
yield and GDP growth rate was used in both models. The stated regressors were 
interacted with central bank independence to determine the effect of the level of central 
bank independence on the impact of each of the specified regressor on net public 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Empirical estimates were computed using the dynamic panel data 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator.  
 
Results for the net stock of government debt securities-to-GDP ratio model show that 
domestic government bond issues were not the primary source of financing budget 
deficits. In addition, government bond yields in the previous period positively and 
significantly affected the net stock adjustment of bond securities. On the contrary, GDP 
growth negatively and significantly led to decreases in the government’s stock of 
domestic debt securities-to-GDP ratio. Such results indicate that economic growth can 
assist in significantly reducing debt issues under certain given market conditions. The 
level of central bank independence significantly affected the effects of borrowing cost 
measured by 10-year government bond yield, deficits and economic growth on net 
government bond issues. Results indicate that high levels central bank independence 
significantly affected pricing of debt securities in the markets, leading to constrained 
financing of deficits through bond issues while GDP growth reduced the likelihoods of 
issuing debt securities. Higher levels of central bank independence greatly influenced 
the effects of securities market conditions on government bond issues. 
 
Concomitantly, results for the public debt-to-GDP ratio model indicate that lagged debt 
had a significant positive impact on the current level of debt. However, Papadamou, 
Sidiropoulos and Spyromitros (2012) accentuate that such an impact depends on the 
prevailing level of central bank independence, pointing out that higher levels of central 
bank independence reduce the likelihood of monitisation of debt. The government can 
meet its debt obligations by issuing new public debt. Growth in output significantly 
reduced public debt while GDP growth had a significant positive effect on debt issues 
in countries that required their central banks to execute the mandate of price stability. 
Results show that the pursuance of an inflation aversion goal cogently leads to a 
restrictive monetary policy stance characterised by higher interest rates.                 
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Greenlaw, Hamilton, Hooper, and Mishkin (2013) examined the effect of debt loads on 
the sovereign interest rate in a group of 20 advanced economies during the sample 
period 2000-2011. The response of sovereign interest rate to changes in gross debt 
and net debt (% of GDP) and BOP current account deficit was estimated using the FE 
estimator. The study found that increased debt above 80% of GDP and persistent BOP 
current account deficits lead to rapid fiscal vulnerability and deterioration of the fiscal 
position, causing fiscal unsustainability. In addition, Camarero, Carrion-i-Silvestre, and 
Tamarit (2013) applied the stock flow approach and analysed fiscal sustainability in a 
group of 17 OECD countries using data for the period 1970-2012. The impacts of 
government expenditure and debt on revenues were estimated using cointegration 
and DOLS methods. In order to obtain robust estimates, the presence of structural 
breaks was tested by analysing cointegration between revenue and spending without 
imposing any restriction, thus indicating evidence of weak fiscal sustainability.  
         
5.8. Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in South Africa 
This sub-section discusses findings on fiscal sustainability based on related empirical 
literature survey conducted in context of South Africa. 
 
Table 8: Findings on Fiscal Sustainability in South Africa 
Author(s) and Year 
Nature of data and 
time span  
Regressand Regressor(s) 
Estimation 
technique 
Main 
findings 
Tshiswaka-
Kashalala, G. (2006).  
 
Time-series (quarterly); 
1990q1–2005q4 
 
Revenues 
Government 
spending, and 
Interest payments 
VECM Sustainable 
      
Burger, P., Stuart, I., 
Jooste, C. and 
Cuevas. A. (2011). 
Time-series (annual); 
1974–2008 
Primary balance 
(as a ratio of 
GDP) 
Public debt-to-
GDP ratio, and 
Output gap 
OLS, VAR, 
GMM, TAR, 
VECM, and 
State Space 
Sustainable 
      
Jibao, S. S., 
Schoeman, N. J. and 
Naidoo, R. (2011). 
Time-series (quarterly)’ 
1960q1–2008q4  
Revenue (as a 
ratio of GDP) 
Expenditure-to-
GDP ratio 
LSTECM Sustainable 
      
Calitz, E., Du 
Plessis, S. and 
Siebrits, S. (2013). 
Time-series (annual);  
1984–2010  
Primary balance-to-GDP ratio, Public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, Real interest rate 
and Real GDP growth 
SVAR Sustainable 
      
Ganyaupfu, E. M. 
(2014). 
Time-series (quarterly); 
1990q1–2013q3 
Primary 
balance-to-GDP 
ratio  
Public debt (as a 
ratio of GDP), and 
Output gap 
VECM  Sustainable 
 
Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2006) assessed sustainability of the South African fiscal policy 
during the period 1990q1-2005q4 by analysing the reaction of revenues to variations 
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in government spending and interest payments. Unit root and cointegration tests were 
first conducted to determine stationarity and cointegration properties of the data series. 
On the contrary, the VECM approach was applied to determine whether government 
fiscal policy was consistent with the inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC) where the 
present value constraint (PVC) was the key instrument for empirical analysis. Findings 
from the study show that the country’s fiscal policy was consistent with the PVC and 
pointed out that the country’s fiscal policy was sustainable over the sample period.        
 
Studies conducted by Burger, Stuart, Jooste, and Cuevas (2011), and Ganyaupfu 
(2014) assessed whether fiscal policy was historically sustainable in South Africa by 
examining the response of primary balance-to-GDP ratio to variations in public debt-
to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, Burger, et al. (2011) used annual time-series data for the 
period 1974-2008, while Ganyaupfu (2014) used quarterly time-series data for the 
sample period 1990q1-2013q3. The studies applied the VECM approach while Burger, 
et al. (2011) further employed the OLS, VAR, TAR and State Space modelling 
techniques in estimating the fiscal reaction function. Results from studies show that 
fiscal policy was sustainable during the given sample periods.  
 
Jibao, Schoeman and Naidoo (2011) examined whether South Africa’s fiscal policy 
was sustainable using quarterly time-series data for the period 1960q1-2008q4. The 
study applied Linear Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (LSTECM) using the 
Non-linear Least Squares (NLS) method in analysing the response of revenue-to-GDP 
ratio to variations in expenditure-to-GDP ratio during the period 1960q1-2008q4. 
Therefore, findings from the study reveal that fiscal policy in South Africa was 
consistent with the IBC, and hence sustainable over the period 1960q1-2008q4. Fiscal 
sustainability in the country was achieved through reduction in expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio. On the contrary, fiscal reaction was quicker when the fiscal budget was in a 
deficit relative to when it was in a surplus. Similarly, Calitz, et al. (2013) analysed fiscal 
sustainability using annual time-series data for the period 1984–2010. The study 
applied the SVAR approach to assess interactions among primary balance-to-GDP 
ratio, debt-to-GDP ratio, real interest rate, and real GDP growth, and found evidence 
of fiscal poicy sustainability.        
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5.8.1. The Missing Link in Fiscal Sustainability Analysis in South Africa 
  
Gurkaynak (2015) points out that fiscal sustainability cannot be regarded as a fiscal 
issue purely exclusive from monetary policy, given that monetary policy in reality also 
affects sustainability of a country’s fiscal policy through public borrowing costs and 
seigniorage. This orthodox premise follows Dahan (1998) who emphasises that a 
monetary policy stance has several channels through which it essentially influences 
budget deficit and government debt in the short-run. In respect of the empirical studies 
conducted to assess fiscal sustainability in South Africa, none of the studies to date 
considered and examined the potential impact of the central bank’s monetary policy 
stance on primary surplus and/or public debt trajectories in the country.    
 
Since the broad macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy are to control inflation, 
ensure financial stability and promote economic growth, adjustments of the respective 
policy’s instruments have direct impacts on the country’s budget deficit (Dahan, 1998). 
The several channels through which monetary policy stance affects the budget deficit 
include prices, interest rate, exchange rate, seigniorage, and sterilization. In scenarios 
where the central bank consistently maintains a tight monetary policy stance, such an 
action conventionally leads to increased budget deficit and improved government debt 
in the short- to medium-term periods (Dahan, 1998).    
 
In highlighting the importance of coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, Laurens 
and de la Piedra (1998) note that the relationship between monetary and fiscal policies 
derives from the link between fiscal deficit and its financing sources, which include 
government bonds (domestic and foreign) and central bank credit to government. 
Under scenarios where the central bank remains dominant, the monetary authority 
can determine the growth of monetary base autonomously of the financing needs of 
the fiscus. In addition, the financing conditions in the domestic and external financial 
markets can cause constraints to the government in raising finances. Inevitably, the 
government can be compelled to reduce its budget deficit in line with available 
financing, which can further negatively affect spending on priority social and economic 
goals. Therefore, the ability of government to place public debt at low borrowing costs 
depends to a larger degree on the stance of monetary policy (Laurens and de la 
Piedra, 1998). In the presence of expansionary monetary policy, the government can 
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place public debt in the financial market at low interest rates. According to Togo (2007), 
low interest rates potentially stimulate economic growth, improve the fiscal position 
and help to reduce fiscal deficit and debt burden. However, if inflation follows, the 
budget deficit can grow rapidly and lead to increases in the real interest rate.  
 
To compensate for perceived risks from inflationary pressures, investors may demand 
higher interest rates, which can lead to increases in debt service costs thereby forcing 
government to reduce the fiscal deficit to match available financing (Laurens and de 
la Piedra, 1998). Conversely, if the central bank takes a restrained policy stance 
without optimal coordination with fiscal policy, the economy can experience slow 
growth in output. Therefore, continued decline in economic activity potentially leads to 
reduced tax revenues and an upsurge in public debt-to-GDP ratio, which can further 
result in undermined sustainability of fiscal policy (Laurens and de la Piedra, 1998).  
 
Following Dahan (1998), monetary policy affects budgetary developments and overall 
fiscal positions (budget balance and public debt) in an economy through numerous 
channels. Accordingly, the framework developed by Dahan (1998) explores numerous 
channels through which a tight monetary policy stance might potentially have on the 
primary balance (budget deficit). The individual effect of a tight monetary policy stance 
on budget deficit might be insignificant. However, the cumulative effect can be 
significant, whereby the effect commonly comes in form of increased budget deficit or 
deterioration primary balance position. In short-run periods, the expansionary impact 
of a tight monetary policy stance on fiscal deficit normally is accompanied by 
improvements in public debt developments.  
 
Togo (2007) notes that if volatile, high interest rates can potentially reduce government 
revenue via slowed private sector economic activity. Hence, consistent policy mix 
between monetary and fiscal policies remains vital in public debt management if fiscal 
sustainability is to be maintained (Togo, 2007). Correspondingly, Goodhart (2012) 
underscores that consistent mix of monetary and fiscal policies remains critical in 
public debt management given the connection between output growth and interest 
rates (either in nominal or real terms) in ensuring macroeconomic stability. Under 
conditions where the economy experiences low and depressed output growth relative 
to interest rates, public debt frequently becomes unsustainable, unless if there are 
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enough primary surpluses. Following Dahan (1998), the effect of monetary policy 
stance on the fiscal position thus becomes more profound if there is at least one kind 
of nominal rigidity such that money remains non-neutral in the short run period. 
 
Following IMF (2015), developments in the banking sector influence the transmission 
of banking sector risks to sovereign debt. Accordingly, banking sector vulnerabilities 
emanating from conditions related to increased leverage, balance sheets expansions 
and external funding create substantial risks that lead to worsening fiscal primary 
balance and government debt positions. The 2008/09 global economic and financial 
crisis demonstrates the long-run relationship between banking sector developments 
and public debt trajectories and related fiscal outcomes. According to the IMF (2015), 
impaired banking regulatory and macroprudential policies lead to lower economic 
growth and increased fiscal risks, which subsequently lead to weaker fiscal balance 
positions and reduced aggregate investment and consumption in the economy. The 
IMF (2015) analysis on fiscal dynamics during business cycles established that during 
booms, banking expansions lead to reductions in public debt. However, increases in 
public debt experienced during recessions outweigh the gains that could have been 
realised from decreases in public debt during severe banking expansions.  
 
In analysing fiscal sustainability in Eritrea, Yamauchi (2004) observes the critical role 
played by monetary policy and highlights the direct influence monetary policy has on 
fiscal policy sustainability via the credit to government. Indirectly, fiscal sustainability 
is influenced by monetary policy through management of public debt and monitoring 
of supply conditions of credit to the private sector, as well as stances taken to maintain 
stability in the country’s financial system in the medium to long term.  
 
Greenlaw, Hamilton, Hooper and Mishkin, (2013) buttress that the crucial role 
monetary policy plays towards ensuring fiscal consolidation during periods of fiscal 
imbalances. In analysing the fiscal experiences of advanced economies with high 
public debt loads, Greenlaw et al. (2013) note that nations with high public debt levels 
(as ratios of GDP) require the support of monetary policy to mitigate vulnerabilities to 
fiscal deteriorations. Government fiscal consolidation efforts therefore need to be 
complemented by monetary policy in a manner that stimulates output growth to 
enhance success in fiscal consolidation. 
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From a practical standpoint, an accommodating monetary policy is regarded as an 
effective policy stance that increases the probability of success in fiscal consolidation 
since goverment makes it default for it to less likely occur. Using time-series data for 
the period 1978-2009, Hellebrandt, Posen and Tolle (2012) found evidence that an 
accommodating monetary policy leads to successful fiscal consolidation. 
 
The study conducted by Allard, Catenaro, Vidal, and Wloswijk (2012) highlights that 
communications by central banks on fiscal policy matters reflects that the reaction of 
monetary policy to fiscal developments plays a critical role in ensuring that fiscal policy 
achieves its target objectives. Using data for the period 1999 quarter 1 to 2011 quarter 
4, Allard, et al. (2012) empirically analysed the intensity of fiscal communications by 
five central banks (US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, 
Bank of Japan, and Swedish Riksbank). The study developed a fiscal indicator that 
measures fiscal-related communication in central banks’ introductory statements or 
minutes of monetary policy meetings. 
 
Central banks’ statements containing fiscal elements were classified into six mutually 
exclusive groups, namely, monetary policy stance, normative element, forecasts, 
monetary policy instrument, fiscal policies in other relevant countries and government 
representative. Empirical findings estimated using the OLS method show that changes 
in general government budget balances and gross debt positions (as percentages of 
GDP), output gaps, official interest rates, inflation and exchange rates significantly 
influence central bank communication on fiscal policy issues. Since government debt 
instruments are used in monetary policy operations, developments in government 
budget deficit and public debt ratios therefore influence reactions by the central bank 
represented by monetary policy stance taken to safeguard functioning of the financial 
system. Given the instant impact monetary policy announcements have on financial 
markets, the central bank’s monetary policy stance in turn influences developments in 
government budget deficit and public debt levels in the short-run epoch.   
 
The independence of central bank plays a crucial role in restraining deficit spending. 
Bodea and Higashijima (2015) elucidate that a balanced budget remains the primary 
preference of independent central banks, given the association that exists between 
budget deficits and inflation. In practice, the preference of an independent central bank 
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is generally reflected by the monetary policy stance a central bank pursues through 
changing the interest rate and controlling credit to government. Empirical findings by 
Bodea and Higashijima (2015) from OLS with PCSEs and GMM regressions on a 
panel dataset of 78 countries over the period 1970-2007 show that legal independence 
of central bank reduces fiscal deficits largely in nations with the rule of law, democracy 
free press and impartial contract enforcements. A monetary policy stance pursued by 
a central bank depicts its independence and transmits important signals to government 
in terms of the central bank’s position on management of fiscal deficits and public debt.  
 
Robinson (2015) empirically validated the underlying implications of fiscal positions on 
sovereign risk premium in South Africa. To account for possible significant breaks in 
the data, monthly time-series data used spans for three periods, namely December 
1994 to December 2006, January 2006 to December 2011, and January 2006 to 
September 2015. The relative impacts of distinct major fiscal variables, among other 
economic exogenous variables, were estimated using the Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) model. The fiscal determinants captured in the model are government revenue, 
government expenditure, public debt, and net borrowing requirement. Results from the 
empirical estimation conducted show that increases in government expenditure and 
government debt led to widening sovereign risk spread. The statistically significant and 
positive effects of government spending and government debt on sovereign risk 
spreads show strong evidence of sensivity of investors to fiscal developments. In order 
to mitigate potential negative effects fiscal positions might have on price stability, the 
central bank takes appropriate monetary policy stances by adjusting the interest rate.        
 
Afflatet (2016) analysed the estimated reaction of governments’ primary surpluses to 
changes in borrowing costs. Based on panel data of European Union countries for the 
period 1995-2013, regression estimates from the Fixed Effects model results reveal 
strong evidence that governments indeed raise primary surpluses in reaction to higher 
interest rates. Therefore, the findings confirm that the monetary policy stance pursued 
by central banks in financial markets potentially has disciplining effect on the manner 
in which governments adjust their primary balances.     
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5.9. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed literature on fiscal sustainability from an empirical standpoint.   
In addition, the empirical literature survey discussed findings on fiscal policy 
sustainability studies conducted on countries in different continents. The continents 
covered include Europe, America, Asia, Africa, mixed-group of countries in diverse 
continents, and ultimately South Africa. The main issues discussed include the data 
used, estimation methods applied, and major findings reported. Based on findings 
explored from such countries, this research study ultimately addressed the research 
gap relating to the missing link between monetary policy stance and fiscal policy 
overlooked in previous empirical studies conducted on fiscal sustainability analysis in 
South Africa. The following chapter discusses the methodological procedure and 
estimation technique applied in this study.      
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CHAPTER 6 
 
METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology and estimation technique applied in line with 
research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses. The description of 
the methodology and estimation technique applied cover the sources of data used for 
estimation, time-series properties of the data (unit root or stationarity and cointegration 
tests), Vector Autoregressive (VAR) lag order selection criteria, VAR framework, 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald 
test, Impulse Response Functions (IRFs), and Cholesky variance decompositions. 
 
6.2. Data and Sources 
Quarterly time-series data on primary balance-to-GDP ratio (B/Y) and public debt-to-
GDP ratio (D/Y) for the sample period 1997q4 to 2016q3 was sourced from South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) historical macroeconomic indicators online database. 
The relatively short dataset time span of 1997q4 to 2016q3 used was chosen subject 
to availability of data. Data on real gross domestic product (Y) and central bank policy 
rate (r) for the respective time period was collected from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) online data portal.  
 
6.2.1 Variables Description 
This section provides brief descriptions of time-series fiscal variables and exogenous 
economic variables that influence sustainability of fiscal policy.  
    
6.2.1.1. Primary balance 
Primary balance, also referred as primary net lending/borrowing (as % of GDP), refers 
to the overall balance excluding net interest payments (interest expenditure less 
interest revenue). The IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001 
edition defines conventional/overall balance or net borrowing/lending (as percentage 
of GDP) as the difference between total revenue and total expenditure; and current 
balance indicates the difference between total current, non-capital expenditure and 
total current revenue.           
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6.2.1.2. Public debt  
Public debt refers to total debt by the entire public sector, including financial and non-
financial public enterprises and the central bank. Public debt can be either gross debt 
(as percentage of GDP) or net debt (as percentage of GDP). The IMF’s GFSM and 
Public Sector Debt Statistics Manual 2001 edition defines gross debt as total liabilities 
that require future payment of interest and/or the principal by general government to 
the lender. The debt instruments that constitute total gross debt liabilities include debt 
securities, pension and guarantee schemes, special drawing rights (SDRs), loans, 
currency and deposits, insurance, and other accounts payable. Based on the concept 
of residence, total debt liabilities owed by government to residents of the same country 
are called domestic debt. On the contrary debt liabilities owed by government to non-
residents are referred to as external or foreign debt. In net terms, net public debt refers 
to gross debt less financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. National 
Treasury (2015) delimits net debt as total domestic and foreign debt less cash 
balances of the National Revenue Fund.  
 
6.2.1.3. Central bank policy rate 
The central bank policy rate (CBPR) provides as a signal for central bank’s monetary 
policy stance in the economy (IMF, 2017). In an analytic paper that quantified the 
rigidity and looseness of monetary policy in South Africa, Heever and Meyer (2016) 
accentuate that the central bank policy rate remains the central bank’s key policy 
interest rate barometer, which reflects the central bank’s monetary policy stance in the 
economy. In South Africa, determination of the central bank policy rate by the South 
African Reserve Bank hinges on repurchase agreements in national currency between 
the central bank and private sector banks (IMF, 2017).  
 
The central bank policy rate was integrated as an exogenous variable in the short-run 
component of the VEC model used to estimate the fiscal reaction function. Integration 
of the respective variable in estimation of the fiscal reaction function was centred on 
the premise that monetary policy measures fundamentally have several channels 
through which they influence the budget deficit and public debt in the short-run (Dahan, 
2003). Moreover, Goodhart (2012) underscores that monetary policy implicitly gets 
integrated into public debt management when the government becomes indebted to 
such an extent that the country’s fiscal sustainability gets potentially at risk.  
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6.2.1.4. Output gap 
The output gap variable, which measures the deviation of the actual output (Y*) from 
potential output (Yf), was generated using the univariate Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to 
capture the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. In addition, a negative output gap, also 
referred to as a recessionary gap, occurs when the economy produces below its full 
capacity. Conversely, a positive output gap occurs when the economy’s actual output 
exceeds its potential output. In order to account for seasonal fluctuations that occur in 
economic production, seasonally adjusted real GDP data was used to reflect accurate 
patterns in economic activity (BEA, 2016). Technically, the classical HP filter extracts 
a trend by taking the time series yt and decomposes it into a trend component t  and 
cyclical component ct; and solves the minimisation problem: 
   




τ
3t
2
2t1tt
τ
1t
2
tt νν2νλνymin                                         (6.2.1) 
 
With the difference between the observed data (yt) and the trend being the cyclical 
component (νt); the positive parameter  controls the smoothness of the series. To 
ensure a suitable value of the smoothing parameter λ, the time-series (y, ν) should 
satisfy the linear mixed model specified as:      
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                                                      (6.2.2) 
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Based on this model, the suitable smoothing parameter, also called the signal-to-noise 
(SNR) ratio, given by the function 
2
κ
2
ω
* /σσλ  satisfies the conditional expectation: 
 
  

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



 y,
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σ
νyνE
2
κ
2
ω
                                                            (6.2.3) 
                       
The mean square difference (MSD) between the ideal signal y)ν(λ,  and conditional 
expectation  yνE  is minimised by the smoothing parameter such that: 
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   22κ2ω y)(λλνyνEminarg/σσ                                     (6.2.4) 
 
Proceeding further, stationarity and cointegration properties of the data series were 
examined prior to performing multivariate macroeconometric estimation of the results.  
 
6.3. Unit Root Processes and Stationarity Tests 
Stationarity of variables remains a critical property in time-series econometric analysis. 
In practice, consideration has to be given to the distinction between weak/covariance 
stationarity and strong stationarity. Nonetheless, since strong stationarity is practically 
complex to evaluate, focus was given to assessment of weak stationarity. In order for 
a series to be weakly stationary, three conditions outlined below have to be satisfied:  
 
(i)     μxExE ktt                         (6.3.1) 
The series should have a constant mean over the given time horizon, hence the 
transitory deviation of the mean reverts to the long-run mean.    
 
(ii)     2kt
2
t σμxEμxE               (6.3.2) 
The variance should be both constant and finite over time.  
  
(iii)       kkhthtktt σμxμxEμxμxE                                                     (6.3.3) 
Covariance between variables strictly depends on selected lag length, not on time.  
 
Assuming an autoregressive process of order one, AR (1), the series t1tt uπXX  
becomes stationary for values of 1π  . Hence, the model satisfies the conditions of 
expected mean equal to zero, the variance 
 2
2
e
π1
σ

 and covariance  

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
 2
2
ek
π1
σ
π . 
Extending the series to a general ARMA (p, q) process yields: 
 
 
 
 
p
1i
q
1i
ittit1t ,uψuXπX                                            (6.3.4) 
 
Applying the lag operators yields: 
 
- 117 - 
 
   
    tt
t
q
q1t
p
p1
uLΨXLΠ
uLψ...Lψ1XLπ...Lπ1


                                 (6.3.5) 
 
Since the MA (q) component of the ARMA (p, q) process remains stationary quite 
often, stationarity of the model thus depends on the AR (p) component. Technically, 
the model becomes stationary when all roots of the characteristic equation   0zΠ   
exist outside the unit circle. Therefore, ARMA (p, q) process is a partial version of the 
ARIMA (p, d, q) process in which the order of integration I(d) equals zero. In practice, 
most time-series are integrated and become stationary when differenced d times. An 
integrated series that becomes stationary when differenced d times is regarded to be 
integrated of order d. However, not all series that are integrated become stationary 
when differenced. Therefore, the two properties of stationary and integration both play 
a critical role in examining cointegration of data series.        
 
Given that the actual data generation process was not known in respect of this study, 
the univariate unit root tests were conducted to determine the order of integration of 
the data series. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips Perron (PP) test 
techniques were applied for the series in levels, as well as first differences at intercept, 
trend and intercept, and none. Selections of proper lag lengths of the ADF unit root 
tests were determined automatically in EViews based on Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) for the ADF test. The Bandwidth for the PP test was automatically selected 
based on the Newey-West criterion anchored on the Bartlett kernel spectral estimation 
method. In recognition of the premise that the ADF criterion performs satisfactorily 
even when the sample size is fairly small (Hamilton, 1994), the order of integration of 
the series was finally assessed based on the ADF unit root test technique. The ADF 
technique considers the general AR (p) process given by the function: 
 
tptp2t21t1t εXγ...XγXγπX                                (6.3.6) 
 
Assuming the data generating process to be an AR (1), equation (6.3.6) reduces to: 
 
t1t1t νXγπX                                               (6.3.7) 
tptp2t2t εXγ...Xγν   , 
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The autocorrelations of tυ  and itυ    01ifor   due to presence of lagged X terms. To 
extend the Dickey-Fuller test to an AR process > 1, consider the AR (2) process: 
    t2t1t21t21t
t2t21t1t
εXXγXγγπX
εXγXγπX





                         (6.3.8) 
 
Eliminating 1tX   from both sides of equation (3.3.8) yields: 
tεΔXαβXπΔX 1t11t1t                                          (6.3.9) 
 
where β  and 1α are defined as: 
2121 γαand1γγβ                                     (6.3.10) 
 
Based on functions specified in equations (6.3.9) and (6.3.10), the unit root tests were 
performed to examine whether the difference between non-stationary series become 
stationary when the same variables move together in the long-run. Therefore, unit root 
test on an AR(p) process modelled the regression based on the specification: 
 



 
1p
1i
titi1tt εΔXαXβπΔX                                     (6.3.11) 
where tε denotes a pure white noise error term, 21iit XXΔX   i  and p denotes the 
class of autoregression; the null hypothesis being β = 0. The computed β coefficients 
and corresponding t-statistics determine the decision to either reject or not reject the 
null hypothesis of presence of a unit root in a given series. The ADF tests with trend 
variable were performed based on the function: 
 
t
1p
1i
iti1t21i εΔXaXβtδδΔX  


          (6.3.12) 
 
where t signifies the time or trend variable; with the null hypothesis being β = 0. 
 
6.4. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
The importance of optimal lag length remains a critical factor in empirical research that 
involves use of vector autoregressive (VAR) models in modelling time series data. 
Since inferences made from estimated VAR models depend on correct specification 
of the models, determination of the ideal lag order plays a critical role towards ensuring 
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precision of estimates, as well as the impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance 
decompositions produced from estimates of VAR models. In standard practice, use of 
a lag length higher than the optimal order leads to higher mean square forecast errors 
(MSFE) of the VAR while use of lag length lower than the correct order regularly leads 
to computation of autocorrelation errors (Lutkepohl, 1993). Therefore, use of incorrect 
lag lengths leads to inaccurate estimation of IRFs and variance decompositions, and 
further adversely affects examination or estimation of cointegration properties of data. 
 
Selection of optimal lag lengths was performed based on the VAR lag order selection 
criteria using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
Final Prediction Error (FPE), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQIC); with standard functional forms described as below. 
 
6.4.1. Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic 
This standard approach tests the goodness of fit of two (null and alternative) models. 
Based on the likelihood ratio, the test measured the number of times data were under 
one model relative to other models. Therefore, the decision to either reject or not reject 
the null hypothesis, comparative to the alternative hypothesis, depends on comparison 
of the computed LR statistic relative to the critical value and corresponding p-value.  
 
Inference about the parameter θ  was drawn from realisations of the data observations 
n321 x...,,x,x,x  of random variables (rv) n3,21 X...,X,X,X , whose distribution depends 
on the parameterθ . The null hypothesis (H0) holds/assumes that the parameter θ  takes 
on values that are in an interval  (parameter space) while the alternative hypothesis 
(H1) restricts θ  to the 1  of . The H0 was therefore the complement of ΘwrtΘ0 .  
 
The test of the H0 versus H1 was based on random sample n...,3,21 XX,X,X  
independent and identically distributed (IID), θ),f(~ x . Assuming that H0 holds, the 
likelihood function upon which inference about the θ  relies on was specified as: 
   θx,fΠθL
n
1i
 ,                                                           (6.4.1) 
where: L  represents the likelihood 
  θ  denotes the parameter space 
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ix  represents a set of observations n321 ...,,,, xxxx  
   symbolises Pi 
 
In scenarios where H0 holds, the likelihood should be large when appraised at 0θ , such 
that the maximum likelihood over the entire  becomes: 
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Therefore, the LR test was based on the likelihood ratio: 
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The decision rule requires rejection of the null hypothesis (H0: 0θθ ) when η  is small.  
 
  
6.4.2. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
Following Akaike (1973), the AIC compares distinct models on given outcomes. Since 
misspecification of the model owing to either under-fitting or over-fitting leads to 
spurious regressions, the AIC provides the basis for selecting the model that best 
determines relationships among given variables. To address drawbacks associated 
with under-fitting the model (which potentially provides an incorrect picture of variability 
in the response variable) and over-fitting the model (which can potentially lead to loss 
of generality), Akaike values were used to select the best model given by the function: 
 


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


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

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



zθLlog2ω2AIC                                               (6.4.4) 
 
where: ω represents the number of estimable parameters (d.f) 
  




 
zθLlog  denotes the maximum log-likelihood (ML) of the estimated model 
  L  represents the likelihood function 
  

θ denotes the maximum likelihood of θ  
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  ω2 measures the variance 
  


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
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


zθLlog2  measures the amount bias 
 
To correct for small samples, the above function is modified as:  
 
 
1ωn
1ωω2
AICAICm


                                                 (6.4.5) 
where: n  represents the sample size, and 1ωn   denotes bias-correction, which 
depends on type of the model. Since a larger sample (n) w.r.t. estimable parameters 
(ω) yields a sufficient AIC, the parsimonious model that best revealed the true 
relationship among given variables (goodness of fit) was the model with the lowest 
AIC or AICm value (Akaike, 1973).  
   
6.4.3. Final Prediction Error (FPE) 
The FPE criterion measures the quality of the model by testing the data that follow a 
strictly stochastic autoregressive process for which the innovations are stationary and 
independent in nature. The FPE, also referred to as the Mean Square Prediction Error 
(MSPE), was specified by the function: 
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where: n represents the number of observations in the dataset  
   tu  is an mn x 1 vector of prediction errors 
  nπ

 denotes the estimated parameters 
  ω represents the number of estimated parameters 
 
6.4.4. Schwarz Information Criterion (SBIC) 
The SIC criterion prefers the model with the lowest or minimum value from a finite set 
of models (Schwarz, 1978). Computationally, the criterion was given by the function: 
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where:ω represents the number of estimable parameters, including intercept 
  z  denotes the number of observations or sample size 
  

M represents the maximised value of the likelihood function of model H 
  

φ denotes the parameter values that maximise the likelihood function 
  p  symbolises the prior probability distribution  
  x  represents the observed data  
   
Derivation of the asymptotic SIC was based on the notion that data are exponentially 
distributed such that the integral of the product of the likelihood function and the prior 
probability distribution over the parameter that maximises the likelihood function of 
model H for observed data was estimated by the function: 
 
     HφpHφ,xp                                                      (6.4.8) 
 
      

 Mln2λ2lnzlnωSICHpln2 x                         (6.4.9) 
 
The function specified by equation (6.4.8) reveals that the criterion penalises complex 
models and prefers simple models.  
  
6.4.5 Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) 
Following Hannan and Quinn (1979), this criterion provides as a measure of strong 
consistency for models that are autoregressive in nature, given by the function: 
 
   L2zlnlnω2HQIC                                           (6.4.10) 
 
where: ω represents the number of estimable parameters 
  z denotes the number of observations or sample size 
  L symbolises the likelihood function  
 
6.5. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model 
Like most other macroeconomic variables, primary balance as a ratio of output (B/Y) 
and public debt as a ratio of output (D/Y) are endogenous rather than exogenous.  
Sims (1980) accentuates that time-series macroeconomic variables are potentially 
endogenous; hence they implicitly exhibit joint dynamic behaviour. However, models 
that explicitly demonstrate causality have great potential of being mis-specified. As an 
- 123 - 
 
alternative, a VAR model was used based on the rationale that VAR allows variables 
to interact without imposing theoretical structures on estimates. Also, a VAR model 
treats variables as endogenous, describes dynamic behaviour, and efficiently captures 
both short-run and long-run interrelations among such variables. This study applied a 
standard VAR model in modelling interrelations of a system of multivariate equations 
for (B/Y) and (D/Y), and the variables were treated as endogenous. The unstructured 
VAR framework for the basic fiscal reaction function was therefore specified as: 
 
 Z(D/Y),(B/Y),X t                                     (6.5.1) 
 
where: Xt is a vector containing primary balance (B/Y), public debt (D/Y) as ratios of 
GDP and a set of exogenous economic variables that have short-run influence on 
fiscal policy behaviour. Explicitly, vector Z comprises central bank policy rate (r), proxy 
for monetary policy stance by the central bank, and output gap 




 
ty
, computed using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter approach to capture the influence of business cycles on 
sustainability of fiscal policy. As such, a bivariate standard VAR model containing 
equations for (B/Y) and (D/Y) was specified in VAR levels as: 
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The unrestricted VAR(p) model (equation 6.5.2) specified above was a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) with lagged (B/Y) and (D/Y) as endogenous variables 
while central bank policy rate (r) and output gap (y) are exogenous variables.  
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6.6. Cointegration Test 
In line with the theoretical economic postulation that variables that are integrated of 
order one can have a cointegrating relationship, the dynamic multivariate Johansen’s 
procedure was applied to test for presence of cointegrating relationship between (B/Y) 
and (D/Y). This implies existence of long-run equilibrium upon which (B/Y) and (D/Y) 
fluctuate. In situations where cointegration exists, shocks to the equilibrium could be 
transitory since stationarity ensures mean-reversion that restores long-run equilibrium.  
 
The Johansen’s procedure, which largely relies on the relationship between the matrix 
rank and analogous characteristic roots, was selected relative to the Engle-Granger 
and Phillip’s-Quliaris approaches. The Johansen procedure was selected in light of 
the rationale that the method can estimate more than one cointegrating relationship 
where the time-series dataset contains equal to or more than two variables. In order 
to establish the number of cointegrating vectors, five assumptions provided by EViews 
were considered. The assumptions revolve around presence or absence of linear and 
non-liner trends in the data, and whether intercepts or no intercepts are considered. 
The summary descriptions of the respective five assumptions are given herein below. 
 
Assumption 1 holds that level data  ty  have no deterministic trends and cointegrating 
equations do not have intercepts ( 112   ttt yβαBxyΠ:H ). Assumption 2 states that level 
data  ty  have no deterministic trends and cointegrating equations have intercepts; 
)()( 011
*
1   ttt yβαBxyΠ:rH ). Assumptions 3 holds that the  ty  have linear trends 
but cointegrating equations have only intercepts ( 00111 )()(    ttt yβαBxyΠ:rH ). 
Assumption 4 establishes that the level data  ty and cointegrating equations have 
linear trends ( 01011
* )()(    tyβαBxyΠ:rH ttt ). Assumption 5 states that the 
level data  ty  have quadratic trends and the cointegrating equations have linear trends 
such that  ttyβαBxyΠ:rH ttt 101011 )()(    . In practice, assumptions 1 
and 5 are not usually used, hence assumpions 2, 3 and 4 were used in this study by 
considering assumptions made on unit root tests in selecting the trend assumption.  
 
Given that the Johansen’s procedure requires the VAR (p) as the starting point, the 
vector Xt containing endogenous variables (B/Y) and (D/Y) ratios was specified as: 
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tptp2t21t1t uXΦ......XΦXΦX                         (6.6.1) 
 
where: Xt is a 2x1 vector of (B/Y) and (D/Y) variables that are I(1), ut is a 2x1 vector of 
innovations, and Φ1 through Φp represents 2x2 coefficient matrices. Reparameterising 
equation (6.6.1) by subtracting Xt-1 from both sides yields: 
 
tuΦXΔXΨ...ΔXΨΔXΨX ptptp2t21t1t                       (6.6.2) 
 
where: p2112211 Φ...ΦΦIΦand,ΨΦΨI,ΦΨ    
 
The impact matrix   determines the magnitude of cointegration of the system. 
Therefore, the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace likelihood ratio (LR) statistics were 
used to test for existence of vector cointegration.  
 
6.6.1. Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis (H0) that the number of 
cointegrating vectors equals to r0 versus the alternative hypothesis (H1) that the 
number of cointegrating vectors equals to r0 + 1, specified by the function: 
 
   1r00max 0λ1lnT1r,rλ                                              (6.6.3) 
 
where: maxλ  represents the maximum eigenvalue statistic, T symbolises the sample 
size, and λ  denotes the canonical correlation. The  1r,rλ 00max   likelihood ratio 
statistic tests the H0 that the rank   0rΠ   against the H1 that the rank   1rΠ 0  . 
 
6.6.2. Trace Test 
The trace statistic tests the H0 that the number of cointegrating vectors is 0r , versus 
the H1 that the number of cointegrating vectors is > 0r , which implies cointegrating 
relationship > r0. Correspondingly, the null and alternative hypotheses are stated as: 
 
 
  




nΠrank1r:H
nΠrankr:H
01
00 where n denotes the number of cointegrating vectors.  
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The Trace LR test statistic therefore becomes: 
 
 


n
1ri
trace
0
λ1lnT                                                   (6.6.4) 
 
where: T represents the sample size, n denotes the maximum number of possible 
cointegrating vectors, and λ  represents the biggest canonical correlation.   
 
The cointegrating vectors provided as an indication of the number of cointegrating 
equations that had to be estimated using the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model. 
Assuming the IBC, the cointegrating relationship was specified as: 
 
    tμD/YβαB/Y tt                                   (6.6.5) 
 
Based on the cointegration approach, Martin (2000) highlights that a fiscal policy can 
be deemed strongly sustainable if and only if the I(1) processes of (B/Y) and (D/Y) are 
cointegrated and β=1. Conversely, the policy can be deemed weakly sustainable if 
(B/Y) and (D/Y) are cointegrated and 0 < β < 1. If the null of cointegration gets rejected, 
μt must be stationary. If the endogenous variables (B/Y) and (D/Y) are I(1), the relevant 
variables could be cointegrated. Presence of cointegration between the endogenous 
variables (B/Y) and (D/Y) substantiated application of the VEC model.  
 
6.7. Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model  
Denoting the primary balance-to-GDP ratio by (B/Y) and public debt-to-GDP ratio by 
(D/Y), the government’s basic fiscal reaction function was formulated as:  
      
t1t31t21t ε(D/Y)β(B/Y)ββ(B/Y)                                                                    (6.7.1) 
 
The one period lag of (B/Y) was added (equation 6.7.1) to capture the inertia in 
government behaviour. Given the VAR representation specified in equation (6.5.2) and 
the procedure followed in estimating the VEC model, a system of two equations was 
specified to estimate both short-run and long-run parameters of the model: 
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The parameters     131t121t θD/YθB/Y    in both equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) denote 
the deviation from the long-run equilibrium specified by the function: 
 
    131t121t θD/YθB/Y                          (6.7.4) 
 
The exogenous variables, central bank policy rate and output gap were included in the 
short-run components of both equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) to capture distinct effects 
of central bank monetary policy stance on changes in primary balance and public debt; 
respectively. The effect of central bank policy rate was integrated in short-run 
components of equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) in respect of the characterisation that 
monetary policy announcements essentially affect the macroeconomy in the short-run 
comparative to fiscal policy whose impact lags are longer than those of monetary 
policy. Given the government’s efforts to pursue short-run demand stabilisation, output 
gap was exogenously added to short-run dynamics of equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) to 
capture the feasible reaction of fiscal policy to business cycles. 
 
Given the structure of the VEC model, empirical estimation was conducted as a model 
consisting of two functions given by equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3). The parameter 
12π  
in equation (6.7.2) denotes the error correction term (ECT), which measures the fiscal 
reaction to the public debt-to-GDP position. Therefore, the ECT that captures the 
reaction of primary balance to deviations from the long-run equilibrium was itemised 
in equation (6.7.4). Therefore, the VEC method estimated the fiscal reaction function 
given by equation (4.7.1) as a model containing equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3); yielding: 
 
kttjt
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j1t
k
it
i1tt εcXΦΔZξZΔZ  



                                (6.7.5) 
 
where: tZ denotes a 3x1 vector comprising I(1) endogenous variables ((B/Y), (D/Y), 
and a constant), 
tX  denotes a 2x1 vector consisting of I(1) exogenous variables (r and y),  
iξ symbolises 2x2 short-run coefficient matrices, 
jΦ  signifies a 2x1 vector comprising coefficients of exogenous variables, 
tc  is a vector  comprising constants and kt designates IDD error terms.  
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The parameter  was decomposed into  and / matrices; yielding:  
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where:  denotes a 2x1 matrix of two variables with 1 cointegrating relationship(s) 
that contain the long-run equilibrium adjustment parameter, and / represents a 1x3 
matrix containing long run parameters, including a constant.  
 
6.8. VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test 
To test for existence of short run causality between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, the VEC Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald test was 
conducted. Based on the null that all lags of one given variable can be excluded from 
each equation in the system, the scalar random variable (D/Y)t can be deemed not to 
Granger cause (B/Y)t  if and only if: 
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Therefore, (D/Y)t  does not Granger cause (B/Y)t  if the forecast of (B/Y)t  remains the 
same whether or not conditioned upon the past values of (D/Y)t. Given the standard 
bivariate VAR(p), Granger causality was tested based on the specification: 
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From the above model (equation 6.8.2), if 0p21,21,1  , then (D/Y)t  does not Granger 
cause (B/Y)t. Moving forward, (B/Y)t  can be modelled using the function: 
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 In the scenario that (D/Y)t  does not Granger cause (B/Y)t, where t1,ε  and t,2ε  are not 
contemporaneously correlated, then (B/Y)t can be deemed to be weakly exogenous, 
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and can be modelled completely independent of (D/Y)t. However, if (D/Y)t does not 
Granger cause (B/Y)t, it remains equally crucial to find out whether (B/Y)t  Granger 
causes (D/Y)t. Since the frequency at which data are collected remains critical to 
detection of causality, inefficient collection of data leads to deduction of instantaneous 
causality. Following Granger (1969), if (D/Y)t and (B/Y)t  demonstrate stationarity in 
respect of spectral systems, then (D/Y)t can be expressed in form of the function  
 πdΦe
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itθ
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
, where:  πΦ(D/Y) denotes a complex random process 
      πdFdΦπdΦE (D/Y)(D/Y)(D/Y)  , if π ; or else      0dΦπdΦE (D/Y)(D/Y)  , where 
 πdF(D/Y)  can be written as    dππfπdF (D/Y)(D/Y)  . The cross spectrum between (D/Y)t 
and (B/Y)t  gets defined by  πΞ  composed as        πifdππΞπdΦπdΦE (D/Y)(D/Y)   . 
Successively, the covariance between (D/Y)t and (B/Y)t  could therefore by given by: 
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Following Enders (2003), the Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald test statistic in 
this study was subsequently defined as: 
 
    p2χ~loglog1p3T 2unre                       (6.8.5) 
 
where: T denotes the number of observations; ∑un is the variance/covariance matrices 
of the unrestricted VAR system; ∑re denotes the variance/covariance matrices of the 
restricted system when the lag of a variable was excluded from the system, p denotes 
the number of lags of the variable that was excluded from the system.  
 
6.9. Impulse Response Functions 
Impulse response functions (IRFs) assess the effect of a shock to a given endogenous 
variable  X on itself and the other given endogenous variable  Y . However, the VEC 
Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald test does not provide information on the 
direction of the effect of the endogenous variable  X on other endogenous variable
 Y ; as well as the time horizon it takes variable  Y  to return to long-run equilibrium 
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path owing to a shock in variable  X . To yield such evidence, analysis of IRFs was 
performed to examine impacts of shocks on the adjustment path of endogenous 
variables in the dynamic system. In order to explore the time path of the effects of the 
shocks on the regressand in the model, an unstructured VAR was first transformed 
into a vector moving-average (VMA) representation. Transformation of unstructured 
VAR into an infinite VMA representation followed the property that for every stationary 
VAR(p), for instance Xt, there exists an infinite VMA which follows the decomposition: 
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The matrix sζ  can further be interpreted as /
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  . Assuming the initial element of 
tε  gets changed by 1ρ , the second element by 2ρ , the third element by 3ρ , and so 
on, then the joint effect of the vector Xt+s could be summarised as: 
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The parameter ,)ρ...,,ρ,ρ,(ρρ
/
n321 for which the row i and column j element of sζ as 
a function of s yields the IFR given by: 
tj,
sti,
ε
X

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                  (6.9.3) 
 
The IFR given in equation (6.9.3) depicts the dynamic multiplier or response of Xi,t+s to 
a one-time previous impulse or shock in jtε , ceteris paribus. Returning to the standard 
VAR containing endogenous variables (B/Y) and (D/Y), exogenous variables interest 
rate (r) and output gap (y_gap) were eliminated from the system in order to focus on 
the AR structure of the model, and re-introduced the unstructured VAR matrix: 
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Rewriting the matrix of the unstructured VAR (equation 6.9.4) in simple form and more 
compactly into an infinite VMA representation yields: 
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Solving the first component on the RHS of equation (equation 6.9.5) provides: 
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In order for the VAR model to satisfy the stability condition, the roots of LHI 1 are 
required to exist outside the unit circle. Assuming that the respective requirement is 
satisfied, the second component of the VMA representation was specified as:  
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The VAR system was thus written as a VMA with standard VAR’s error terms as: 
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The error terms of the VMA representation (equation 6.9.8) are composite errors 
comprising structural innovations. Following Shin and Pesaran (1998), the impulse 
response function in this study was then specified by the function: 
 
     1tmt1ttmt1t ZyEZh,eyEZh,m,IR                     (6.9.9) 
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where m symbolises time, h (h1,…,hm) denotes n x 1 vector that represents the size of 
shock, Zt-1 signifies accumulative information about the economy from the past period 
up to time period t-1.  
 
In light of the important role played by h in the relations of properties of the IRF, the 
orthogonalised impulse response (OIR) was established by identifying the shock h 
through m time horizon using Cholesky decomposition of  PP;e where P denotes 
n x n lower triangular matrix. Borrowing from Sim (1980), OIRFs were defined as: 
 
  k0,1,2,...,m:PεQmIR jm
0
ij                      (6.9.10)     
where: nopmp2m21m1m IQ;QA...QAQAQk;0,1,2,...,m      
 
6.9.1. Impact Multipliers  
To measure the impact effect of a one unit change in a structural innovation or shock, 
impact multipliers were computed. Replacing the error terms sε'se' with , the impact 
effect of t(D/Y)ε  on (B/Y) and (D/Y) was, for instance, computed as: 
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The impact effect of one period ahead on   1tB/Y   and   1tD/Y   was calculated as:  
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Congruently, the impact effect expressed above (equation 6.9.12) was the same effect 
on  tB/Y  and  tD/Y  of a structural innovation one period ago calculated as: 
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Furthermore, the IRF of (B/Y) to a unit change in the shock to (D/Y) therefore equal to
      ...,2,1,0 131212  . The sum of the IRFs (cumulated effect), was thus computed 
as  

0i
12 iΩ , while the long-run cumulated effect was specified as  


n
0i
12
n
iΩlim .  
 
6.9.2. Stability of the Model 
Following Hamilton (1994) and Lutkepohl (2005), a VEC model derived from the VAR 
representation can be deemed stable only if all the moduli of the given companion 
matrix can be specified by the function: 
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Stability of the model technically implies that that the specified VAR is invertible and 
has an infinite VMA representation. Since the innovations  ite of the IFRs are regularly 
characterised by contemporaneous correlation, a shock to one variable can most likely 
get accompanied by shocks to other variables in the system.     
 
6.10. Cholesky Variance Decomposition 
In order to examine the relative significance of the random error terms to endogenous 
variables in the model, Cholesky variance decomposition was conducted in which the 
variance of the forecast error for each variable was broken down into components. In 
simple terms, variance decomposition measures the amount of change in a given 
variable owing to its own shock as well as shocks of other variables in the model.   
Accordingly, each variable was explained as a linear combination of its own current 
innovations and lagged innovations of other variables in the VEC model. Therefore, 
variance decompositions were computed from OIRF specified in equation (4.9.10). 
Considering the endogenous variables (B/Y) and (D/Y) in the model, the variance of 
each given variable’s n-step ahead forecast error was computed as: 
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In practice, where ε(D/Y)  explains none of the forecast error variance of  tB/Y  all 
through the forecast horizon 







0
σ
σ
2
(D/Y)
2
n(B/Y), , then 
tY
B






is deemed exogenous. 
Exogeneity involves the concurrent value of a given endogenous variable and the 
contemporaneous error term of another variable. Hence, it should not be treated to be 
the same as Granger-Causality. Conversely, if ε(D/Y)  explains most of the forecast 
error variance of  tB/Y  during the course of the forecast horizon 







9.0
σ
σ
2
(D/Y)
2
n(B/Y), , 
then 
tY
B






is deemed endogenous. In the short-run, most of the variance in a variable 
result from own shock while the proportion of the effect of a shock to another variable 
in the model increases over time. 
 
6.11. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology and estimation technique applied in the study 
with regards to the research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses. 
The chapter discussed the sources of data used for econometric estimation of results, 
unit root and cointegration properties of time-series data, the Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) lag order selection criteria, VAR representation, Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model, VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald test, Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs), and Cholesky variance decompositions. The next chapter presents 
analyses and interprets results of the fiscal reaction function derived from econometric 
modelling conducted in line with research objectives of the study.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This section presents results of the study estimated using EViews 8 econometric 
modelling software. Section 7.2 presents descriptive statisticswhile results on the ADF 
unit root tests, and Johansen cointegration tests are presented in Section 7.3 and 
Section 7.4 respectively. Results of the VAR order selection criteria are provided in 
Section 7.5. VEC estimates together with VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity 
Wald tests results are presented in Section 7.6. Section 7.7 provides estimates of the 
VEC model stability tests while Section 7.8 presents results on the VEC residual 
diagnostic tests. Section 7.9 discusses the graphical impulse response functions 
(IRFs). Section 7.10 presents results on Cholesky variance decompositions. Lastly, 
Section 7.11 provides the overall conclusion on the results of the study.  
 
7.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 9: Summary Statistics 
Test Statistic B/Y D/Y CBPR Output gap 
Mean 0.763158 34.93026 9.140658 2.64E-13 
Median 1.000000 33.85000 7.750000 0.373482 
Maximum 7.300000 47.30000 21.85000 2.126260 
Minimum -6.000000 21.60000 5.000000 -4.930092 
Std. Dev. 3.309415 7.830556 3.827137 1.328102 
Skewness -0.203313 -0.045769 1.169594 -1.621608 
Kurtosis 2.096235 1.831220 4.138043 6.475744 
Jarque-Bera 3.110096 4.352349 21.42864 71.56427 
Probability 0.211179 0.113475 0.000022 0.00000 
Observations 76 76 76 76 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 9 show that the average debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y) was 
about 34.9% relative to the average primary balance-to-GDP ratio (B/Y) of merely 
0.76%. The average central bank policy rate (CBPR) stood at 9.1% relative to the real 
output gap of 2.6 x 1013 due to substantial skewness of the series. JB statistics and p-
values indicate that primary balance and public ratios followed normal distributions, 
while central bank policy rate and real output gap did not follow normal distributions. 
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7.3. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests 
The unit root tests results are conducted at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance in 
levels and first differences using the ADF and PP techniques. Three models choices 
in EViews were applied in conducting and computing estimates of the stationarity 
tests, namely, constant, trend, constant, and none.   
 
Table 10: ADF and PP Stationarity Tests Statistics in Levels† 
Data Model 
ADF PP 
Lag 
length 
α=1% α=5% α=10% 
t-stat 
τc, τtc, τn 
Band α=1% α=5% α=10% 
t-stat 
Øc, Øtc, Øn 
(B/Y) 
Constant 7 -3.530 -2.904 -2.589 -1.320 0 -3.520 -2.900 -2.587 -5.719** 
Trend and 
Constant 
7 -4.098 -3.477 -3.166 -2.333 4 -4.085 -3.470 -3.162 -7.987*** 
None 7 -2.599 -1.945 -1.613 -1.481 1 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -5.507*** 
 
(D/Y) 
Constant 8 -3.531 -2.905 -2.590 -1.907 5 -3.520 -2.900 -2.587 -1.044 
Trend and 
Constant 
8 -4.100 -3.478 -3.166 -1.250 0 -4.085 -3.470 -3.162 0.618 
None 8 -2.599 -1.945 -1.613 0.151 5 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -0.271 
 
CBPR 
Constant 1 -3.521 -2.901 -2.587 -2.143 1 -3.520 -2.900 -2.587 -1.965 
Trend and 
Constant 
1 -4.086 -3.471 -3.162 -3.225* 0 -4.085 -3.470 -3.162 -1.924 
None 3 -2.577 -1.945 -1.613 -2.486** 1 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -1.507 
 
Y_gap 
Constant 9 -3.533 -2.906 -2.590 -3.399** 2 -3.520 -2.900 -2.587 -3.186** 
Trend and 
Constant 
9 -4.103 -3.479 -3.167 -3.368* 2 -4.085 -3.470 -3.162 -3.174** 
None 9 -2.600 -1.945 -1.613 -3.432*** 2 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -3.198*** 
 
† denotes testing of unit root hypothesis based on MacKinnon (1996) one sided p-values 
[***] (**) * represent significance at 1 percent, (5) percent levels and [10] percent levels; respectively 
τc, τtc, τn and Øc, Øtc, Øn represent ADF and PP test results computed using constant, trend and constant, and none; respectively 
Selections of proper lag lengths of ADF unit root tests were determined automatically by EViews based on the AIC, while selection 
of Bandwidths of PP unit root tests were determined automatically in EViews based on the Newey-West Bandwidth criterion 
performed using Bartlett kernel spectral estimation method      
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Although the time series properties of fiscal data provide critical information that guides 
estimation of fiscal reaction functions, the respective statistical properties themselves 
should not be regarded as indicators of fiscal sustainability. Results of stationarity tests 
in levels conducted using three models, namely, constant, trend and constant, and 
none, at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels show that public debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y) 
had a unit root based on ADF and PP methods. While output gap exhibits stationarity 
based on both ADF and PP tests, primary balance-to-GDP ratio (B/Y) was stationary 
based on the PP test criterion only while central bank policy rate (CBPR) demonstrated 
stationarity based on the ADF test criterion at 5%level of significance.      
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Table 11: ADF and PP Stationarity Tests Statistics in First Differences 
Data Model 
ADF PP 
Lag 
length 
α=1% α=5% α=10% 
t-stat 
τc, τtc, τn 
Band α=1% α=5% α=10% 
t-stat 
Øc, Øtc, Øn 
(B/Y) 
Constant 6 -3.530 -2.904 -2.589 -3.496** 13 -3.521 -2.901 -2.587 -23.834***
 
Trend and 
Constant 
6 -4.098 -3.477 -3.166 -3.462* 13 -4.086 -3.471 -3.162 -23.618*** 
None 6 -2.599 -1.945 -1.613 -3.449*** 13 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -23.192*** 
 
(D/Y) 
Constant 7 -3.531 -2.905 -2.590 -1.073 0 -3.521 -2.901 -2.587 -5.635*** 
Trend and 
Constant 
7 -4.100 -3.478 -3.166 -2.211 5 -4.086 -3.471 -3.162 -7.077*** 
None 7 -2.599 -1.945 -1.613 -1.133 0 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -5.678*** 
 
CBPR 
Constant 11 -3.538 -2.908 -2.591 -4.614*** 6 -3.521 -2.901 -2.587 -5.316*** 
Trend and 
Constant 
11 -4.110 -3.482 -3.169 -4.984*** 7 -4.086 -3.471 -3.162 -5.196*** 
None 11 -2.602 -1.946 -1.613 -4.110*** 6 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -5.357*** 
 
Y_gap 
Constant 8 -3.533 -2.906 -2.590 -3.181** 3 -3.521 -2.901 -2.587 -4.983*** 
Trend and 
Constant 
8 -4.103 -3.479 -3.167 -3.147 3 -4.086 -3.471 -3.162 -4.948*** 
None 8 -2.600 -1.945 -1.613 -3.209*** 3 -2.596 -1.945 -1.613 -5.017*** 
 
† denotes testing of unit root hypothesis based on MacKinnon (1996) one sided p-values 
[***] (**) * represent significance at 1 percent, (5) percent levels and [10] percent levels; respectively 
τc, τtc, τn and Øc, Øtc, Øn represent ADF and PP test results computed using constant, trend and constant, and none; respectively 
Selections of proper lag lengths of ADF unit root tests were determined automatically by EViews based on the AIC, while selection 
of Bandwidths of PP unit root tests were determined automatically in EViews based on the Newey-West Bandwidth criterion 
performed using Bartlett kernel spectral estimation method 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
The ADF and PP unit root test in first differences results show that primary balance-
to-GDP ratio, central bank policy rate and output gap were stationary at 1% 
significance based on the model with neither a constant nor trend and constant. 
Central bank policy rate exhibited stationarity at 1% significance for all three models 
(constant, trend and constant, and none) at 1% significance level based on both the 
ADF and PP tests. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained non-stationary at 10% significance 
level based on ADF test criterion, and rejected the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% 
significance level based on the PP test criterion. Generally, all variables demonstrated 
stationarity at first difference based on the ADF and PP tests. 
 
7.4. Cointegration Test 
The assessment of cointegrating relationships between endogenous series primary 
balance (B/Y) and public debt (D/Y) as ratios of GDP; and exogenous series central 
bank policy rate (CBPR) and seasonally adjusted real output gap (Y_gap) was 
conducted based on the Johansen Trace statistic and Max-Eigen statistic methods.  
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Table 12: Cointegration Test with Linear Deterministic Trend-Lag Interval: 1 to 1 
Null hypothesis (H0) 
Alternative hypothesis (H1) 
r = 0 
r = 1 
r ≤ 1 
r = 2 
Trace statistic 
Critical value (0.05) 
Prob.** 
49.656 
15.494 
0.000 
1.073 
3.841 
0.300 
Maximum-Eigen statistic 
Critical value (0.05) 
Prob.** 
48.583 
14.264 
0.000 
1.073 
3.841 
0.3002 
 denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significance level 
** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
The Johansen Trace test and Maximum-Eigen test statistics both indicate existence 
of 1 cointegrating equation. Rejection of the null hypothesis of no presence of a 
cointegrating relationship (r=0) between endogenous variables primary balance and 
public debt (as ratios of GDP) at 5% significance level was demonstrated by the 
computed Trace statistic (= 49.65697) greater than the critical value (= 15.49471; p < 
0.05) and Max-Eigen statistic (= 48.58367) larger than the analogous computed critical 
value (= 14.26460; p < 0.05). The presence of a cointegrating relationship between 
fiscal endogenous series primary balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio 
confirmed suitability of conducting fiscal sustainability analysis using the VEC model. 
The third assumption regarding deterministic trends in the data was chosen based on 
the rationale that the data series were trending, and the trends were stochastic.  
 
7.5. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Results on the optimum lag lengths presented in Table 13 were determined based on 
computed results of the LR, FPE, AIC, SIC, and HQ lag length selection methods.  
 
Table 13: Optimum Lag Length 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -219.3167 NA   2.589133  6.626963  6.822801  6.704560 
1 -215.9140  6.305080  2.636116  6.644529  6.970927  6.773858 
2 -208.2165  13.81025  2.366680  6.535778  6.992736  6.716839 
3 -204.6251  6.232059  2.399277  6.547797  7.135314  6.780589 
4 -164.8684   66.65103*   0.840388*   5.496128*   6.214204*   5.780652* 
5 -161.0411  6.191206  0.847877  5.501208  6.349843  5.837463 
6 -157.9167  4.870321  0.874548  5.526962  6.506157  5.914949 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; 
SC: Schwarz information criterion; and HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Results presented in Table 13 indicate that the optimum lag length of 4 was selected 
based on all the methods LR, FPE, AIC, SC, and HQ.  
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7.6. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) Estimates 
This section presents estimates of the VEC model, fiscal policy cyclicality measured 
based on variations of primary balance-to-GDP ratio and output gap levels and VEC 
Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald tests.   
 
Table 14: VECM Estimates 
Cointegrating Equation: 
Primary balance-to-GDP (-1)) 1 
d(Debt-to-GDP ratio (-1)) 
1.627 
(0.666) 
[2.441]*** 
Constant 0.854 
 
Error Correction: d(Primary balance-to-GDP) d(Debt-to-GDP, 2) 
Cointegrating Equation 
-0.696 
(0.114) 
[-6.095]*** 
0.218 
(0.043) 
[4.982]*** 
 
d(Primary balance-to-GDP(-1)) 
-0.176 
(0.121) 
[-1.449] 
-0.199 
(0.046) 
[-4.272]*** 
 
d(Debt-to-GDP(-1),2) 
-1.377 
(0.327) 
[-4.210]*** 
-0.226 
(0.125) 
[-1.803]* 
 
Constant 
-10.133 
(2.613) 
[-3.878] 
3.104 
(1.004) 
[3.091] 
 
Central Bank Policy Rate 
4.744 
(1.226) 
[3.868]*** 
-1.463 
(0.471) 
[-3.105]*** 
 
Output gap 
0.748 
(0.261) 
[2.859]*** 
-0.152 
(0.100) 
[-1.519] 
   
R-squared 
Adj. R-squared 
Sum sq. resids 
S.E. equation 
F-statistic 
Log likelihood 
Akaike AIC 
Schwarz SC 
Mean dependent  
S.D. dependent  
0.486 
 0.446 
 434.505 
 2.605 
 12.133 
-163.225 
 4.835 
 5.027 
 -0.065 
 3.502 
0.386 
 0.338 
 64.197 
 1.001 
 8.066 
-96.297 
 2.922 
 3.115 
 0.015 
 1.231 
( ) and [ ] represent standard errors and t-statistics; respectively 
 denotes significance at 5 percent significance level 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
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Estimates presented in the first segment of the VEC model were computed based on 
the first-step Johansen procedure to identify all cointegrating relations, and reflect the 
nature and magnitude of the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio on primary balance-to-GDP 
ratio. Results of the long-run component show a positive relationship between public 
debt ratio and primary balance and suggest that for every 1% increase in public debt-
to-GDP ratio, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio increased by an average of 1.62% 
over the period 1999q1 to 2016q2. The statistically significant positive coefficient of 
the long-run segment of the cointegrating equation demonstrates a significant positive 
relationship between primary balance and public debt ratio on which the vector was 
normalised. The cointegrating vector results reveal strong evidence of a significant 
positive and systematic reaction of primary balance to variations in public debt.  
 
Findings indicate evidence of consistency of South African government’s behaviour 
with the inter-temporal budget constraint and fiscal policy sustainability in the country. 
Concomitantly, results presented in the second segment of the model were computed 
based on the second-step of VAR in first and/or second differences, including the error 
correction term estimated from the first-step Johansen procedure. The error correction 
or cointegration term shows speed of adjustment at which a deviation by endogenous 
variables primary balance and public debt ratios from the long-run equilibrium path 
gradually corrects through a sequence of partial short-run adjustments. In other words, 
the error correction term shows the long-run behaviour of primary balance and public 
debt ratios towards convergence to their long-run cointegrating relationship.  
 
The occurrence of steady adjustment to the long-run equilibrium through the short-run 
partial adjustment mechanism was substantiated by the significant fiscal response to 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium path equal to -0.69. Results of the short-run 
dynamics of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio equation show that about 0.69% of the 
temporary deviation from long-run equilibrium relationship between primary balance 
and public debt was corrected through reductions in the primary balance ratio during 
the first quarter after occurrence of the deviation. Primary balance ratio deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium relationship were corrected by 0.69% reductions in primary 
balance ratio in the current quarter to restore the cointegrating relationship. The short 
run dynamics debt-to-GDP ratio equation results show that public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
on average, had to increase by 0.21% in the current period to restore the equilibrium.  
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Previous empirical studies (Tshiswaka-Kashalala, 2006; Burger, et al., 2011; Jibao, 
Schoeman & Naidoo, 2011; Calitz, Du Plessis, & Siebrits, 2013; Ganyaupfu, 2014) 
which assessed historical fiscal sustainability in South Africa overlooked the role 
played by monetary policy in influencing conditions in borrowing markets from which 
government finances its deficits through bond issues. To capture the exogenous effect 
of monetary policy stance on primary balance and public debt (as ratios of GDP), the 
central bank policy rate (CBPR) was integrated into the VEC model. Accordingly, the 
respective variable provided as a proxy for monetary policy stance.  
 
Results of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio equation show that central bank policy 
rate had statistically significant impacts on both primary balance-to-GDP ratio and 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, findings show that an increase or tightening in central 
bank policy rate by 1 percentage point led to about 4.7% upsurge in primary balance-
to-GDP ratio while public debt decreased by about 1.4% of GDP during the sample 
period 1999q1-2016q2. Since the largest proportion of government budget deficits are 
financed through borrowing from the domestic market, results suggest that monetary 
policy stance significantly influenced government behaviour and fiscal authorities’ 
efforts towards maintaining fiscal sustainability during the sample period under review.    
 
The short-run dynamics estimates show that output gap had a statistically substantial 
impact on primary balance-to-GDP ratio while the impact was insignificant on public 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Though statistically insignificant, the negative output gap coefficient 
in the short-run dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio equation indicates that positive 
output gap levels moderately reduced the average change in public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Correspondingly, the statistically significant and positive output gap coefficient in the 
primary balance-to-GDP equation indicates that positive output gap levels significantly 
increased the average change in primary balance as a ratio of GDP.  
 
Findings indicate evidence of countercyclicality behaviour of fiscal policy, implying that 
fiscal policy had an automatic stabilisation effect on debt accumulation. In conditions 
of destabilising shocks, effects of such shocks were possibly prevented from becoming 
distortive to macroeconomic stability during the period 1999q1-2016q2. Figure 20 
validates the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy by comparing variations between 
primary balance and output gap levels during the sample period under review.  
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Figure 20: Fiscal Policy Cyclicality 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations  
 
Figure 20 explores the cyclicality of South Africa’s fiscal policy over the period 1997q4 
to 2016q3 as demonstrated by variations and scatter plot between primary balance-
to-GDP ratio and output gap levels. Fiscal policy is regarded as counter-cyclical if 
primary deficit decreases (surplus increases) in periods with positive output gaps or if 
primary surplus decreases (deficit increases) in periods with negative output gaps. 
The Figure shows that South Africa experienced moderate down swings in productivity 
over the period 1997q4-2004q3. The economy noticeably experienced volatile primary 
surplus during the period 19947q4-2009q1, and persistent volatile primary deficit over 
the period 2009q1-2016q3. Output gap considerably remained negative during the 
period 1997q4-2004q2, vis-à-vis volatile primary surplus during the respective period. 
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The economy experienced a shock in production when output gap explosively grew 
from 0.66% in 2004q3 to 10.9% in 2004q4, and radically declined to 0.55% in 2005q1. 
Output gap remained positive and relatively stable during the period 2005q1-2008q3. 
The primary surplus-to-GDP ratio decreased from 2.5% in 2009q1 to -4.8% deficit level 
in 2009q2 following negative changes in output gap from 0.64% in 2008q3 to -4.93% 
in 2009q2. The output gap grew from -4.93% in 2009q2 to 0.14% in 2010q2 and 
remained marginally positive and stable while largely coupled with primary deficit 
during the period 2010q2-2016q3. The positive correlation coefficient equal to 0.217 
between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and output gap confirms that discretionary 
fiscal policy showed a tendency of counter-cyclicality over the period 1997q4-2016q3.     
 
The primary balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio equations VEC model 
estimates (Table 14) in VAR representation are provided in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: VAR Model - Substituted Coefficients 
Equation: Primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
              
6.7.2)(eqn*
1
(-2)Y_gap0.748(-2)CBPR*4.744
10.1332,1D/Yd*1.3771B/Yd*0.1760.8541D/Yd*1.627B/Y*0.696B/Yd


 
Equation: Public debt-to-GDP ratio 
              
6.7.3)(eqn*)2(463.1
2262,
(-2)Y_gap0.152CBPR*
3.1042,1D/Yd*0.1B/Yd*0.1990.8541D/Yd*1.6271B/Y*0.218D/Yd


 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews  
 
The VAR representation of the primary balance and debt equations (as ratios of GDP) 
presented in Table 15 show that a 1% increase in debt-to-GDP ratio led to an average 
increase in the primary balance ratio by about 1.62% of GDP in the long-run. Given a 
constant of 85.4%, a debt-to-GDP ratio of 45% leads to a long-run primary balance-
to-GDP ratio of 12.18%. Furthermore, a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% leads to long-
run primary balance ratio of 4.4%. The short-run dynamics of the primary balance ratio 
equation show that approximately 0.69% of the transitory deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between primary balance and debt ratios was corrected by 
reductions in primary balance ratio in the first quarter. In addition, a 1 percentage point 
increase in central bank policy rate led to about 4.74% average increase in primary 
balance ratio and about 1.46% average decline in debt ratio. The significant positive 
coefficient of output gap demonstrates that fiscal policy was indeed counter-cyclical. 
Following VEC estimation, system specification by variable yielded the functions. 
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Table 16: System Specification by Variable 
   
(6.7.2)eqn2)(Y_gap*2)(CBPR*
2),1((D/Yd*))1(B/Yd*)0.854))1((D/Yd*1.6271(B/Y*B/Y)d
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11121112

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

 
   
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
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Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
The system coefficients of equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) presented in Table 17 were 
estimated using the Least Squares method. Parameters -θ12 = 1.627 and -θ13 = 0.854 
of equations (6.7.2) and (6.7.3) measure the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. 
 
Table 17: System Estimation 
Estimation Method: Least Squares – Total system (balanced) observations 146 
Parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
12
  -0.696 0.114 -6.095 0.000 
11  -0.176 0.121 -1.449 0.149 
12  -1.377 0.327 -4.210 0.000 
11  -10.133 2.613 -3.877 0.000 
12  4.744 1.226 3.868 0.000 
13  0.748 0.261 2.859 0.005 
13  0.218 0.043 4.982 0.000 
21  -0.199 0.046 -4.272 0.000 
22  -0.226 0.125 -1.803 0.073 
21  3.104 1.004 3.091 0.002 
22  -1.463 0.471 -3.105 0.002 
23  -0.152 0.100 -1.519 0.131 
 
Panel A: Primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
Equation: d(B/Y) = 12 *(B/Y(-1) + 1.627*d(D/Y(-1)) + 0.854) + 11 *d(B/Y(-1)) + 12 *d(D/Y(-1),2) +  
11  + 12 *CBPR(-2)+ 13 *Output gap(-2) 
Adj. R-squared 0.446                  Mean dependent var -0.065 
S.E. of regression 2.605                  S.D. dependent var 3.502 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.858                  Sum squared resid 434.505 
 
Panel B: Public debt-to-GDP ratio    
Equation: d(D/Y,2) = 13 *( B/Y(-1) + 1.627*d(D/Y(-1)) + 0.854) + 21 *d(B/Y(-1)) + 22 *d(D/Y(-1),2) 
+ 21  + 22 *CBPR(-2) + 23 *Output gap(-2)  
Adj. R-squared 0.338     Mean dependent var 0.015 
S.E. of regression 1.001     S.D. dependent var 1.231 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.918     Sum squared resid 64.197 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
The Least-Squares system estimation version of the VEC model indicates that the 
coefficient of the error correction term equal to -0.696 was statistically significant at 
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1% level. In the short-run dynamics component of the model, estimated coefficients in 
the primary balance-to-GDP ratio equation were statistically significant at 1% level with 
the exception of the coefficient of the one-period lagged primary balance-to-GDP ratio. 
Similarly, coefficients in the debt-to-GDP ratio equation were statistically significant at 
1% level with the exception of the coefficients of the one-period lagged debt-to-GDP 
ratio and output gap. The adjusted R-squared values show that about 45% and 34% 
variations in primary balance and debt equations respectively were accounted for by 
variables captured in the respective equations. The Durbin Watson statistic for the 
primary balance and public debt ratios equations indicate absence of serial correlation.        
 
Following estimation of the fiscal reaction function using the VECM approach, the VEC 
Granger causality/Block Exogeneity test was conducted to determine the short run 
causality between primary surplus and public debt, as ratios of GDP.  
 
Table 18: VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Panel A – Dependent variable: d(Primary balance-to-GDP ratio) 
Excluded Chi-square  df Prob. 
d(Debt-to-GDP ratio,2) 
All 
17.729 
17.729  
1 
1 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel B – Dependent variable: d(Debt-to-GDP ratio,2) 
Excluded Chi-square df Prob. 
d(Primary balance-to-GDP ratio) 
All 
18.256 
18.256 
1 
1 
0.000 
0.000 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Results presented in Table 18 on joint tests p-values for each equation of primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio show that the respective variables 
were endogenous in nature. Panel A estimates indicate that the null hypothesis that 
public debt-to-GDP ratio does not Granger cause primary balance-to-GDP ratio in the 
short run was rejected at 1% significance level. The finding implies that the lagged 
difference of the debt-to-GDP ratio could not be excluded in the estimated differenced 
primary balance-to-GDP equation. Similarly, Panel B estimates indicate that null 
hypothesis that primary balance-to-GDP ratio does not Granger cause public debt-to-
GDP ratio in the short run was rejected at 1% significance level. Furthermore, results 
suggest that the lagged difference of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio could not be 
excluded in the differenced debt-to-GDP equation. Therefore, the short-run dynamics 
of the VEC model could not be estimated without lags of the endogenous variables. 
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Though results demonstrate evidence of short-run causality between primary balance 
and public debt, no information was provided on the impact of a shock or one-standard 
innovation in each of the variables on itself and another variable. To obtain such 
evidence, impulse response functions and variance decomposition analysis were 
conducted subsequent to tests of stability and residual properties of the VEC model. 
The roots characteristic polynomial VEC model stability test results are presented in 
Table 19 embedded with a diagrammatic representation depicted by Figure 20.    
 
Table 19: Roots of Characteristic Polynomial† 
Root Modulus 
1.000 1.000 
-0.738 0.738 
0.141 - 0.546i 0.564 
0.141 + 0.546i 0.564 
† VEC specification imposes 1 unit root(s)  
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Figure 20: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Results in Table 19 indicate that all roots have modulus less than one and generally 
lie inside the unit circle (Figure 20). The presence of 1-unit root satisfies the condition 
that when a VEC model has been estimated from a single cointegrating relation with 
two variables, then the characteristic polynomial should have 1 root equal to a unity. 
Thus, the moduli less than one inside the unit circle satisfied the stability condition.   
      
7.7. VEC Residual Diagnostic Tests 
Results on residual diagnostic tests examined to determine robustness of the model 
are presented in Table 20. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation was tested at 
lag order 3 while the joint Jacque-Bera test of the null hypothesis of model residual 
multivariate normality was tested based on Cholesky (Lutkepohl) Orthogonalization.   
- 147 - 
 
 
Table 20: VEC Residual Tests 
H1 H0 Test Statistic df Prob 
Serial correlation No serial correlation  LM-(χ2) 3.289 4 0.510 
Multivariate normality Normally distributed error term JB-Joint 5.456 4 0.065 
Heteroskedasticity No heteroskedasticity χ2 33.960 30 0.282 
 Source: Author’s Computations 
 
The estimated VEC model passed the residual diagnostic tests on serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity. The computed Lagrangian Multiplier statistic value equal to 
3.28 (p>0.5) was consistent with null hypothesis of no serial correlation while the VEC 
residual normality test conducted using the Cholesky (Lutkepohl) Orthogonalization 
method indicate that residuals were multivariate normal at 5% significance level.  
 
7.8. Impulse Response Functions 
The impulse responses of endogenous variables primary balance (B/Y) and debt (D/Y) 
ratios derived using orthogonalized Cholesky decomposition are shown in Figure 21.    
 
Figure 21: Response to a One S.D. through a 70 Quarter (1999q1-2016q2) Period 
Panel A: Response of B/Y) to a shock in (B/Y) Panel B: Response of (B/Y) to a shock in d(D/Y) 
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Panel C: Response of d(D/Y) to a shock in (B/Y) Panel D: Response of d(D/Y) to a shock in d(D/Y) 
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Source: Author’s Computations using EViews  
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Panel A shows that a shock to primary balance-to-GDP ratio had a significant negative 
impact on future primary balance-to-GDP ratio during the first two quarters. The impact 
of the shock caused profound deterioration in primary surplus from 2.6% in the 1st 
quarter to -0.34% in the 4th quarter. A statistically significant positive impact of 0.25% 
was realised from the 5th quarter in the short-run. The impact remained significantly 
positive with marginal variability through to the 13th quarter during the short- to medium 
term period. The long-run impact of a shock in primary surplus-to-GDP ratio on itself 
remained significantly positive at 0.1% along the equilibrium in the long-run.  
 
Panel B shows that a one standard innovation in public debt-to-GDP ratio initially had 
a statistically significant negative impact of -0.18% on future primary balance ratio 
during the 1st quarter in the short-run period. The impact became significantly positive 
at 0.93% in the 3rd quarter and fluctuated between 0.31% and 0.58% from quarter 4 
through to the 16th quarter in the medium term. Findings confirm results of Granger 
causality tests that provided strong evidence of existence of causality between the 
respective endogenous fiscal variables in the short-run period. From the 17th quarter, 
the long-run impact of a shock in public debt-to-GDP ratio on future primary balance-
to-GDP ratio remained significantly positive and constant at 0.47% in the long-run.  
 
Panel C demonstrates strong evidence that a shock emanating from primary balance-
to-GDP ratio had a statistically significant positive impact on future public debt-to-GDP 
ratio from -0.66% in the 1st quarter to 0.28% in the 3rd quarter during the short-run. The 
positive impact noticeably deteriorated from 0.16% in the 4th quarter and became 
insignificant to -0.00% in the 6th quarter. From the 7th quarter, the positive impact of a 
shock in primary balance to debt rebounded with minimal variation between 0.05% 
and 0.07% through to the 10th quarter in the short-run. The impact reverted to the 
equilibrium and remained significantly positive and constant at 0.06% in the long-run. 
 
Panel D indicates that a one standard innovation to debt-to-GDP ratio had a profoundly 
declining positive impact on debt-to-GDP ratio from 0.75% in the 1st quarter to 0.17% 
in the 4th quarter in the short-run. The impact remained positive and varied between 
0.26% and 0.33% through the period quarter 5 to quarter 16 in the medium term. From 
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the 17th quarter, the long-run impact of a shock in debt-to-GDP ratio on its future path 
remained significantly positive and constant at 0.29% in the long-run.  
7.9. VAR Cholesky Variance Decompositions 
Results on the VAR Cholesky variance decompositions of endogenous variables used 
in estimation of the VEC model are shown in Table 21 and Table 22. 
 
Table 21: Cholesky Variance Decomposition of Primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
Period S.E. (B/Y) d(D/Y) 
1  2.605  100.000  0.000 
5  2.962  83.372  16.627 
10  3.146  74.692  25.307 
15  3.329  67.158  32.841 
20  3.500  61.157  38.842 
25  3.664  56.186  43.813 
30  3.821  52.016  47.983 
35  3.971  48.465  51.534 
40  4.116  45.405  54.594 
45  4.256  42.742  57.257 
50  4.391  40.401  59.598 
55  4.523  38.329  61.670 
60  4.651  36.482  63.517 
65  4.775  34.824  65.175 
70  4.896  33.328  66.671 
Cholesky ordering: (B/Y), d(D/Y) 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
The variance decomposition of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio results presented in 
Table 21 show that fluctuations in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio were explained 
predominantly by shocks to primary balance-to-GDP ratio in the long-run. Primary 
balance-to-GDP shock accounted for 100% variation in itself in the first quarter while 
its proportion in the variance of primary balance-to-GDP ratio progressively decreased 
over time. The variance reached 67% in the 15th quarter, 52% in the 30th quarter, 42% 
in the 45th quarter, 36% in the 60th quarter, and 33% in the 70th quarter.  
 
The contribution of a shock to public debt-to-GDP ratio on variance of primary balance-
to-GDP ratio substantially increased over time from 0% in the first quarter to about 
25% in the 10th quarter in the short-run. The proportion of variance in primary balance-
to-GDP ratio emanating from a shock in debt-to-GDP ratio progressively increased 
over time to about 38% in the 20th quarter and 48% in the 30th quarter. The respective 
proportion breached the 50% mark through to 54% in the 40th quarter, 59% in the 50th 
quarter, 63% in the 60th quarter, and 67% in the 70th quarter. Therefore, the variance 
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in primary balance ratio in South Africa progressively became explained by the shock 
to public debt as a ratio of GDP in the long-run.  
Table 22: Cholesky Variance Decomposition of d(Debt-to-GDP ratio) 
 Period S.E. (B/Y) d(D/Y) 
 1  1.001  43.484  56.515 
 5  1.223  39.948  60.051 
 10  1.391  31.760  68.239 
 15  1.543  26.608  73.391 
 20  1.680  23.106  76.893 
 25  1.807  20.549  79.450 
 30  1.926  18.602  81.397 
 35  2.037  17.071  82.928 
 40  2.143  15.834  84.165 
 45  2.244  14.814  85.185 
 50  2.340  13.959  86.040 
 55  2.433  13.232  86.767 
 60  2.522  12.606  87.393 
 65  2.608  12.061  87.938 
 70  2.692  11.583  88.416 
Cholesky ordering: (B/Y), d(D/Y) 
Source: Author’s Computations using EViews 
 
Results of variance decomposition of public debt ratio presented in Table 22 indicate 
that the variation in public debt-to-GDP ratio was progressively explained largely by 
shocks to public debt ratio in the long-run. In the first quarter, a shock to public debt-
to-GDP accounted for about 57% variation in itself while the remaining proportion of 
approximately 43% was explained by primary balance-to-GDP ratio. The proportion of 
variance in public debt-to-GDP ratio emanating from a shock in public debt-to-GDP 
ratio consistently increased over time to about 77% in the 20th quarter, 84% in the 40th 
quarter; 87% in the 60th quarter and slightly to 88% in the 70th quarter. 
  
Conversely, the contribution of a shock to primary balance-to-GDP ratio on variance 
of public debt-to-GDP ratio moderately diminished over time from about 43% in the 
first quarter to approximately 32% in the 10th quarter. In addition, the proportion of 
variance in public debt ratio emanating from a shock in the primary surplus ratio 
consistently decreased as time progressed to approximately 23% in the 20th quarter, 
19% in the 30th quarter, and 16% in the 40th quarter. The proportion declined to 14% 
in the 50th quarter, 13% in the 60th quarter and ultimately 11% in the 70th quarter.  
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7.11. Conclusion 
This chapter provided econometric results of the fiscal reaction function estimated to 
assess whether the South African fiscal authorities historically reacted to public debt 
positions in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, the chapter took into account the 
exogenous short-run impact of monetary policy stance on positions of primary balance 
and public debt ratios during the sample period 1999q1-2016q2. The fiscal reaction 
function was estimated within the framework of the Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model to evaluate whether the government’s historical fiscal conduct was in line with 
the intertemporal budget constraint. The VEC model results indicate that fiscal policy 
was sustainable while monetary policy stance had significant impact on both primary 
balance and public debt positions during the sample period under review. Simulations 
of the impulse response functions provide strong evidence that the macroeconomy 
can correct itself from transitory deviations in the short-run to the medium term, and 
return to the long-run equilibrium path after occurrence of a shock. The next chapter 
provides the summary of major findings, conclusion, limitations of the research study, 
and recommendations for further research.        
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the primary findings from the study, conclusion, 
limitations of the study, and recommendations for further study. In line with the primary 
aim and research objectives of this study, Section 8.2 summarises the major findings 
of the study, Section 8.3 presents some policy implications, while Section 8.4 outlines 
key limitations of the study. Section 8.5 provides recommendations for further studies 
on fiscal sustainability, and Section 8.6 provides the overall conclusion to the study.  
 
8.2. Major Findings  
The Johansen cointegrating test results for the relationship between endogenous 
series primary balance-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio, and exogenous variables 
central bank policy rate and seasonally adjusted real output gap provided evidence of 
existence of a cointegrating relationship. Findings from the estimated VEC model’s 
long-run component computed based on the first-step Johansen procedure indicated 
that for every 1% increase in public debt-to-GDP ratio, the primary balance-to-GDP 
ratio increased by an average of about 1.62% during the sample period 1999 quarter 
1 to 2016 quarter 2. Findings indicate evidence of a significant positive relationship 
between the primary balance-to-GDP ratio and public debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, 
the primary balance-to-GDP ratio had a significant positive and systematic reaction to 
variations in the public debt-to-GDP ratio during the sample period under review.  
 
Results indicate evidence of consistency of South African government’s behaviour 
with the inter-temporal budget constraint and fiscal policy sustainability in the country. 
Concomitantly, results of the VEC model’s second segment computed based on the 
second-step of VAR, including the error correction term estimated from the first-step 
Johansen procedure, show that about 0.69% of the temporary deviation from the long-
run equilibrium relationship between primary balance and debt ratios was corrected 
by variations in primary balance in the first quarter after occurrence of the deviation.  
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Empirical results in this research study are consistent with findings from preceding 
similar studies (Tshiswaka-Kashalala, 2006; Burger, et al. 2011; Jibao, Schoeman and 
Naidoo, 2011; Ganyaupfu, 2014). Nonetheless, the respective previous studies did not 
integrate the exogenous impact of monetary policy stance in analysing the historical 
sustainability of fiscal policy in South Africa. In order to validate such a link between 
monetary policy and fiscal sustainability empirically, the exogenous effect of central 
bank policy rate (proxy for monetary policy stance) on primary surplus and public debt 
ratios were captured in the fiscal reaction function.  
 
Results of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio equation show that monetary policy 
stance had statistically significant impacts on both primary balance-to-GDP ratio and 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, findings provided evidence that an increase in central 
bank policy rate by 1 percentage point led to about 4.7% increase in the primary 
balance ratio, while public debt decreased by about 1.4% of GDP during the sample 
period 1999q1-2016q2. Since the largest proportion of government budget deficits are 
financed through borrowing from the domestic market, results suggest that monetary 
policy stance significantly influenced government behaviour and fiscal authorities’ 
efforts towards maintaining fiscal sustainability during the sample period under review.    
 
The short-run dynamics estimates show that output gap had a statistically significant 
impact on the primary surplus ratio, while the impact was insignificant on public debt 
ratio. Although statistically insignificant, the negative coefficient of output gap in the 
short-run dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio equation indicates that positive output 
gaps reduced the average change in debt-to-GDP ratio. Congruently, the significantly 
positive output gap coefficient on primary balance-to-GDP suggests that positive 
output gap levels significantly increased the average change in primary balances-to-
GDP ratio. Such findings provide evidence of countercyclicality nature of fiscal policy, 
signifying that fiscal policy had an automatic stabilisation effect on debt accumulation.  
 
The cyclicality of the country’s discretionary fiscal policy was validated by comparing 
variations between primary balance and output gap levels during the respective 
sample period. Graphical expositions were used to explore cyclicality of the country’s 
fiscal policy by exploring variations between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and output 
gap levels during the period 1997q4 to 2016q3. Findings show that the South Africa 
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economy experienced marginal down swings in productivity during the period 1997q4-
2004q3. The economy considerably experienced volatile primary surplus during the 
period 1997q4-2009q1 and persistent volatile primary deficit during 2009q2-2016q3. 
However, the output gap remained significantly negative during the period 1997q4 to 
2004q2 vis-à-vis volatile primary balance-to-GDP ratio over the same period.  
 
As time progressed, the economy experienced a shock in production when output gap 
explosively grew from 0.66% in 2004q3 to 10.9% in 2004q4, and drastically declined 
to 0.55% in 2005q1. Output gap remained positive and relatively stable during the 
period 2005q1-2008q3. The primary balance-to-GDP ratio decreased from 2.5% in 
2009q1 to -4.8% deficit level in 2009q2 following negative changes in output gap from 
0.64% in 2008q3 to -4.93% in 2009q2. Output gap grew from -4.93% in 2009q2 to 
0.14% in 2010q2 and remained marginally positive and stable while largely coupled 
with primary deficit over the period 2010q2-2016q3. The estimated positive correlation 
coefficient between primary balance-to-GDP ratio and output gap confirms that fiscal 
policy was counter-cyclical in nature in South Africa over the period 1997q4-2016q3.     
 
Results of the VEC Granger causality/Block Exogeneity test conducted to determine 
the short-run causality between primary balance and public debt ratios show that null 
hypotheses of no Granger-causality between the respective variables was rejected for 
both equations. Findings indicated that the lagged difference of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
could not be excluded in the estimated differenced primary balance-to-GDP equation 
while the lagged difference of the primary balance ratio could also not be excluded in 
the differenced debt-to-GDP equation. Results show that the short-run dynamics of 
the model could not be estimated without lags of the respective endogenous variables.  
   
Results of impulse response functions and variance decomposition conducted after 
confirmation of the model stability show that a shock to primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
had a significant negative impact on future primary balance-to-GDP ratio during the 
first two quarters. The impact of the shock caused profound deterioration in primary 
balance from 2.6% in the first quarter to -0.34% in the fourth quarter. Therefore, a 
statistically significant positive impact of 0.25% was realised from the fifth quarter in 
the short-run. The impact remained significantly positive with marginal variability 
through to the 13th quarter during the short- to medium term period. Finally, the long-
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run impact of a shock in primary balance ratio on itself remained significantly positive 
at 0.1% along the equilibrium path in the long-run.  
 
A shock to public debt-to-GDP ratio initially had a significant negative impact of -0.18% 
on future primary balance during the first quarter in the short-run. The impact became 
significantly positive at 0.93% in the third quarter and fluctuated between 0.31% and 
0.58% from quarter 4 through to quarter 16 in the medium term. From the seventh 
quarter, the long-run impact of a shock in debt-to-GDP ratio on future primary balance-
to-GDP ratio remained significantly positive and constant at 0.47% in the long-run. 
 
A shock to primary balance-to-GDP ratio had a statistically significant positive impact 
on future public debt-to-GDP ratio from -0.66% in the first quarter to 0.28% in the third 
quarter in the short-run. The positive impact noticeably deteriorated from 0.16% in the 
fourth quarter and became insignificant to -0.00% in the sixth quarter. From the 
seventh quarter, the positive impact of a shock in primary balance to public debt 
rebounded with minimal variation between 0.05% and 0.07% through to the 10th 
quarter in the short-run period. The impact reverted to the equilibrium path and 
remained significantly positive and constant at 0.06% in the long-run. 
 
The impulse response functions further show that a shock to public debt-to-GDP ratio 
had a profoundly deteriorating positive impact on debt-to-GDP ratio from 0.75% in the 
first quarter to 0.17% in the fourth quarter in the short-run. In addition, the impact 
remained positive and fluctuated between 0.26% and 0.33% through the period 
quarter 5 to quarter 16 in the medium term. From the seventh quarter, the long-run 
impact of a shock in public debt-to-GDP ratio on its future path remained significantly 
positive and constant at 0.29% in the long-run.  
 
The variance decomposition of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio results show that 
fluctuations in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio were explained predominantly by 
shocks to primary balance-to-GDP ratio in the long run. Primary balance-to-GDP 
shock accounted for 100% variation in itself in the first quarter while its proportion in 
the variance of primary balance-to-GDP ratio progressively decreased over time. 
Concomitantly, the contribution of a shock to public debt-to-GDP ratio on variance of 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio substantially increased over time from 0% in the first 
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quarter to about the highest level of 67% in the 70th quarter. Therefore, variance in 
primary balance ratio progressively became substantially explained by the shock to 
public debt ratio in the long-run. 
 
Results of variance decomposition of public debt-to-GDP ratio indicate that variation 
in debt-to-GDP ratio was progressively explained largely by shocks to debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the long run. In the first quarter, a shock to public debt-to-GDP accounted for 
about 57% variation in itself. The proportion of variance in public debt-to-GDP ratio 
emanating from a shock in the same variable consistently increased over time to about 
88% in the last 70th quarter of the sample period. Conversely, the contribution of a 
shock to the primary balance ratio on variance of the debt ratio moderately diminished 
over time from about 43% in the first quarter to about 11% in the 70th quarter. 
 
8.3. Policy Implications   
The findings of this research study on sustainability of the country’s fiscal policy have 
some considerable policy implications for both fiscal and monetary authorities. Based 
on the mainstream postulation on fiscal sustainability, the government is considered 
similarly as a household that faces budget constraints and maximise utility subject to 
budget constraint by smoothing spending throughout the lifecycle. The mainstream 
concept underscores that some adjustable optimum levels of savings are incessantly 
required to maximise utility of households. Linking the same concept to government 
fiscal behaviour faced with given investment and production functions, interest rates 
higher than the growth rates (r > g) imply low levels of savings while interest rates 
lower than growth rates (r < g) imply higher levels of savings required for investment. 
 
The unceasingly widening differential between the interest rate and real GDP growth 
rate (Figure 1.2) since the fourth quarter of 2013 triggers serious concerns about 
sustainability of the country’s fiscal policy in the long-run. Since an explosion in public 
debt commonly occurs when r > g, the consistent upsurge in public debt-to-GDP ratio 
from an all-time low of 22% in 2008 quarter 4 to 46% in 2013 quarter 3 coupled with 
primary deficits signifies a potential risk to sustainability of South Africa’s fiscal policy. 
Unremittingly rising government debt levels have a substantial crowding-out effect on 
investment and production in the economy. In light of the backdrop of such economic 
developments of interest rates higher then growth rates (r > g) and incessantly rising 
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public debt levels, it is necessary for the fiscal authorities to closely monitor changes 
in interest rates and growth, and determine the need to run a primary surplus or deficit.  
 
Though South Africa’s fiscal supervision framework is anchored on sound institutional 
arrangements, the country’s fiscus is faced with contingent and accrued liabilities risks 
attributed to government guarantees of funding to numerous State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) with weak financial positions. The presence of a significant number of public 
enterprises currently in need of financial bailouts to meet operating cost and debt 
obligations, and working capital requirements has heightened the country’s fiscal risk 
of guarantee exposure. The weak financial positions of SOEs, coupled with sustained 
pressure on social spending programmes, require fiscal authorities to implement and 
consistently monitor fiscal austerity measures in order to maintain fiscal sustainability. 
Although the scope for government expenditure cuts remains much limited in respect 
of South Africa, the government need to consider public spending priorities carefully 
and avoid populist spending in order to ensure economic growth and development.  
 
The finding that a tight monetary policy stance led to increases in primary balance-to-
GDP ratio, and reduced public debt-to-GDP ratio suggest that government need to 
coordinate with the monetary authorities in managing sovereign debt to ensure fiscal 
sustainability. Since the broad macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy are to 
ensure price stability and promote growth, fiscal authorities should consistently give 
attention to changes in monetary policy stances when making fiscal adjustments. 
Monetary authorities should prudentially determine the growth of monetary base 
independently of financing needs of the fiscus through influencing financing conditions 
in domestic capital market where the bulk of government borrowing occurs. Therefore, 
such monetary policy measures can induce government to reduce its budget deficit in 
line with available financing and help to reduce the debt burden in the economy.  
 
The statistically significant short-run exogenous effect monetary policy stance has on 
primary surplus and public debt further demonstrates that need for harmonisation of 
fiscal and monetary policies to contain pressure on inflation and interest rates. Lack of 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies can cause the nation to experience 
slow output growth which can further lead to declining tax revenues and rising public 
debt, thereby undermining sustainability of fiscal policy. Hence, consistent policy mix 
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between monetary and fiscal policies remains vital in public debt management if both 
fiscal sustainability and price stability are to be consistently maintained.  
 
8.4. Limitations of the Study  
The major limitation encountered in this research study was unavailability of a longer 
period data for the primary balance-to-GDP ratio series. In addition, the relatively small 
sample period 1997q quarter 4 to 2016 quarter 4 covered in the study was restricted 
to the starting date from which data for primary balance ratio and public debt ratio was 
available from SARB and IMF historical time-series data sources. The South African 
government started publishing primary balance data in quarter 4 of 1997 in the Budget 
Review. However, for this study, the time series sample epoch was restricted to the 
period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. In light of such background, the empirical 
validity of findings of this study are only restricted to the system-adjusted sample 
period 1999 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 2. Therefore, results reported in this research 
study cannot be generalised in other time horizons outside the sample period covered 
in this research study.     
   
8.5. Recommendations for Further Research 
Consistent with numerous previous empirical studies conducted across countries in 
different continents and regions, further studies on fiscal sustainability in South Africa 
should estimate several models using different fiscal indicators. Specifically, the 
numerous fiscal indicators that can be computed and used include government 
revenue, expenditure, public debt, primary balance, net asset accumulation, overall 
balance, adjusted budget balance, structural balance, fiscal stance, and fiscal 
sustainability index. Since fiscal sustainability is not a fiscal issue purely exclusive from 
monetary policy, a number of monetary policy-related variables that influence the fiscal 
behaviour of government should be incorporated as exogenous variables in fiscal 
policy sustainability models. Such variables include inflation, real exchange rate, 
money growth rate, monetary policy interest rate, financing conditions (spreads and 
threshold balances) and dummy variables such as central bank independence and 
changes in political developments. 
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The studies should also apply different time-series estimation techniques in assessing 
historical sustainability of fiscal policy. Different linear and nonlinear techniques that 
can be applied include the following: 
 Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration tests.  
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  
 Regime-Switching Model Based Sustainability (RS-MBS).  
 Smooth Transition Regression (STR).  
 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).  
 Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model.  
 Markov Switching Criterion (MSC).  
 Vector Auto-Regression (VAR).  
 Two-Step Engle-Granger Error Correction Model (ECM).  
 Monte Carlo Simulations.  
 Bounds Testing ARDL.  
 Bayesian VAR.  
 Structural VAR.  
 Linear Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (LSTECM).  
 Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM).   
 
8.6. Conclusion 
This research study estimated a fiscal reaction function using a Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) model approach to examine whether the South African government historically 
reacted to its public debt positions in a sustainable manner. The fiscal reaction function 
empirically explored the link between fiscal policy and monetary policy stance in 
ensuring fiscal policy sustainability in context of South Africa. In order to explore such 
link, which was overlooked by previous empirical studies on fiscal policy sustainability 
in South Africa, the “central bank policy rate” was incorporated as an exogenous 
variable in the fiscal reaction function to assess the exogenous impact of monetary 
policy stance on primary balance and public debt ratios positions during the sample 
period 1999q1-2016q2.  
 
The overall findings indicate that fiscal policy in the country was sustainable while 
monetary policy stance had significant impacts on both primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
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and public debt-to-GDP ratio positions during the sample period under review. Thus, 
the discretionary fiscal policy demonstrated a tendency of countercyclicality and had 
an automatic stabilisation effect on public debt accumulation. Simulations of impulse 
response functions provide strong evidence that the economy can correct itself from 
temporary deviations in the short-run, and revert to the long-run equilibrium path after 
occurrence of a shock.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Seasonal Graphs - Primary balance and Public debt (as % of GDP) 
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Appendix 2: VEC Cointegrating Graph 
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Appendix 3: Correlograms 
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Appendix 4: Residual Graphs – Primary balance and Public Debt (as % of GDP) 
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Appendix 5: Cholesky Impulses Response Function (Cholesky – dof adjusted) 
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Appendix 6: Cholesky Variance Decomposition 
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